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  1. Classifying emotions: Prospects for a psychoevolutionary approach.Charles Starkey - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):759 – 777.
    One of the most significant developments in the area of emotion theory in recent years is the revival of the psychoevolutionary approach to classification. This essay appraises the prospects for such an approach. The first contention is that the supposed advantages of psychoevolutionary classification over functional classification in scientific psychological research is less than presumed , particularly with respect to the utility of the classification , which is the basis of the argument for the superiority of psychoevolutionary classification. The second (...)
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  • The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.
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  • Love as a contested concept.Richard Paul Hamilton - 2006 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (3):239–254.
    Theorists about love typically downplay the scale of persistent and possibly intractable disagreement about love. Where they have considered such disagreements at all, they have tended to treat them as an example of the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of love, a problem which can be resolved by philosophical analysis. In doing so, they invariably slip into prescriptive mode and offer moral injunctions in the guise of conceptual analyses.This article argues for philosophical modesty. I propose that the starting point (...)
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  • Perceiving Emotions.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement (...)
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  • II—Mitchell Green: Perceiving Emotions.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
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