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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Buddhist Philosophy of Logic.Koji Tanaka - 2013 - In Emmanuel Steven Michael (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 320-330.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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Logic isn’t normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Hartry Field - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind.Nick Zangwill - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.details
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Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.details
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Against Reflective Equilibrium for Logical Theorizing.Jack Woods - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):319.details
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Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form.Jack Woods - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1667-1680.details
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The effects of source trustworthiness and inference type on human belief revision.Ann G. Wolf, Susann Rieger & Markus Knauff - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (4):417-440.details
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Epistemic subjectivism.Roger White - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):115-129.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism.Gregory Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):315-328.details
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The Role of Naturalness in Lewis's Theory of Meaning.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (10).details
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Memory, belief and time.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):692-715.details
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Centrality and marginalisation.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):517-533.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
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Methods of Representation as Inferential Devices.Matías Osta Vélez - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (2):231-245.details
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What reasoning might be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):293-307.details
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Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.details
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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.details
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Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations.Borut Trpin & Max Pellert - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):977-1001.details
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Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.details
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Another Particularism: Reasons, Status and Defaults.Alan Thomas - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):151-167.details
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Philosophy and machine learning.Paul Thagard - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):261-76.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
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Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353-374.details
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No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.details
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Inferential and non-inferential reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.details
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Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
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Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):453-473.details
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Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
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Reasons without principles.Herman E. Stark - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):143 – 167.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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Stich`s The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.Miriam Solomon - 1994 - Informal Logic 16 (2).details
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