In medical practice, physicians are often faced with tough ethical and moral dilemmas, one such example is the reoccurring conflict between a patient’s hope and the truth. This paper explores two ethical dilemmas centered on compassion and the reduction of suffering: truth-telling with terminal patients and the clinical use of placebos. In each case the disclosure of truthful information could interfere with hope and suffering relief.

Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual's inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this article I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically valuable. I will argue that these options constitute the (...) foundations of a dilemma: either epistemic paternalism collapses into general paternalism, or a distinctive project of justified epistemic paternalism is implausible. (shrink)