This paper considers the medium of videogames from a goodmanian standpoint. After some preliminary clarifications and definitions, I examine the ontological status of videogames. Against several existing accounts, I hold that what grounds their identity qua work types is code. The rest of the paper is dedicated to the epistemology of videogaming. Drawing on Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin's works, I suggest that the best model to defend videogame cognitivism appeals to the notion of understanding.

This paper reflects on the problem of endowing Artificial Intelligence with legal subjectivity, especially with regard to civil law. It is necessary to reject the myth that the criteria of legal subjectivity are sentience and reason. Arguing that AI may have potential legal subjectivity based on an analogy to animals or juristic persons suggests the existence of a single hierarchy or sequence of entities, organized according to their degree of similarity to human beings; also, that the place of an entity (...) in this hierarchy determines the scope of subjectivity attributed to it. Rather, it is participation or presence in social life, whatever the role, that is the true criterion of subjectivity. In addition, it is clear that even if AI is not currently a significant participant in social life, it will be in the nearest future. Despite the potential dangers associated with endowing AI with some kind of subjectivity, such a course is inescapable, and should be considered sooner rather than later. (shrink)

This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things (...) as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one’s own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein’s remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language. (shrink)

In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the (...) latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed. (shrink)

For me, personally, Wittgenstein’s philosophy poses the greatest challenge: if he is right, the sort of philosophy I am attempting to do is impossible. Wittgenstein argued powerfully that there can be no such thing as a general philosophical theory of language, mind, consciousness, society, and so on. I wanted and still do want to do precisely that: to present a general philosophical theory of language, mind, consciousness, society, and so on.

Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism is, I argue, compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘Be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant X-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.

Michael Polanyi’s conceptions of tacit knowing and emergent being are used to correct a reductionism that developed from, or reacted against, the excesses of several Cartesian assumptions: (a) the method of universal doubt; (b) the emphasis on reductive analysis to unshakeable foundations, via connections between clear and distinct ideas; (c) the notion that what is real are the basic atomic substances out of which all else is composed; (d) a sharp body-mind substance dualism; and (e) the notion that the seat (...) of consciousness can be traced to a point in the human body. The reductivist project in biology began with the emphasis Descartes put on the body as a machine. Polanyi reappropriates the machine metaphor to demonstrate how mechanistic explanations are not fully reductive. He shows how an eliminative materialism that would reduce mind to brain is unwarranted if either an interlevel mechanistic reduction or an intralevel successional reduction is posited. (shrink)

According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a (...) blind spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects. (shrink)

I address the question of whether naturalism can provide adequate means for the scientific study of rules and rule-following behavior. As the term "naturalism" is used in many different ways in the contemporary debate, I will first spell out which version of naturalism I am targeting. Then I will recall a classical argument against naturalism in a version presented by Husserl. In the main part of the paper I will sketch a conception of rule-following behavior that is influenced by Sellars (...) and Haugeland. I will argue that rule-following is an essential part of human nature and insist in the social dimension of rules. Moreover, I will focus on the often overlooked fact that genuine rule-following behavior requires resilience and presupposes an inclination to calibrate one's own behavior to that of the other members of the community. Rule-following, I will argue, is possible only for social creatures who follow shared rules, which in turn presupposes a shared (first-person plural) perspective. This implies, however, that our scientific understanding of human nature has to remain incomplete as long as it does not take this perspective, which prima facie seems alien to it, into account. (shrink)

The non-alethic systems N1 of da Costa and A of Grana are both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Based on them, a multi-agent doxastic logic NADK can be obtained by logical expansion. The soundness and completeness of NADK are proved and its special theorems are also presented. In this logic, the belief version of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, as well as the principle of explosion are all invalid. Therefore, it may provide a reliable logical basis for any theory which (...) has paraconsistent or paracomplete epistemic conflicts, such as true contradictions, true contrarieties, and belief paradoxes. We also explain in detail how a non-alethic doxastic logic provides a reliable logical basis for tolerating these three types of epistemic conflicts. The present paper is the deepening and development of system N1 and A. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it with Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this reconstruction and a (...) series of examples, I demonstrate that a basic formal structure recurs in cases of discursively repressed moral injury, namely, a particular kind of dilemma. I argue that appreciating this dilemma pushes us in the direction of a form of non-ideal ethical theory and I conclude by elaborating a conception of moral reflective judgement that begins from particular experiences of moral injury and moves towards the creation of new moral universals. (shrink)

Mathematics achievement in different education systems around the world is assessed periodically in the Programme for International Student Assessment. PISA is deemed to yield robust...

