Recent work by Ingmar Persson and Jason Hanna has posed an interesting new challenge for deontologists: How can they account for so-called cases of letting oneself do harm? In this article, I argue that cases of letting oneself do harm are structurally similar to real-world cases such as climate change, and that deontologists need an account of the moral status of these cases to provide moral guidance in real-world cases. I then explore different ways in which deontologists can solve this (...) challenge and argue that the most promising way to conceive of cases of letting oneself do harm is as nonstandard cases of allowing harm, supplemented with an additional argument for the moral relevance of one's own agency. The upshot is that cases of letting oneself do harm are both more theoretically challenging and practically important than has been acknowledged. (shrink)

It is typically wrong to act in a way that foreseeably makes some impending harm worse. Sometimes it is permissible to do so, however, if one also offsets the harm increasing action by doing something that decreases the badness of the same harm by at least as much. This chapter argues that the standard deontological constraint against doing harm is not compatible with the permissibility of harm increases that have been offset. Offsetting neither prevents one's other actions from doing harm (...) nor ensures that the harm those actions do is made permissible by any of the constraint's familiar provisos. To make sense of offsetting, the old constraint against doing harm should be replaced with a new constraint against making unoffset harm increases. The chapter discusses how to formulate the new constraint so that it can handle both the offsetting cases that the old constraint gets wrong as as well as the non-offsetting cases that the old constraint gets right. Adopting this constraint against unoffset harm increases may have important implications both for theoretical questions about the sources of deontological constraints as well as for practical questions, such as whether buying carbon offsets can make emitting carbon dioxide permissible. (shrink)

In the article, the scenario-moulding is evaluated through the linguistic and conceptual accessibility of the future and the moral challenges of doing and allowing harm to the future participants of the practical discourses rooted in the present-centered scenarios. The viability of the scenarios is suggested to be defined by the alienation from the present and past imaginative contexts, as well as by overcoming the projections of humanity exclusiveness through inversible forecasting with the shift from human power to vulnerability as the (...) key issue in scenario-making. The eccentric approach to the future makes it possible to review both intergenerational and intragenerational perspectives of the future through the chronological distance and yet-inexistent subjects’ expectations and needs simulation. Taking to account the impact of the past, present and future otherness implies the three-dimensional assessment model involving metaphorical evaluation of the past-rooted patterns as paradise lost, illusions of the accessible futures as paradise found, and refusal of the futurized present expectations for the yetunknown imaginative future contexts as paradise conceptually postponed. The approach can find its practical application in tailoring and evaluating migration solutions and scenarios. (shrink)