A teoria schopenhaueriana da justiça se estabelece de forma negativa: a noção de injustiça é primitiva e positiva, e a de justiça é secundária e negativa. A injustiça é a invasão no domínio onde se afirma a vontade do outro: uma ação injusta é aquela que consiste na destruição ou ferimento do corpo do outro, ou então na redução das forças desse corpo ao seu próprio serviço. O objetivo da legislação estatal é, assim, apenas evitar a injustiça e não realizar (...) a justiça. O Estado é uma instituição protetora, necessária devido aos ataques múltiplos aos quais o homem é exposto e dos quais ele não pode se defender senão por uma aliança com os outros. Schopenhauer ainda critica a visão daqueles que consideram o Estado como o propósito máximo da existência humana e a condição da liberdade e da moralidade. Trata-se de uma concepção de Estado “ultramínimo” cuja base é um certo pessimismo antropológico, já que “a necessidade do Estado repousa, em última instância, na reconhecida injustiça do gênero humano, sem o que não se teria pensado jamais num Estado” . O objetivo do presente artigo é investigar as bases e as consequências da teoria da justiça de Schopenhauer e ver como essa visão se sai diante do debate contemporâneo sobre a justiça.For Schopenhauer the concept of injustice is the original, while the opposite concept of right is the derivative and negative. Injustice is the quality of an individual’s conduct in which he extends the affirmation of the will that appears in his own body so far that it becomes the denial of the will that appears in the bodies of other. The concept of right contains merely the negation of wrong or injustice, and under it is subsumed every action which is not a denial of another’s will for the stronger affirmation of one’s own. The aim of the positive legislation is to avoid injustice and not to realize justice. The State is essentially a mere institution for protecting all from external attacks and individuals from attacks within its borders and Schopenhauer criticizes the view that represents the State as the highest purpose and the flower of human existence, and hence as the condition of freedom and morality. This is a conception of the ultra-minimum State which is based on an anthropological pessimism for “the necessity of the State rests ultimately on the acknowledged injustice and unfairness of the human race” . We shall discuss Schopenhauer’s negative doctrine of justice in relation to contemporary debate on justice. (shrink)

In this thesis I offer an interpretation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimism. I argue against interpreting Schopenhauer’s pessimism as if it were merely a matter of temperament, and I resist the urge to find a single standard argument for pessimism in Schopenhauer’s work. Instead, I treat Schopenhauer’s pessimism as inherently variegated, composed of several distinct but interrelated pessimistic positions, each of which is supported by its own argument. I begin by examining Schopenhauer’s famous argument that willing necessitates suffering, which I defend (...) against the misrepresentative interpretation advocated by Ivan Soll. I also offer a metaphysical reading of Schopenhauer’s claim that no amount happiness can compensate for the mere fact of suffering, based upon his negative conception of happiness. I proceed by analysing Schopenhauer’s criticisms of two prominent optimists, Leibniz and Rousseau. I attempt to salvage something of Schopenhauer’s counterargument against Leibniz that this is the worse of all possible worlds, and I also examine Schopenhauer’s claim that the optimistic metaphysics of a priori rationalistic philosophy cannot cope with the evidence of meaningless suffering. In the case of Rousseau, I interpret Schopenhauer’s brief objection to Rousseau’s assumption of original goodness, by means of an examination of Schopenhauer’s conception of the contrary doctrine, original sin. Next I consider the metaphysics of Schopenhauer’s account of eternal justice. After defending it against a number of objections, I argue that the nature of his version of eternal justice, which he admits constitutes a justification for suffering, does not conflict with the fact that he so strongly condemns Leibniz’s and Rousseau’s optimistic justifications for suffering. Finally I assess whether and to what extent Schopenhauer’s ethics of salvation are either pessimistic or optimistic. I conclude that the mere fact that salvation is possible is not necessarily a cause for optimism, but that Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation is made partly optimistic by the higher form of cognition that he describes as part of it. I also argue that Schopenhauer’s views on the essentially mystical nature of the state of salvation ultimately commit him to being neither positively optimistic nor positively pessimistic about salvation. I conclude overall with some brief remarks about the meaning of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, and how in spite of its diverse nature, it is able to lay down a singular challenge to all future philosophers concerned with the question of suffering. (shrink)