This article is an attempt to present the critics that Galen made against ancient atomist theory based largely on his theory of elements. For Galen, the problem of irreducible complexity in nature can’t be explained by the atomist theory, especially when the issue is concerned with a metaphysical discussion in the context of philosophy of nature. Yet for him the subject of change in nature was not explicitly formulated by proponents of atomism. For this being the case, by criticizing atomism, (...) Galen tries to formulate a syncretic theory which is mostly an amalgamation of Aristotle and Hippocrates’ views. His theory is a frame in which like-elements affect the likes through a presupposed ‘leap’ between them that is largely related to krasis; which eventually makes the change, bodily sensibility and lastly the pain possible. Therefore, it is imperative that one embraces a transient theory like that of the combination of Aristotle-Hippocrates’s, instead of a closed-theory such as atomism. Taken into consideration from the point of philosophy of nature, Galen would come to the terms with a teleological causality instead of mechanical one. All combined, Galen’s mentioned understandings has led him to bring serious criticism against the atomist theory which can be seen as the extension of his medical-philosophy project. (shrink)

The paper examines the conception of health of the Graeco-Roman medical and philosophical author Galen. On the basis of a range of texts, especially Matters of Health and Thrasybulus, the most significant and influential characteristics of this conception are considered: the twofold definition of health in terms of balance of elements and of organic function; the notion of a latitude within health; the extent to which health is conceived as a specialist expertise, and against this the possible role of the (...) patient in understanding his/her own health. Galen's health writings are also considered in their social-historical context and in relation to their intellectual predecessors – Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle and a range.. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider points of intersection between the Aristotelian and the Galenic notions of ‘ power of the seed’ and some of the key issues and key concepts developed within the power -structuralism paradigm and try to understand whether, and to what extent, the conceptual lens provided by the power -structuralism hypothesis may help us to shed fresh light on aspects of both the Aristotelian and the Galenic theory of the seed, which are still unclear or highly controversial, (...) like the role played by the female in the generative process; to better understand how much the Aristotelian and the Galenic theories of the seed have in common and, on the other hand, to what extent and in what regard they differ when it comes to considering the metaphysics of powers, which both theories are grounded upon. Specifically, I explore how far Marmodoro's theory of ‘ power -structuralism ontology’ can help us to make better sense of this metaphysics. I suggest that this theory helps us to recognize, below the s. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 62, Issue 1, pp 69 - 89 Galen’s physiology—his theory of elements, mixtures and the emergence of natural capacities—compels him to conceive of each part of the soul as a peculiar mixture of elementary qualities in the material substance of the organ in which it is located. The reason why Galen, nevertheless, refrains from making a dogmatic assertion about the substance of the soul, or of human nature in general, is the acknowledged failure to account for two (...) goal-directed activities—the formation of bodily organs and human intelligence—in terms of elementary qualities and their mixtures. (shrink)

This paper aims to assess the epistemological value of the notion of sympathy in Galen’s thought. It first shows that Galen makes use of two different concepts of sympathy: the ambient concept, according to which the human body manifests a harmonious part-whole relationship, and the technical concept, with which one connects two pathologies on the basis of the fact that the cause of the ailment is elsewhere than where it surfaces. Neither of these sympathies constitutes in itself a causal explanation (...) of reality. The first merely acknowledges an obvious interrelationship, the second acts as an epistemic tool to shift the focus of diagnosis away from the place where the condition manifests itself. However, the two concepts are not absolutely unrelated; and they come together when the sympathetic paradigm is used to understand the unifying action of the psychic and natural faculties. Very significantly, Galen then provisionally defines the cause as a power or faculty (δύναμις) not out of theoretical necessity but for practical reasons. (shrink)

After a quick overview on the specification of the causal role of the powers or faculties (δυνάμεις) in nutrition, from the Hippocratic physicians to Galen, via Aristotle, the article defines the set of questions about this process that the Hippocratic physicians leave open. It then examines how Aristotle provides some sort of indirect physical and ethical answers, while Galen openly takes the side of reappropriating the central Stoic concept of oikeiôsis in a Platonist way.