Moral responsibility for outcomes in corporate settings can be ascribed either to the individual members, the corporation, or both. In the latter case, the relationship between individual and corporate responsibility has been approached as inversely proportional, such that an increase in individual responsibility leads to a corresponding decrease in corporate responsibility and vice versa. In this article, we develop a non-proportionate approach, where, under specific conditions, individual and corporate moral responsibilities interact dynamically, leading to a mutual enhancement of responsibility: the (...) more the corporation is responsible, the more the individuals become responsible and vice versa. We develop this mutually enhancing approach in terms of normative ascriptions of responsibility, while leaving aside empirical implications in terms of mutual awareness of responsibility between individuals and corporations. We explore conceptually the conditions and mechanisms that generate this mutual enhancement and also discuss the implications for research and practice. (shrink)

One way to allocate tasks to agents is by ascribing them obligations. From obligations to be, agents are able to infer what are the forbidden, permitted and obligatory actions they may perform, by using the well-known Meyer’s reduction from obligations to be to obligations to do. However, we show through an example that this method is not completely adequate to guide agents’ decisions. We then propose a solution using, instead of obligations, the concept of ‘responsibility’. To formalise responsibility we use (...) a multiagent extension of propositional dynamic logic as framework, and then we define some basic concepts, such as ‘agent ability’, also briefly discussing the problem of uniform strategies and a possible solution. In the last part, we show that our framework can be used in the specification of normative multiagent systems, by presenting an extensive running example. (shrink)

In the past half century, the theory of the firm has become a specific and prolific research field. However, the social ontology of this central institution of capitalism has never truly been the subject of investigation. I consider this negligence harmful for organizational economics and management and, more broadly, for the social sciences, notably because the first and central question raised by the theory of the firm relates to its nature: What is a firm? For this reason, I propose some (...) novel considerations for a social ontology of the firm by focusing on social emergence, reconstitution, the two-level institutional logic of the firm, complex organizational dynamics and interacting mechanisms, and power. (shrink)

The aim of the work is to provide a language to reason about Closed Interactions, i.e. all those situations in which the outcomes of an interaction can be determined by the agents themselves and in which the environment cannot interfere with they are able to determine. We will see that two different interpretations can be given of this restriction, both stemming from Pauly Representation Theorem. We will identify such restrictions and axiomatize their logic. We will apply the formal tools to (...) reason about games and their regulation. (shrink)