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Integrating two evolutionary models for the study of social cognition

In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 363--369 (2002)

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  1. Pour une approche évolutionniste de la cognition animale.Édouard Machery - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):731-746.
    Cet article recense et discute le récent livre de Joëlle Proust, Les animaux pensent-ils ?. Proust s'appuie sur les récents développements en psychologie animale et en éthologie pour fournir des réponses nouvelles à des questions philosophiques traditionnelles, comme « les animaux pensent-ils » ou « les animaux parlent-ils ? ». Ce livre est à recommander aussi bien aux étudiants qu'aux chercheurs confirmés. Toutefois, malgré son intérêt, je souligne une limite critique de l'approche de Proust : plusieurs arguments souffrent du fait (...)
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  • Mirror, Mirror in the Brain, What's the Monkey Stand to Gain?Colin Allen - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):372 - 391.
    Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called "mirror neurons" in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionahty, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical (...)
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  • A skeptic's progress.Colin Allen - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):695-702.
    Seven chimpanzees in twenty-seven experiments run over the course of five years at his University of Louisiana laboratory in New Iberia, Louisiana, are at the heart of Daniel Povinelli’s case that chimpanzee thinking about the physical world is not at all like that of humans. Chimps, according to Povinelli and his coauthors James Reaux, Laura Theall, and Steve Giambrone, are phenomenally quick at learning to associate visible features of tools with specific uses of those tools, but they appear to lack (...)
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  • Animal consciousness.Colin Allen & Michael Trestman - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.