Although there is a long tradition, going back at least to the tenth century, that would see Aristophanes' Birds as somehow related to the exile in Lacedaemon of Alcibiades, and to the fortification of the Attic township of Decelea by his Spartan hosts , current scholarship surrounding Birds is firmly in the hands of those who are antipathetic to seeing the creation of Cloudcuckooland in terms of a political allegory. ‘The majority of scholars today…flatly reject a political reading’; Birds has (...) ‘no strong and obvious connection with a topical question of public interest’; ‘attempts to find in Birds any extensive allegorical comment…are unconvincing’. Not only is it widely believed that ‘Birds… is strangely free of political concerns’. but also that ‘the theme of the Birds is absurdity itself…it is about meaninglessness’ . This is a tradition that descends from A. W. von Schlegel, for whom Birds was ‘merely a “Lustspiel”, full of imagination and the marvellous, with amusing touches at everything, but with no particular object’. This approach was reinforced by the fact that by the second half of the nineteenth century, the allegorists had apparently spun out of control. By 1879, there were no fewer than 79 accounts of the Tendenz of the Birds —some political, some ‘escapist fantasy’–on offer. The most influential allegorical interpretation of Birds was J. W. Suvern's study of 1826, but which is now generally dismissed, and only mentioned to be held up as a warning to those who might be tempted to take the allegorical route. This paper takes a different point of departure, namely Pierre Brumoy's Le thétre des grecs , an allegorical treatment that is full of good sense, and which was too hastily dismissed by Suvern, and ignored by others. (shrink)

Although there is a long tradition, going back at least to the tenth century, that would see Aristophanes'Birds(performed in the spring of 414 B.C.) as somehow related to the exile in Lacedaemon of Alcibiades, and to the fortification of the Attic township of Decelea by his Spartan hosts (Arg. Av. 1 Coulon), current scholarship surroundingBirdsis firmly in the hands of those who are antipathetic to seeing the creation of Cloudcuckooland in terms of a political allegory. ‘The majority of scholars today…flatly (...) reject a political reading’;Birdshas ‘no strong and obvious connection with a topical question of public interest’; ‘attempts to find inBirdsany extensive allegorical comment…are unconvincing’. Not only is it widely believed that ‘Birds… is strangely free of political concerns’. but also that ‘the theme of theBirdsis absurdity itself…it is about meaninglessness’ (ibid. 179). This is a tradition that descends from A. W. von Schlegel, for whomBirdswas ‘merely a “Lustspiel”, full of imagination and the marvellous, with amusing touches at everything, but with no particular object’. This approach was reinforced by the fact that by the second half of the nineteenth century, the allegorists had apparently spun out of control. By 1879, there were no fewer than 79 accounts of theTendenzof theBirds—some political, some ‘escapist fantasy’–on offer. The most influential allegorical interpretation ofBirdswas J. W. Suvern's study of 1826, but which is now generally dismissed, and only mentioned to be held up as a warning to those who might be tempted to take the allegorical route. This paper takes a different point of departure, namely Pierre Brumoy'sLe thétre des grecs(Paris, 1730), an allegorical treatment that is full of good sense, and which was too hastily dismissed by Suvern, and ignored by others. (shrink)

A much-discussed fragment of Phrynichos’ comedy Monotropos, together with the comments of the scholiast on Aristophanes who preserves it, have often been taken to indicate that at some point before the production of the play, in spring 414 B.C., the Athenian politician Syrakosios moved a decree that restricted the right of comic playwrights to satirize individual Athenians. The relevant passage reads as follows.

A much-discussed fragment of Phrynichos’ comedy Monotropos, together with the comments of the scholiast on Aristophanes who preserves it, have often been taken to indicate that at some point before the production of the play, in spring 414 B.C., the Athenian politician Syrakosios moved a decree that restricted the right of comic playwrights to satirize individual Athenians. The relevant passage reads as follows.

This paper is based on two separate, though partly overlapping, registers of male Athenian citizens known to have been in the public eye between theyears 432/1 and 405/4 B.C., inclusive. Register I comprises those who are known inthis period to have held important elective public office, or to have proposed andcarried resolutions in the Assembly; a total of 176 persons. These are singled out fromthe much wider range of ‘officials’, most of them chosen by lot, to be found in theprosopography (...) of Develin 1989, because they are those who actively, and in somemeasure successfully, competed for the political favour of the Athenian public. Theimportant elective public offices I take to be those of general, proboulos , member of any embassy, and delegate for swearing to an international treaty. Register II comprises those who are known in this period to have been referred to asindividuals in Athenian comedies; a total of 224 persons. Both lists inevitably havesomewhat fuzzy edges, mainly over questions of identification and dating; doubtfulcases are briefly discussed in the notes to the Registers. Probably no other scholar willagree with every one of my decisions in these matters, but the general validity of thepicture here presented is unlikely to be affected. Within Register II can be identifiedtwo small but important subgroups: those who are referred to not, as is normal, fordisparagement but for praise; and those to whom is devoted an entire play or a largepart of one. I will be returning to these. (shrink)

