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  1. Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu analityczne/syntetyczne.Wawrzyniak Jan - 2014 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 4 (2):299-314.
    Both John Langshaw Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine were critical of the traditional division of propositions into the two categories: analytic and synthetic. their criticism has, however, a di erent character. Quine questions the usefulness of the notion of analyticity, whereas Austin does not accept the view that every proposition should be considered either analytic or synthetic. According to Quine, we have to abandon the notion of analyticity because we cannot de ne it in a satisfactory way. Quine’s criticism (...)
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  • Concepts, Conceptual Schemes and Grammar.Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):653-668.
    This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall (...)
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  • Modality and Anti-Metaphysics.Stephen K. McLeod - 2001 - Ashgate.
    Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...)
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  • Boghossian on Analyticity.E. Margolis & S. Laurence - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):293-302.
    Paul Boghossian (1997) has argued that there is much to be said on behalf of the notion of analyticity so long as we distinguish epistemic analyticity and metaphysical analyticity. In particular, (1) epistemic analyticity isn’t undermined by Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, (2) it can explain the a prioricity of logic, and (3) epistemic analyticity can’t be rejected short of embracing semantic irrealism. In this paper, we argue that all three of these claims are mistaken.
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  • Quinean Holism, Analyticity, and Diachronic Rational Norms.Brett Topey - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3143-3171.
    I argue that Quinean naturalists’ holism-based arguments against analyticity and apriority are more difficult to resist than is generally supposed, for two reasons. First, although opponents of naturalism sometimes dismiss these arguments on the grounds that the holistic premises on which they depend are unacceptably radical, it turns out that the sort of holism required by these arguments is actually quite minimal. And second, although it’s true, as Grice and Strawson pointed out long ago, that these arguments can succeed only (...)
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  • Trends and Progress in Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):276-292.
    This article is in three parts. The first discusses trends in philosophy. The second defends reliance on intuitions in philosophy from some doubts that have recently been raised. The third discusses Philip Kitcher's contention that contemporary analytic philosophy does not have its priorities straight. While the three parts are independent, there is a common theme. Each part defends what is regarded as orthodoxy from attacks. Of course there are other reasonable challenges to philosophical methodology. The article's aim is just to (...)
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  • Grice’s Intentionalistic Theory of Meaning.Salah Ismail - 2005 - Kuwait: Annals of the Arts and Social Science, Kuwait University.
    Philosophical inquiry on the problem of meaning is as old as philosophy. There are two approaches to the study of meaning . the first is associated with formal theories of meaning, proposed by Frege, earlier Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson and Dummett. The second is associated with use theories of meaning, which was supported by later Wittgenstein , Austin, Grice, Strawson and Searle. Formal theories are concerned with the formal structure of language and the interrelations between sentences. The use theories put central (...)
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  • Pragmatic a Priori Knowledge: A Pragmatic Approach to the Nature and Object of What Can Be Known Independently of Experience.Lauri Järvilehto - 2011 - Jyväskylä University Printing House.
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  • Embodied Knowledge, Conceptual Change, and the A Priori; or, Justification, Revision, and the Ways Life Could Go.Robert D. Rupert - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):169-192.
  • Down the Methodological Rabbit Hole.David Frydrych - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (147):41-73.
    This article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section 4 explains “meta- theoretical” desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical appeals (...)
     
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  • Schauer's Anti‐Essentialism.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (2):182-214.
    In his new book, The Force of Law, Frederick Schauer maintains that law has no necessary properties, and that therefore jurisprudents should not assume that an inquiry into the nature of law has to be a search for such properties. I argue, however, that Schauer's attempt to show that legal anti-essentialism is a defensible position fails, because his one main argument is either irrelevant or else incomplete, depending on how one understands it, and because the other main argument is false.
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  • The Event of Primary Experience and Philosophy. Metatheory of Experience in Kant and Quine’s Epistemologies.Mykhailo Minakov - 2015 - Sententiae 33 (2):64-74.
    The author argues that Quine’s criticism of Kantian analytical/synthetic distinction, as well as transcendentalist reductionism, is not entirely adequate. Furthermore, the author states that Kant’s and Quine’s theories of experience and cognition (transcendentalist and holistic) are based on a common dogma, the one of consistency. Taking into account their uncritical ac-ceptance of experience as a system that is able to adjust new and old elements to each other, both philosophers have much more in common than Quine and his followers might (...)
