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  1. Invariance and Logicality in Perspective.Gila Sher - 2021 - In Gil Sagi & Jack Woods (eds.), The Semantic Conception of Logic : Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13-34.
    Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a purely mathematical interest, it has developed into a criterion of considerable linguistic and philosophical interest. In this paper I compare two different perspectives on this criterion. The first is the perspective of natural language. Here, the invariance criterion is measured by its success in capturing our linguistic intuitions about logicality and explaining our logical behavior in natural-linguistic settings. The second perspective is more theoretical. Here, the invariance criterion (...)
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  • Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form.Jack Woods - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1667-1680.
    I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be (...)
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  • A Defense of the Kripkean Account of Logical Truth in First-Order Modal Logic.M. McKeon - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):305-326.
    This paper responds to criticism of the Kripkean account of logical truth in first-order modal logic. The criticism, largely ignored in the literature, claims that when the box and diamond are interpreted as the logical modality operators, the Kripkean account is extensionally incorrect because it fails to reflect the fact that all sentences stating truths about what is logically possible are themselves logically necessary. I defend the Kripkean account by arguing that some true sentences about logical possibility are not logically (...)
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  • Paul Karl Feyerabend Las proyecciones de la proliferación teórica en la relación ciencia-metafísica.María Teresa Gargiulo de Vázquez - 2015 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 32 (1).
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  • Logical Truth.Paal Fjeldvig Antonsen - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):187-201.
    On the model-theoretic account, a sentence is logically true just in case it is true on all possible semantic interpretations. We dierentiate four ways one can interpret the modality 'possible' in this definition, and argue that one of these readings is not subject to the criticism levelled against the model-theoretic account by Etchemendy. By explicating the four readings we also draw some consequences for what linguistic evidence a selection of logical theories should be sensitive to.
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