This book presents a collection of studies by Romanian philosophers, addressing foundational issues currently debated in contemporary philosophy of science. It offers a historical survey of the tradition of scientific philosophy in Romania. It examines some problems in the foundations of logic, mathematics, linguistics, the natural and social sciences. Among the more specific topics, it discusses scientific explanation, models, and mechanisms, as well as memory, artifacts, and rules of research. The book is useful to those interested in the philosophy of (...) real science, but also to those interested in Romanian philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues against the view that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.

The best developed formulation of closed system quantum theory that handles multiple-time statements, is the consistent (or decoherent) histories approach. The most important weaknesses of the approach is that it gives rise to many different consistent sets, and it has been argued that a complete interpretation should be accompanied with a natural mechanism leading to a (possibly) unique preferred consistent set. The existence of multiple consistent sets becomes more problematic because it allows the existence of contrary inferences [1]. We analyse (...) the conceptual difficulties that arise from the existence of multiple consistent sets and provide a suggestion for a natural set selection criterion. This criterion does not lead to a unique physical consistent set, however it evades the existence of consistent sets with contrary inferences. The criterion is based on the concept of preclusion and the requirement that probability one propositions and their inferences should be non-contextual. The allowed consistent sets turn-out to be compatible with coevents which are the ontology of an alternative, histories based, formulation [2–4]. (shrink)

A probabilistic propositional logic, endowed with a constructor for asserting compatibility of diagonalisable and bounded observables, is presented and illustrated for reasoning about the random results of projective measurements made on a given quantum state. Simultaneous measurements are assumed to imply that the underlying observables are compatible. A sound and weakly complete axiomatisation is provided relying on the decidable first-order theory of real closed ordered fields. The proposed logic is proved to be a conservative extension of classical propositional logic.

A hidden-variable model for quantum–mechanical spin, as represented by the Pauli spin operators, is proposed for systems illustrating the well-known no-hidden-variables arguments by Peres (Phys Lett A 151:107–108, 1990) and Mermin (Phys Rev Lett 65:3373–3376, 1990) and by Greenberger et al. (Bell’s theorem, quantum theory, and conceptions of the universe, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1989). Both arguments rely on an assumption of non-contextuality; the latter argument can also be phrased as a non-locality argument, using a locality assumption. The model suggested here is (...) compatible with both assumptions. This is possible because the scalar values of spin observables are replaced by vectors that are components of orientations. (shrink)

The traditional analysis of the basic version of the double-slit experiment leads to the conclusion that wave-particle duality is a fundamental fact of nature. However, such a conclusion means to imply that we are not only required to have two contradictory pictures of reality but also compelled to abandon the objectiveness of the truth values, “true” and “false”. Yet, even if we could accept wave-like behavior of quantum particles as the best explanation for the build-up of an interference pattern in (...) the double-slit experiment, without the objectivity of the truth values we would never have certainty regarding any statement about the world. The present paper discusses ways to reconcile the correct description of the double-slit experiment with the objectiveness of “true” and “false”. (shrink)