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  • One Dogma of Millianism.Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
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  • Are There Understanding-Assent Links?Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:12.
    Abstract: It is commonly held that there are internal links between understanding and assent such that being semantically competent with an expression requires accepting certain sentences as true. The paper discusses a recent challenge to this conception of semantic competence, posed by Timothy Williamson (2007). According to Williamson there are no understanding-assent links of the suggested sort, no internal connection between semantic competence and belief. I suggest that Williamson is quite right to question the claim that being semantically competent with (...)
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  • The Legacy of Methodological Dualism.Kent Johnson - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):366–401.
    Methodological dualism in linguistics occurs when its theories are subjected to standards that are inappropriate for them qua scientific theories. Despite much opposition, methodological dualism abounds in contemporary thinking. In this paper, I treat linguistics as a scientific activity and explore some instances of dualism. By extracting some ubiquitous aspects of scientific methodology from its typically quantitative expression, I show that two recent instances of methodologically dualistic critiques of linguistics are ill-founded. I then show that there are nonetheless some divergences (...)
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  • Should We Trust Our Intuitions? Deflationary Accounts of the Analytic Data.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):299-323.
    At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have ' intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions and (...)
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  • How Did We Get Here From There? The Transformation of Analytic Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 27:7-37.
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  • Holism About Meaning and About Evidence: In Defence of W. V. Quine. [REVIEW]S. Okasha - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (1):39-61.
    Holistic claims about evidence are a commonplace inthe philosophy of science; holistic claims aboutmeaning are a commonplace in the philosophy oflanguage. W. V. Quine has advocated both types ofholism, and argued for an intimate link between thetwo. Semantic holism may be inferred from theconjunction of confirmation holism andverificationism, he maintains. But in their recentbook Holism: a Shopper's Guide, Jerry Fodor andErnest Lepore (1992) claim that this inference isfallacious. In what follows, I defend Quine's argumentfor semantic holism from Fodor and Lepore'smulti-pronged (...)
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  • The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness.J. A. Burgess - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):417-474.
    One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can be constructed (...)
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  • Quine: Before and After the Commitment to Naturalism.Nathan Daniel Haining Kirkwood - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    There is little in Quine’s philosophy that is more significant and more puzzling than his commitment to naturalism. On the one hand, naturalism seems to play an unparalleled role in explaining the development and unorthodox nature of Quine’s views. On the other hand, however, naturalism is deeply elusive. Not only is there disagreement amongst commentators about how to understand the nature and development of naturalism, but also Quine’s own characterisations of naturalism are often thinly sketched and leave us with few (...)
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  • Two Dogmatists.Charles Pigden - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (1 & 2):173 – 193.
    Grice and Strawson's 'In Defense of a Dogma is admired even by revisionist Quineans such as Putnam (1962) who should know better. The analytic/synthetic distinction they defend is distinct from that which Putnam successfully rehabilitates. Theirs is the post-positivist distinction bounding a grossly enlarged analytic. It is not, as they claim, the sanctified product of a long philosophic tradition, but the cast-off of a defunct philosophy - logical positivism. The fact that the distinction can be communally drawn does not show (...)
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  • Metaphilosophy.Yuri Cath - 2011 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    Often philosophers have reason to ask fundamental questions about the aims, methods, nature, or value of their own discipline. When philosophers systematically examine such questions, the resulting work is sometimes referred to as “metaphilosophy.” Metaphilosophy, it should be said, is not a well-established, or clearly demarcated, field of philosophical inquiry like epistemology or the philosophy of art. However, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries there has been a great deal of metaphilosophical work on issues concerning the methodology of (...)
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  • Analyticity.George Bealer - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 234-9.
  • Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.E. J. Lowe - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):587-592.