This paper is based on two separate, though partly overlapping, registers (Registers I and II) of male Athenian citizens known to have been in the public eye between theyears 432/1 and 405/4 B.C., inclusive. Register I comprises those who are known inthis period to have held important elective public office, or to have proposed andcarried resolutions in the Assembly; a total of 176 persons. These are singled out fromthe much wider range of ‘officials’, most of them chosen by lot, to (...) be found in theprosopography of Develin 1989, because they are those who actively, and in somemeasure successfully, competed for the political favour of the Athenian public. Theimportant elective public offices I take to be those of general, proboulos (in 413–411), member of any embassy, and delegate for swearing to an international treaty. Register II comprises those who are known in this period to have been referred to asindividuals in Athenian comedies; a total of 224 persons. Both lists inevitably havesomewhat fuzzy edges, mainly over questions of identification and dating; doubtfulcases are briefly discussed in the notes to the Registers. Probably no other scholar willagree with every one of my decisions in these matters, but the general validity of thepicture here presented is unlikely to be affected. Within Register II can be identifiedtwo small but important subgroups: those who are referred to not, as is normal, fordisparagement but for praise; and those to whom is devoted an entire play or a largepart of one. I will be returning to these. (shrink)

Ecclesiazusae, the first surviving work of Aristophanes from the fourth centuryb.c.e., has often been dismissed as an example of Aristophanes’ declining powers and categorized as being less directly rooted in politics than its fifth-century predecessors owing to the after-effects of Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Arguing against this perception, which was largely based on the absence of ad hominem attacks characterizing Aristophanes’ earlier works, this paper explores howEcclesiazusaeengages with contemporary post-war Athenian politics in a manner which, while different to (...) his earlier comedies, remained closely rooted in the political and cultural concerns of the 390s. By examining the figure of Praxagora, I will first consider recent suggestions thatEcclesiazusaehints at the possibility of an anti-democratic coup. I will then examine how contemporary discussions of constitutional and legal reforms (including the invocation of ‘founding fathers’ such as Solon and Lycurgus) are incorporated into both Praxagora's language and the scenes featuring the Selfish Man and Hags that follow the establishment of Praxagora's regime. Examining these final scenes, I conclude thatEcclesiasuzaedoes not suggest that the idea of democratic equality itself is fundamentally flawed, but instead argues that Athens needs a suitable leader, well suited to the rough and tumble of assembly rhetoric, in order to successfully function. In the world ofEcclesiazusae,the men of Athens have failed too often to inspire any hope, putting their own interest above the state, and the new leader must be someone different. Thus Aristophanes sets up Praxagora as a female Solon to remake the state and lead the democracy. The second half of the play demonstrates this need for a strong leader, as problems arise both from the quarter of critical bystanders (the Selfish Man and Epigenes, the Young Man in the ‘hag scene’) and from over-zealous enforcers (the Old Women). (shrink)

This article explores the ideological origins of the American free-speech tradition. It analyzes the two principal categorizations of free speech in classical antiquity: isegoria, the right to voice one’s opinion, and parrhesia, the license to say what one pleases often through provocative discourse, thus grounding modern free-speech epistemology and jurisprudential philosophy in a sociohistorical context. Part 1 reviews the First Amendment corpus juris. A progression of incrementally absolute judicial holdings promotes parrhesia, highlighting democratic utility over individual self-actualization; thus, Americans no (...) longer view freedom of speech as an end ipso facto. While Athenian democracy recognized the need for provocative speech, certain institutional and social constraints, such as dokimasia, established standards of truth and accountability. Part 2 frames the historical developments of isegoria and parrhesia for modern analysis. The author begins by discussing isegoria’s principal aims, namely, promoting individual self-actualization and effective democratic governance. The European free-speech tradition, which views the individual as the locus of power, favors the former. The American tradition, which ‘depersonizes’ civil liberties such that the collective becomes the locus of control, favors the latter. Part 3 identifies the colonial developments in Anglo-American history that account for present-day U.S. free-speech permissiveness. It shows that the American preference for parrhesia-based absolutism was born from British imperialism and censorship. Part 4 suggests a need to reexamine free speech-understandings in the context of new-media proliferation and digital content regulation. The dominance of U.S.-based social media companies injects the American speech tradition into cultures with disparate free-speech philosophies and practices. (shrink)

In Knights, Aristophanes represents the dangers of parrhēsia run amuck with the near-destruction of an elderly man’s Athenian household by Paphlagon. In this setting, Paphlagon’s invocations of his own parrhēsia and goodwill become a destructive form of flattery, causing chaos in the household and threatening its viability. This article begins with a discussion of the problem of parrhēsia in democratic Athens and the ways in which Cleon exemplified those problems. Moving to an examination of Aristophanes’ Knights, the author tracks the (...) playwright’s exploration and response. Aristophanes uses the figure of the elderly Demos as a metaphor for the decline of the city, allowing him to both critique the demos and to align himself with it. Moreover, even as he must win the audience over in order to achieve the theatrical success he craves, Aristophanes removes himself from the perverse logic of dēmophilia-turned-pandering by claiming to be motivated not by goodwill for the audience, but by his hatred of Cleon, an enemy shared by both the playwright and the city. (shrink)

