Switch to: References

Citations of:

Moral status in virtue ethics

Philosophy 82 (3):449-473 (2007)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Reconsidering Approaches to Moral Status.Kristian Skagen Ekeli & Espen Gamlund - 2011 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (3):361 - 375.
    Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 361-375, October 2011.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
  • For the Sake of a Stone? Inanimate Things and the Demands of Morality.Simon P. James - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):384-397.
    Abstract Everyday inanimate things such as stones, teapots and bicycles are not objects to which moral agents could have direct duties; they do not have moral status. It is usually assumed that there is therefore no reason to think that a morally good person would, on account of her goodness, be disposed to treat them well for their own sakes. I challenge this assumption. I begin by showing that to act for the sake of an entity need not be to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Robot Rights? Towards a Social-Relational Justification of Moral Consideration.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (3):209-221.
    Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral consideration (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics and Abortion: Abortion Ethics Without Metaphysics? [REVIEW]R. Jo Kornegay - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):51-71.
    This essay explicates and evaluates the roles that fetal metaphysics and moral status play in Rosalind Hursthouse’s abortion ethics. It is motivated by Hursthouse’s puzzling claim in her widely anthologized paper Virtue Ethics and Abortion that fetal moral status and (by implication) its underlying metaphysics are in a way, fundamentally irrelevant to her position. The essay clarifies the roles that fetal ontology and moral status do in fact play in her abortion ethics. To this end, it presents and then develops (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why the Concept of Moral Status Should Be Abandoned.Oscar Horta - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):899-910.
    The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse & Glen Pettigrove - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • Cognitive Disability and Moral Status.David Wasserman - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Justice as a Virtue.Michael Slote - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.