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  • Jackson, Serious Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis.A. Miller - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):574-587.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  • The Role of Inversion in the Genesis, Development and the Structure of Scientific Knowledge.Nagarjuna G. - manuscript
    The main thrust of the argument of this thesis is to show the possibility of articulating a method of construction or of synthesis--as against the most common method of analysis or division--which has always been (so we shall argue) a necessary component of scientific theorization. This method will be shown to be based on a fundamental synthetic logical relation of thought, that we shall call inversion--to be understood as a species of logical opposition, and as one of the basic monadic (...)
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  • The Presumptions of Meaning. Hamblin and Equivocation.Fabrizio Macagno - 2011 - Informal Logic 31 (4):367-393.
    When we use a word, we face a crucial epistemic gap: we ground our move on the fact that our interlocutor knows the meaning of the word we used, and therefore he can interpret our dialogical intention. However, how is it possible to know the other’s mind? Hamblin explained this dialogical problem advancing the idea of dialectical meaning: on his view, the use of a word is based on a set of presumptions. Building on this approach, the use of a (...)
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  • Are There Understanding-Assent Links?Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    Abstract: It is commonly held that there are internal links between understanding and assent such that being semantically competent with an expression requires accepting certain sentences as true. The paper discusses a recent challenge to this conception of semantic competence, posed by Timothy Williamson (2007). According to Williamson there are no understanding-assent links of the suggested sort, no internal connection between semantic competence and belief. I suggest that Williamson is quite right to question the claim that being semantically competent with (...)
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  • The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 1-46.
    My primary aim in this chapter is to explain in what the traditional mind–body problem consists, what its possible solutions are, and what obstacles lie in the way of a resolution. The discussion will develop in two phases. The first phase, sections 1.2–1.4, will be concerned to get clearer about the import of our initial question as a precondition of developing an account of possible responses to it. The second phase, sections 1.5–1.6, explains how a problem arises in our attempts (...)
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  • Meinongian Scorekeeping.Vojko Strahovnik - 2005 - In Alfred Schramm (ed.), Meinong Studien. De Gruyter. pp. 309-330.
    Some commitments at the interface of semantics and ontology, such as numbers or symphonies, tend to appear problematic. The scorekeeping approach to semantics introduces contextually shifting parameters that allow for construal of truth as indirect correspondence. Meinong did recognize diversity and richness that is made possible by the non-reductionist engagement of the scorekeeping approach. Because of his commitment to the deep presupposition of direct correspondence construal of truth though, Meinong had to interpret richness of normative discursive scorekeeping commitments as richness (...)
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  • Analiticidade.Célia Teixeira - 2015 - In João Branquinho & Ricardo Santos (eds.), Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisbon, Portugal: pp. 1-21.
    A noção de analiticidade teve um papel central em vários debates filosóficos, em particular durante a primeira metade do século XX. Na sequência do influente artigo de W. V. Quine “Dois Dogmas do empirismo” (1951), a noção passou a ser vista com grande cepticismo. Mais recentemente, Paul Boghossian, no artigo “Analiticidade Reconsiderada” (1996), propôs uma forma de compreender a noção que é, putativamente, imune às críticas de Quine. O interesse na noção de analiticidade ficou desta forma renovado, assim como a (...)
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  • Duhem, Quine and the Other Dogma.Alexander Afriat - unknown
    With resources hinted at in different ways by both Duhem and Quine, it is argued that some of their misgivings about empirical confirmation, or crucial experiments, may be exaggerated or unfounded; and that such experiments, suitably conceived, can give good meaning to empirical sentences. With appropriate meanings one can then wonder about synonymy and analyticity.
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  • In Carnap’s Defense: A Survey on the Concept of a Linguistic Framework in Carnap’s Philosophy.Parzhad Torfehnezhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):03-30.
    The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”. On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on conventional decisions concerning the (...)
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  • Meaning and Reality: A Cross-Traditional Encounter.Lajos L. Brons - 2013 - In Bo Mou & R. Tieszen (eds.), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy. Brill. pp. 199-220.
    (First paragraph.) Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the world as we consciously experience it, and noumenal reality, the world as it is independent from an experiencing subject, have different implications for a collection of interrelated issues of meaning and reality including aspects of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical methodology. Exploring some of these implications, this paper compares and brings together analytic, continental, and Buddhist approaches, focusing on relevant aspects of the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Jacques (...)
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  • Two Dogmas of Analytical Philosophy.Greg Taylor - 2007 - Macalester Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):40-55.
