Kant argues that we have a duty to perfect ourselves morally and promote the happiness of others. He also argues that we have an innate propensity to evil. Our duty to perfect ourselves suggests that we struggle with our innate propensity to wilfully deviate from doing our duty. And we do this when we struggle against the depravation of our heart, namely our propensity to reverse ‘the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice’, namely, our (...) propensity to wilfully comply with the principle of self-love and override the moral law. It seems, however, that education does not enable those concerned to fulfil their duties. It seems, instead, that education basically makes them efficacious with regard to desired ends and with the devised means. It seems, too, that education does not necessarily make it possible for those concerned with duty to perfect themselves morally and help others to do the same, which in turn suggests that those concerned are not being enabled to make themselves ‘as conscientious as possible in [their] moral self-examination’. I argue that education ought to enable those concerned to cultivate their moral strength to do so and enable others to do the same. (shrink)

This paper analyses the thorny interpretative puzzle surrounding the connection between humanity and the good will. It discusses this puzzle: if the good will is the only good without qualification, why does Kant claim that humanity is something possessing an absolute value? It explores the answers to this question within Kantian scholarship; answers that emanate from a commitment to the human capacity for freedom and morality and to actual obedience to the moral law. In its final analysis, it endorses Richard (...) Dean’s good will reading as the most reflective of Kant’s ethics. It claims that in order for a person to reach the moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law, he must always honour his duties to himself. Accordingly, it argues that before a person can be deemed as an object of respect, he must first respect the right of humanity in his own person. (shrink)

Kant and Butler have a sharp methodological conflict in justifying moral obligations. While Kant argues that moral obligations can only be grounded in a prior justifications rather than in anything empirical, Joseph Butler grounds moral obligations in the empirical knowledge of human beings. Despite the apparent radical difference, I argue that Kant agrees with Butler that moral obligations must be grounded in the understanding of human beings. They, however, fundamentally disagree about human nature, which generates their methodological conflict in studying (...) morality. For Kant, the essential attribute for human beings is autonomy, which presupposes independence from any particular experience. In contrast, Butler understands human nature as a system that includes different particular experience. Although there is no conclusive answer of the correct understanding of human nature, I suggest that Butler’s account of moral obligations is a plausible one that can be considered as a counterexample to Kant’s account. (shrink)