This article explores the educative importance of ethos from a broadly philosophical perspective. It is argued that, for a range of reasons, the notion of ethos in the context of education needs to be brought into clearer focus. An analysis is offered of the concept of ethos, with particular reference to the context of classrooms and schools. The educative importance of ethos is explored, with reference to a range of difficulties and challenges which it presents.

The purpose of this article is to show that Piaget's use of the equilibrium principle cannot explain the possibility of correct understanding. That is, it cannot explain the possibility of knowledge, as opposed to simple change in belief. To make the argument, I begin by describing Piaget's explanatory model, which is known as the equilibrium principle. I then argue that correct understanding, or knowledge of any x as a case of y, requires a concept of correctness, i.e., the recognition that (...) words and concepts apply under some conditions but not others. I try to show that because he uses the equilibrium principle as a basis for his explanation, Piaget cannot explain how a concept of correctness is acquired. Finally, I argue that to explain the possibility of knowledge, one must show how the conditions for word and concept application are determined by a community of language users. Again, I claim that Piaget's use of the equilibrium model precludes such an account. (shrink)

In an epistemology of contextualism, how robust does consensus need to be for critique to be practically effective? In ‘Relativism and the Critical Potential of Philosophy of Education’ Frieda Heyting proposes a form of contextualism, but her argument raises a number of problems. The kinds of criteria that her version of contextualism will furnish provide, at best, the potential only for an immanent form of critique from within a particular practice, and the possibility that practitioners alone will adopt a general (...) stance of critique. By their nature, the criteria that Heyting endorses will be too transient and ephemeral to assist in any larger project that might be aimed at making effective criticism of the status quo. Further problems are exposed to do with the conditions needed to make critique effective when Heyting's normative argument is situated in the Realpolitik of contemporary education. Drawing on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, and in a manner intended to be complementary to Heyting's normative argument, the paper offers some suggestions regarding the role that doubt might play in justifying criticisms of the status quo. (shrink)

I offer a novel defence of radically externalist theories of perception, via a strikingly spare and broadly physicalist metaphysics. The core, motivating claim is what I call a natural view of perception, according to which perception involves direct awareness of our environment, such that the phenomenology of experience consists of the worldly things perceived, as they appear to the perspective of the subject. To underpin this natural view, I propose a simple metaphysical picture of perception, which identifies the perceptual experience (...) with the relation of awareness holding between subject and object, a relation that can be described in familiar physical terms as a causal process involving the thing perceived and the perceiver. Distinctively, the simple metaphysical picture has no place for the notion of ‘experiences’ understood as distinctively ‘mental’ states or events internal or otherwise belonging to the subject. Although there is some limited precedent for the simple metaphysical picture of perception, I offer the first detailed argument for its role in underpinning the natural view. The thesis offers new and detailed arguments to show that the simple metaphysical picture can not only account for normal perceptual experiences, but can also accommodate and explain other forms of sensory experience that have widely been considered to undermine the natural view of perception. These ‘problem’ cases include perceptual illusion, hallucination, and the role of memory and beliefs in influencing how things appear perceptually. In all of these cases, the simple metaphysical picture accounts for the phenomenology of the experience purely in terms of awareness of worldly objects, albeit in some cases objects that are not currently present in the subject’s environment. The simple metaphysical picture thus promises to explain not just perceptual experience but phenomenal consciousness more generally. The natural view is explicitly a commitment of some varieties of naïve realism, but I argue that the two theses come apart. For one thing, the simple metaphysical picture offers a solution to hallucination and other ‘problem’ cases quite different to the solutions offered by naïve realists. However, the most striking and novel claim advanced here is that the natural view can be defended without a commitment to realism. In this regard, I cite evidence for the subject-relativity or experience-dependence of certain perceived qualities, notably colour, and show the simple metaphysical picture allows us to square this with the natural view that colours are ‘out there’ in the environment. I discuss the metaphysical implications of rejecting realism while adhering to the simple metaphysical picture, and outline a radical – and radically simple – metaphysics of the world in general that might preserve the natural view and accommodate the simple metaphysical picture of phenomenal consciousness more generally. This metaphysics takes the form of a process monism in which the governing metaphysical structuring principle is one of top-down determination, such that whole processes determine the nature of their constituent parts. (shrink)