This essay argues for a convergence between, on the one side, Foucault’s characterization of the care of the self as a way of overcoming the traps of anthropological sleep, and on the other side, Deleuze’s characterization of initiating becomings as a way of fleeing the traps of organization, a line of flight, becoming becoming. This convergence is defended on the basis of a Bergsonian ontology of becoming, and in particular, Bergson’s opposition to what he calls the retrograde motion of truth. (...) One result of this convergence is that a Wittgensteinian approach to the sense of life floats to the surface. A kind of mysticism. (shrink)

This paper discusses and brings into light Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophical thought as a movement from realism towards conventionalism. Taking into account both his early and later works, one can say that the early Wittgenstein was an exponent of realism- A philosophical position that claims reality to be objective/external and independent of us. We argue that, while language remained the central theme in his philosophy, Wittgenstein moved from realism to conventionalism in his later philosophy. Conventionalism is a philosophical (...) position that emphasizes on conventions and general agreements in a society rather than taking reality as external. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to show, first, that there is a misconception underlying two opposing readings of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, notably Kripke’s sceptical reading and Baker and Hacker’s reading. I believe that the correct characterization of this misunderstanding is the first step towards the correct way to read the rule-following considerations, since these readings are still subject to a philosophical confusion that Wittgenstein wants to dissolve. Then I present a commentary on the rule-following considerations inspired by the so-called resolute (...) reading, more precisely, by the idea that Wittgenstein’s main purpose is to undermine the philosophical illusion according to which we could contemplate our own practices from sideways on, that is, from a standpoint independent of all the human activities and reactions. In my reading I stress an often-neglected aspect of the rule-following considerations, namely the temporal aspect of language. (shrink)

Cosmos+Taxis published a special issue with a symposium discussing Robert Vinten's book Wittgenstein and the Social Sciences. The symposium was edited by Richard Eldridge and it contains contributions from Paul Roth (Distinguished Professor, UC Santa Cruz), Daniel Little (Professor, University of Michigan, Dearborn), Rafael Azize (Associate Professor, Federal University of Bahia), Richard Raatzsch (Professor, EBS Universität), and Rupert Read (Associate Professor, UEA) - with a response by Robert Vinten ('Response to Critics'). Within the issue the papers compare Wittgenstein's philosophy to (...) art, compare Wittgenstein to Brecht, and examine the nature of the social sciences. (shrink)

SUMMARY Major theories of philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind are examined on the basis of the fundamental questions of ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and logic. The result is the choice between language of eliminative reductionism and dualism, neither of which answers properly the relation between mind and body. In the search for a non–dualistic and non–reductive language, Wittgenstein’s notion of language–games as the representative links between language and the world is considered together with Peirce’s semeiosis of cognition. The result (...) is a redefined notion of cognition as the goal–oriented ability to instantiate strategies from the rules of the language–games. Cognition is considered within the four-dimensional languagegames: rules/strategies, primitive/complete language-games, family-resemblances/forms of life, and non-temporal continuum as the language-games’ modality. Cognition is seen as a continuum process of non–individualized elements that unites perception, volition, emotion, will and thought against the commonly accepted understandings of cognition in exclusive terms of perception and thinking. The alternative to the mind/body problem is the continuity of cognition where rules and strategies, syntax and semantics, are considered inseparable within language–games. This continuity of cognition is explained in terms of virtual (univocal) identity, replacing the old philosophical paradigm of the mind/body problem. -/- SOMMARIO Le teorie maggiori della psicologia filosofica e filosofia della mente sono esaminate a partire dalle questioni fondamentali di ontologia, metafisica, epistemologia, semantica e logica. Il risultato è la scelta tra un linguaggio riduzionista eliminativo e un dualismo che però non confronta in modo adeguato la relazione tra mente e corpo. Nella ricerca per un linguaggio non-dualistico e non-riduttivo, viene considerata la nozione del gioco linguistico di Wittgenstein come un legame rappresentativo tra il linguaggio e il mondo insieme con la semiosi cognitiva di Peirce. Il risultato è la nozione ridefinita della cognizione come abilità goal-orientata di creare le strategie dalle regole dei giochi linguistici. La cognizione è considerata entro le quattro dimensioni dei giochi linguistici: regole/strategie, giochi linguistici primitivi/completi, somiglianze di famiglia/forme di vita, e la continuità atemporale come la modalità dei giochi linguistici. La cognizione diventa un processo continuo degli elementi non-individualizzati che tende ad unificare la percezione, volizione, emozione, la volontà e il pensiero contro un concetto generalmente accettato di vedere la cognizione nei termini esclusivamente di percezione e di pensiero. L’alternativa al problema della mente/corpo è la continuità della cognizione, dove le regole e le strategie, la sintassi e la semantica, sono considerate inseparabili nei giochi linguistici. Questa continuità della cognizione è spiegata nei termini dell’identità virtuale (univoca) sostituendo un paradigma filosofico previo del problema della mente/corpo. (shrink)

This chapter from André Barata and José Manuel Santos´s (eds.) book Formas de Vida, Forms of Life, Formes de Vie involves a critical discussion of the political philosophies of Richard Rorty and Chantal Mouffe. Rorty and Mouffe have both developed similar kinds of liberal political visions and both have taken inspiration from Wittgenstein. However, it is doubtful whether any such vision can be found in Wittgenstein’s work. In fact, it will be argued here that Wittgenstein’s work contains tools for criticising (...) the work of Rorty and Mouffe. Wittgenstein made a more dramatic break with the philosophical tradition than either Rorty or Mouffe. (shrink)