The proposition that man is the only animal capable of laughter is at least as old as Aristotle. In a strictly physical sense, this is probably false; but it is undoubtedly true that as a psychologically expressive and socially potent means of communication, laughter is a distinctively human phenomenon. Any attempt to study sets of cultural attitudes towards laughter, or the particular types of personal conduct which these attitudes shape and influence, must certainly adopt a wider perspective than a narrowly (...) physical definition of laughter will allow. Throughout this paper, which will attempt to establish part of the framework of such a cultural analysis for the Greek world of, broadly speaking, the archaic and classical periods, ‘laughter’ must be taken, by a convenient synecdoche, to encompass the many behavioural and affective patterns which are associated with, or which characteristically give scope for, uses of laughter in the literal sense of the word. My concern, then, is with a whole network of feelings, concepts and actions; and my argument will try to elucidate the practices within which laughter fulfils a recognizable function in Greek societies, as well as the dominant ideas and values which Greek thought brings to bear upon these practices. The results of the enquiry will, I believe, give us some reason to accept a rapprochement between the universalist assumption for which my epigraph from Johnson speaks and the recognition of cultural specificity in laughter's uses for which many anthropologists would argue, as emphatically asserted, from a Marxizing point of view, in the quotation from Vladimir Propp. (shrink)

The proposition that man is the only animal capable of laughter is at least as old as Aristotle . In a strictly physical sense, this is probably false; but it is undoubtedly true that as a psychologically expressive and socially potent means of communication, laughter is a distinctively human phenomenon. Any attempt to study sets of cultural attitudes towards laughter, or the particular types of personal conduct which these attitudes shape and influence, must certainly adopt a wider perspective than a (...) narrowly physical definition of laughter will allow. Throughout this paper, which will attempt to establish part of the framework of such a cultural analysis for the Greek world of, broadly speaking, the archaic and classical periods, ‘laughter’ must be taken, by a convenient synecdoche, to encompass the many behavioural and affective patterns which are associated with, or which characteristically give scope for, uses of laughter in the literal sense of the word. My concern, then, is with a whole network of feelings, concepts and actions; and my argument will try to elucidate the practices within which laughter fulfils a recognizable function in Greek societies, as well as the dominant ideas and values which Greek thought brings to bear upon these practices. The results of the enquiry will, I believe, give us some reason to accept a rapprochement between the universalist assumption for which my epigraph from Johnson speaks and the recognition of cultural specificity in laughter's uses for which many anthropologists would argue, as emphatically asserted, from a Marxizing point of view, in the quotation from Vladimir Propp. (shrink)

In the famous and widely cited opening of hisSatires 1.4, Horace states :Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetaeatque alii quorum comoedia prisca uirorum est,si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus ac fur,quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioquifamosus, multa cum libertate notabant. 5.

Punning on names was common in Old Comedy. Aristophanes punned on the name of Lamachus, who died at Syracuse. In the same play he made the famous joke, ‘some went to Kamarina, others to Gela, and some to Katagela’—‘an invention of the poet's from the fact that the men's officers laughed at them’.

Plato’s treatment of poetry is usually discussed without reference to other contemporary reception of Greek poetry, leading to divergent political or aesthetic accounts of its meaning. Yet the culture of the Greek polis, in particular Athens, is the defining context for understanding his aims. Four distinct points are made here, and cumulatively an interpretation of Plato’s opposition to poetry: on the basis of other evidence, including Aristophanes’ Frogs, that Plato would quite reasonably understand poetry to claim the craft of looking (...) after a city ; that Socrates makes a rival claim that philosophy is the pursuit of this skill; that Plato considers the poets, owing to this rivalry, to aim to exclude philosophy from Athens; and finally, that Plato’s exclusion of poetry from the theoretical just city of the Republic is part of his defence of the possibility of philosophy in Athens. (shrink)

Las comedias de Aristófanes del periodo cleoniano, que se centran en polémicas políticas, emplean una misma técnica de apertura: el primer personaje protagónico que sale a escena en el prólogo representa la posición política defendida en la pieza y actúa como su principal portavoz. La prioridad en el orden de aparición genera en el público una empatía por los personajes que inauguran la obra porque estos acceden a un contacto inicial, cómplice, con el público y pueden asentar su postura antes (...) que los antagonistas, que siempre ocupan la escena con posterioridad. Además, gracias al carácter convencional del recurso, el espectador ya podría anticipar con seguridad, desde la apertura misma de la pieza, cuál sería la postura defendida en la obra. Este recurso contribuye, por lo tanto, a limitar las ambigüedades propias de toda ficción literaria, favorece la estrategia persuasiva de la pieza y genera efectos argumentativos sobre los espectadores. (shrink)