Switch to: References

Citations of:

Some remarks about the senses

In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, First Series. Oxford University Press (1962)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Pain is the most prominent member of a class of sensations known as bodily sensations, which includes itches, tickles, tingles, orgasms, and so on. Bodily sensations are typically attributed to bodily locations and appear to have features such as volume, intensity, duration, and so on, that are ordinarily attributed to physical objects or quantities. Yet these sensations are often thought to be logically private, subjective, self-intimating, and the source of incorrigible knowledge for those who have them. Hence there appear to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis I seek to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that intuitions are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character. -/- In Chapter 1 I identify our target and provide some important reliminaries. Intuitions are mental states, but which ones? Giving examples helps: a person has an intuition when it seems to her that torturing the innocent is wrong, or that if something is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Meditation, Enactivism and Introspective Training.Michael David Roberts - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    This PhD thesis concerns introspective approaches to the study of the mind. Across three standalone papers, I examine the significance of introspective data and advise on appropriate kinds of training for the production of such data. An overview document first introduces major themes, methods and arguments of the thesis. Paper 1 then begins the argumentative work, interrogating the constraining function of introspection in cognitive science. Here, I evaluate “enactivist” claims about the significance of introspection, clarifying central enactivist suggestions to draw (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Quality-Space Theory in Olfaction.Benjamin D. Young, Andreas Keller & David Rosenthal - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities. Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents, we show how a quality space (QS) could be (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Individuating the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - In The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    The senses, or sensory modalities, constitute the different ways we have of perceiving the world, such as seeing, hearing , touching, tasting, and smelling. But what makes the senses different? How many senses are there? How many could there be? Wha t interaction takes place between the senses? This introduction is a guide to thinking about these questions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.
    Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • The Representational Theory of Consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a simple yet fully general model that specifies the precise conditions under which any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correlations between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness. -/- One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in which to formulate illuminating (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • On the Capacity for Vision Through Sensory Substitution.David Evan Pence - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):79-103.
    Sensory substitution presents the philosopher of cognitive science with a particularly interesting case. Using prosthetics to map visual stimuli onto other modalities, such as touch or audition, otherwise blind individuals may develop perceptual capacities and behaviours commonly associated with sight. Experienced users can distinguish ‘visually’ presented objects and will even jerk back from a looming surface. Whether perception with sensory substitution devices should be classed as a type of vision, some other modality, or a new sense remains a matter of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sensory Substitution Conference Report Question One.Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Does sensory substitution generate perceptual or cognitive states?
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   407 citations  
  • Sensory Substitution Conference Full Report.Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez - manuscript
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the workshop on sensory substitution and augmentation at the British Academy, March 26th through 28th, 2013.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.
    I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Perception With Compensatory Devices: From Sensory Substitution to Sensorimotor Extension.Malika Auvray & Erik Myin - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (6):1036–1058.
    Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience (Grice, 1962), to which we have added the criteria (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Migue Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.
    Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Percept and Vector Function Theories of the Brain.Jeff Foss - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (December):511-537.
    Physicalism is an empirical theory of the mind and its place in nature. So the physicalist must show that current neuroscience does not falsify physicalism, but instead supports it. Current neuroscience shows that a nervous system is what I call a vector function system. I provide a brief outline of the resources that empirical research has made available within the constraints of the vector function approach. Then I argue that these resources are sufficient, indeed apt, for the physicalist enterprise, by (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. Duisburg-Essen: DuEPublico. pp. 525-535.