    In his landmark article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” W.V.O. Quine pushed analytical philosophy into its post-positivist phase by rejecting two central tenets of logical empiricism. The first dogma was the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements; the second was reductionism, or the belief that to each synthetic sentence there corresponds a set of experiences that will confirm or disconfirm it. But in both “Two Dogmas” and Word and Object, Quine stretches analytical philosophy to its limits. The problem is, ironically, his (...)
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  • The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
    It is commonplace in cognitive science that concepts are individuated in terms of the roles they play in the cognitive lives of thinkers, a view that Jerry Fodor has recently been dubbed ‘Concept Pragmatism’. Quinean critics of Pragmatism have long argued that it founders on its commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction, since without such a distinction there is plausibly no way to distinguish constitutive from non-constitutive roles in cognition. This paper considers Fodor’s empirical arguments against analyticity, and in particular his (...)
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  • The Dynamics and Communication of Concepts.Simon James Prosser - unknown
    The central claim of this thesis is that concepts, the components from which cognitively significant truth evaluable content (thought) is composed, are unstructured entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to other concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by which the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. This position is called Conceptual Atomism and contrasts with Inferential Role Semantics, according to which concepts are individuated by their (...)
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  • II—Knowledge and Belief.John Hyman - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):267-288.
    In this article, I oppose the view that knowledge is a species of belief, and argue that belief should be defined in terms of knowledge, instead of the other way round. However, I reject the idea that the concept of knowledge has a primary or basic role or position in our system of mental and logical concepts, because I reject the hierarchical conception of philosophical analysis implicit in this idea. I approach the topic of knowledge and belief from a discussion (...)
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  • Vagueness, Epistemicism and Response-Dependence.J. Burgess - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):507 – 524.
  • The Particular–Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?Fraser MacBride - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):565-614.
    Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F. P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular – universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the piecemeal investigation of this issue three interrelated conceptions of the particular – universal distinction are examined: universals, by contrast to particulars, are unigrade; particulars are related to universals by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; universals (...)
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  • Twentieth Century.Robert Hanna - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 149.
  • Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?Gary Ebbs - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.
    W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism (...)
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  • Are Scrutability Conditionals Rationally Deniable?Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):452-461.
    Chalmers has argued that Bayesianism supports the existence of a priori truths, since it entails that scrutability conditionals are not rationally revisable. However, as we argue, Chalmers's arguments leave open that every proposition is rationally deniable, which would be devastating for large parts of his philosophical program. We suggest that Chalmers should appeal to well-known convergence theorems to argue that ideally rational subjects converge on the truth of scrutability conditionals. However, our discussion reveals that showing that these theorems apply in (...)
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  • What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese Room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
  • Convergence and Parallelism in Evolution: A Neo-Gouldian Account.Trevor Pearce - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):429-448.
    Determining whether a homoplastic trait is the result of convergence or parallelism is central to many of the most important contemporary discussions in biology and philosophy: the relation between evolution and development, the importance of constraints on variation, and the role of contingency in evolution. In this article, I show that two recent attempts to draw a black-or-white distinction between convergence and parallelism fail, albeit for different reasons. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not be afraid of gray areas: a (...)
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  • Understanding the Revisability Thesis.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):180-195.
    W. V. Quine famously claimed that no statement is immune to revision. This thesis has had a profound impact on twentieth century philosophy, and it still occupies centre stage in many contemporary debates. However, despite its importance it is not clear how it should be interpreted. I show that the thesis is in fact ambiguous between three substantially different theses. I illustrate the importance of clarifying it by assessing its use in the debate against the existence of a priori knowledge. (...)
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  • De por qué en la filosofía importan los ejemplos.Eduardo Fermandois - 2008 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 20 (2):189-216.
    “On Why in Philosophy Examples Matter”. The purpose of the article is to show the need of using examples in philosophy, associating to them four functions: to illustrate, explain, argue and show. Among other assertions, we attempt to justify the following: a) Examples are, as well as illustrations, evidences; such that what may be seen as an act of didactic generosity may be considered properly as the response to an always possible demand. b) The introduction of philosophical concepts requires frequently (...)
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