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  1. Review of John Hacker-Wright (Ed.): Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue, 2018. [REVIEW]Sascha Settegast - 2019 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 2 (2):391-397.
  • Nothing in Ethics Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution? Natural Goodness, Normativity, and Naturalism.Jay Odenbaugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1031-1055.
    Foot , Hursthouse , and Thompson , along with other philosophers, have argued for a metaethical position, the natural goodness approach, that claims moral judgments are, or are on a par with, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically, an organism’s flourishing is characterized by how well they function as specified by the species to which they belong. In this essay, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of (...)
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  • Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Indeterminacy Objection.Scott Woodcock - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):20-41.
    Philippa Foot’s virtue ethics remains an intriguing but divisive position in normative ethics. For some, the promise of grounding human virtue in natural facts is a useful method of establishing normative content. For others, the natural facts on which the virtues are established appear naively uninformed when it comes to the empirical details of our species. In response to this criticism, a new cohort of neo-Aristotelians like John Hacker-Wright attempt to defend Foot by reminding critics that the facts at stake (...)
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  • Human Nature and Moral Sprouts: Mencius on the Pollyanna Problem.Richard T. Kim - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):140-162.
    This article responds to a common criticism of Aristotelian naturalism known as the Pollyanna Problem, the objection that Aristotelian naturalism, when combined with recent empirical research, generates morally unacceptable conclusions. In developing a reply to this objection, I draw upon the conception of human nature developed by the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, and build up an account of ethical naturalism that provides a satisfying response to the Pollyanna Problem while also preserving what is most attractive about Aristotelian naturalism.
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  • Nature, Feminism, and Flourishing: Human Nature and the Feminist Ethics of Flourishing.Celeste D. Harvey - 2016 - Dissertation, Marquette University
    This dissertation examines the viability of a feminist ethic of flourishing. The possibility of a eudaimonist, or flourishing-based, ethic adapted for the needs of feminist ethics and politics has recently been raised by a number of feminist moral philosophers. However, in these discussions, the degree to which an ethic of flourishing requires a substantive conception of human nature has not been adequately addressed. Flourishing-based ethical theories appear to require a substantive account of the kind of thing whose flourishing is to (...)
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  • Moral Reasoning as Naturally Good: A Qualified Defense of Foot's Conception of Practical Rationality.Steven Hendley - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):427-449.
    Philippa Foot 's version of ethical naturalism, centered on the idea of “natural goodness,” has received a good deal of critical scrutiny. One pervasive criticism contends that less than virtuous modes of conduct may be described as naturally good or, at least, not naturally defective on her account. If true, this contradicts the most ambitious aspect of Foot 's naturalistic approach to ethics: to show that judgments of moral goodness are a subclass of judgments of natural goodness. But even if (...)
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  • Must Realists Be Skeptics? An Aristotelian Reply to a Darwinian Dilemma.Micah Lott - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):71-96.
    In a series of influential essays, Sharon Street has argued, on the basis of Darwinian considerations, that normative realism leads to skepticism about moral knowledge. I argue that if we begin with the account of moral knowledge provided by Aristotelian naturalism, then we can offer a satisfactory realist response to Street’s argument, and that Aristotelian naturalism can avoid challenges facing other realist responses. I first explain Street’s evolutionary argument and three of the most prominent realist responses, and I identify challenges (...)
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  • Why Be a Good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature.Micah Lott - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):761-777.
    The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who (...)
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  • Good Reasons and Natural Ends: Rosalind Hursthouse's Hermeneutical Naturalism.Sascha Settegast - 2020 - In Martin Hähnel (ed.), Aristotelian Naturalism: A Research Companion. Springer. pp. 195-207.
    My aims are exegetical rather than critical: I offer a systematic account of Hursthouse's ethical naturalism with an emphasis on the normative authority of the four ends, and try to correct some misconceptions found in the literature. Specifically, I argue that the four ends function akin to Wittgensteinian hinge-propositions for our practice of ethical reasoning and as such form part of a description of the logical grammar of said practice.
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  • Natural Goodness Without Natural History.Parisa Moosavi - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human action and character is an evaluation of natural goodness—a kind of evaluation that applies to living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo‐Aristotelian view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history, or the ‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that this conception of natural goodness commits the neo‐Aristotelian view to a problematic (...)
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  • Gute Gründe Und Natürliche Zwecke: Rosalind Hursthouses Beitrag Zum Ethischen Naturalismus.Sascha Settegast - 2017 - In Martin Hähnel (ed.), Aristotelischer Naturalismus. Springer. pp. 173-183.
    A revised and expanded English version was published as "Good Reasons and Natural Ends: Rosalind Hursthouse's Hermeneutical Naturalism", in M. Hähnel: Aristotelian Naturalism. A Research Companion, Springer 2020.
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  • Ethical Naturalism and the Justification of Claims About Human Form.Jessy Jordan - 2016 - Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 55 (3):467-492.
    Recent defenders of Philippa Foot, such as Michael Thompson and John Hacker-Wright, have argued that it is a mistake to think that Ft aims to justify a substantive conception of human soundness and defect. instead, she relies on the acceptance of certain groundless moral norms to underwrite her views about what is characteristically human. I maintain that this is a weakness and that the Footian-style proponent of natural normativity needs to provide a story about how we might achieve justified self-confidence (...)
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