    Distributive egalitarians believe that distributive justice is to be explained by the idea of distributive equality (DE) and that DE is of intrinsic value. The socio-relational critique argues that distributive egalitarianism does not account for the “true” value of equality, which rather lies in the idea of “equality as a substantive social value” (ESV). This paper examines the socio-relational critique and argues that it fails because – contrary to what the critique presupposes –, first, ESV is not conceptually distinct from (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • XV—Cross‐Modal Experiences.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Looks as Powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
    Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Characterising the Senses.Mark Leon - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):243-270.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Characterising the Senses.Mark Leon - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):243-70.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Restricted Auditory Aspatialism.Douglas Wadle - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Some philosophers have argued that we do not hear sounds as located in the environment. Others have objected that this straightforwardly contradicts the phenomenology of auditory experience. And from this they draw metaphysical conclusions about the nature of sounds—that they are events or properties of vibrating surfaces rather than waves or sensations. I argue that there is a minimal, but recognizable, notion of audition to which this phenomenal objection does not apply. While this notion doesn’t correspond to our ordinary notion (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • IX—Perceptual Activity and Bodily Awareness.Louise Richardson - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):147-165.
    Bodily awareness is a kind of perceptual awareness of the body that we do not usually count as a sense. I argue that that there is an overlooked agential difference between bodily awareness and perception in the five familiar senses: a difference in what is involved in perceptual activity in sight, hearing, touch taste and smell on the one hand, and bodily awareness on the other.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Seeing What You Hear: Cross-Modal Illusions and Perception.Casey O'Callaghan - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.
    Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which understanding perception and perceptual experience is a matter of assembling independently viable stories (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
    This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Sensory Modalities and Novel Features of Perceptual Experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.
    Is the flavor of mint reducible to the minty smell, the taste, and the menthol-like coolness on the roof of one’s mouth, or does it include something over and above these—something not properly associated with any one of the contributing senses? More generally, are there features of perceptual experiences—so-called novel features—that are not associated with any of our senses taken singly? This question has received a lot of attention of late. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Just a Matter of Taste.Vivian Mizrahi - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):411-431.
    According to an ordinary view, we distinguish, classify, and appreciate food and beverages according to their taste. However, scientists seem to disagree with this naive view. They maintain that we don't really perceive the lemony taste of a cake or the delicate smoky taste of a single-malt whiskey, because what we ascribe to taste is in reality mostly perceived by smell. As opposed to this scientific consensus regarding taste, I will defend a naive view of taste and deny that olfaction (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Meditation.Wolfgang Fasching - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):463-483.
    Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Representationalism and the Phenomenology of Mental Imagery.Evan Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (3):203--213.
    This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW]Evan Thompson - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Common Sense About Qualities and Senses.Peter W. Ross - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316.
    There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Objects, Seeing, and Object-Seeing.Mohan Matthen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4).
    Two questions are addressed in this paper. First, what is it to see? I argue that it is veridical experience of things outside the perceiver brought about by looking. Second, what is it to see a material object? I argue that it is experience of an occupant of a spatial region that is a logical subject for other visual features, able to move to another spatial region, to change intrinsically, and to interact with other material objects. I show how this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Individuating the Senses of ‘Smell’: Orthonasal Versus Retronasal Olfaction.Keith A. Wilson - 2021 - Synthese 199:4217-4242.
    The dual role of olfaction in both smelling and tasting, i.e. flavour perception, makes it an important test case for philosophical theories of sensory individuation. Indeed, the psychologist Paul Rozin claimed that olfaction is a “dual sense”, leading some scientists and philosophers to propose that we have not one, but two senses of smell: orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In this paper I consider how best to understand Rozin’s claim, and upon what grounds one might judge there to be one or (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Love in the Time of Cholera.Benj Hellie - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 241–261.
    We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115.
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Les cinq sens, le sens commun et les sensibles communs.Olivier Massin - 2008 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    Le sens commun distingue le corps de l’esprit. Il considère par exemple que les désirs et les souvenirs sont des phénomènes mentaux alors que les sons et les courants d’air sont des phénomènes physiques. Au sein de l’esprit, il distingue diverses facultés mentales : il considère par exemple que l’imagination est distincte de la volonté, qui est elle-même distincte de la perception. Au sein de la faculté perceptive, il distingue cinq sens : l’odorat, le goût, la vue, le toucher et (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses.John O'Dea - 2011 - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which is consistent (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Nada Vendo no Escuro, Nada Ouvindo no Silêncio.André Joffily Abath - 2012 - Doispontos 9 (2).
    Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Podemos ver na ausência de luz, e ouvir na ausência de som? Em seu livro Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen defende que sim, que podemos ver a escuridão na ausência de luz, e ouvir o silêncio na ausência de som. Neste artigo, defendo que (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reading the World Through the Skin and Ears: A New Perspective on Sensory Substitution.Ophelia Deroy & Malika Auvray - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
  • Taxonomising the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.
    I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Touch as a Sense of Force.Olivier Massin - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to give a description of the objects of the sense of touch. Those objects, it is argued, are forces, rather than flesh deformation, solidity or weight. Tangible forces, basically tensions and pressures, are construed as symmetric and non-spatially reducible causal relations. Two consequences are drawn: first, the perception of heat and cold falls outside the sense of touch; second, muscular sense (together with a large part of proprioception) falls inside the sense of touch.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • L'étoffe du sensible [Sensible Stuffs].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In J.-M. Chevalier & B. Gaultier (eds.), Connaître, Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine. Paris, France: Ithaque. pp. 201-230.
    The proper sensible criterion of sensory individuation holds that senses are individuated by the special kind of sensibles on which they exclusively bear about (colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc.). H. P. Grice objected to the proper sensibles criterion that it cannot account for the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing shapes or other common sensibles. That paper advances a novel answer to Grice's objection. Admittedly, the upholder of the proper sensible criterion must bind the proper sensibles –i.e. colors– (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Sense of Time.Gerardo Viera - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):443-469.
    It’s often claimed in the philosophical and scientific literature on temporal representation that there is no such thing as a genuine sensory system for time. In this paper, I argue for the opposite—many animals, including all mammals, possess a genuine sensory system for time based in the circadian system. In arguing for this conclusion, I develop a semantics and meta-semantics for explaining how the endogenous rhythms of the circadian system provide organisms with a direct information link to the temporal structure (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Validity of First-Person Descriptions as Authenticity and Coherence.Claire Petitmengin - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    This article is devoted to the description of the experience associated with listening to a sound. In the first part, we describe the method we used to gather descriptions of auditory experience and to analyse these descriptions. This work of explicitation and analysis has enabled us to identify a threefold generic structure of this experience, depending on whether the attention of the subject is directed towards the event which is at the source of the sound, the sound in itself, considered (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Perception and Multimodality.Casey O'Callaghan - 2012 - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists of perception by custom have investigated individual sense modalities in relative isolation from each other. However, perceiving is, in a number of respects, multimodal. The traditional sense modalities should not be treated as explanatorily independent. Attention to the multimodal aspects of perception challenges common assumptions about the content and phenomenology of perception, and about the individuation and psychological nature of sense modalities. Multimodal perception thus presents a valuable opportunity for a case study in mature interdisciplinary cognitive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Not All Perceptual Experience is Modality Specific.Casey O'Callaghan - 2015 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-165.
    This paper presents forms of multimodal perceptual experience that undermine the claim that each aspect of perceptual experience is modality specific. In particular, it argues against the thesis that all phenomenal character is modality specific (even making an allowance for co-conscious unity). It concludes that a multimodal perceptual episode may have phenomenal features beyond those that are associated with the specific modalities.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • What is Distinctive About the Senses?Louise Fiona Richardson - unknown
    For the most part, philosophical discussion of the senses has been concerned with what distinguishes them from one another, following Grice’s treatment of this issue in his ‘Remarks on the senses’. But this is one of two questions which Grice raises in this influential paper. The other, the question of what distinguishes senses from faculties that are not senses, is the question I address in this thesis. Though there are good reasons to think that the awareness we have of our (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency of Experience.Erhan Demircioglu - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (1):56-81.
    Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Doświadczenie I Eksperyment W Sztuce.Alva Noë - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1):259 - 273.
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Experience and Experiment in Art.Alva Noë - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • On the Logic of What It is Like to Be a Conscious Subject.Jeff Foss - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):305-320.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations