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In defense of a dogma

In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophical Review. Routledge. pp. 141 - 158 (1956)

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  1. Concepts, Conceptual Schemes and Grammar.Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):653-668.
    This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall (...)
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  • How to Be a Selective Quinean.Samir Okasha - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (1):37–47.
    This paper examines whether one can accept Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction while rejecting his indeterminacy of translation thesis. I argue that this is possible, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Holding that linguistic synonymy is a well‐defined relation, and that translation is thus a determinate matter, does not commit one to the existence of an analytic‐synthetic distinction capable of playing the explanatory role that the traditional distinction was supposed to play, unless one holds that logical truths have distinctive epistemological (...)
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  • Quinean Holism, Analyticity, and Diachronic Rational Norms.Brett Topey - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3143-3171.
    I argue that Quinean naturalists’ holism-based arguments against analyticity and apriority are more difficult to resist than is generally supposed, for two reasons. First, although opponents of naturalism sometimes dismiss these arguments on the grounds that the holistic premises on which they depend are unacceptably radical, it turns out that the sort of holism required by these arguments is actually quite minimal. And second, although it’s true, as Grice and Strawson pointed out long ago, that these arguments can succeed only (...)
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  • Trends and Progress in Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):276-292.
    This article is in three parts. The first discusses trends in philosophy. The second defends reliance on intuitions in philosophy from some doubts that have recently been raised. The third discusses Philip Kitcher's contention that contemporary analytic philosophy does not have its priorities straight. While the three parts are independent, there is a common theme. Each part defends what is regarded as orthodoxy from attacks. Of course there are other reasonable challenges to philosophical methodology. The article's aim is just to (...)
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  • Willard Van Orman Quine.Peter Hylton - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Derrida's Language-Games.Newton Garver - 1991 - Topoi 10 (2):187-198.
    In previous essays (1973, 1975, 1977) I have praised Derrida's contributions to philosophical dialogue and also insisted on their limitations. The considerations raised in this present essay do not lead me to a position that is less ambivalent. Philosophy is a particular language-game. Like any other, it has its constitutive rules; or, perhaps better: its practice has certain distinctive features by means of which we recognize philosophizing and distinguish it from other linguistic activities. None of this can be set down (...)
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  • Internal Relations and Analyticity: Wittgenstein and Quine.Michael Hymers - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):591 - 612.
    L'A. défend la thèse selon laquelle Wittgenstein développe une conception pragmatique et linguistique des relations internes qui définissent les vérités nécessaires: 1) qui n'implique pas l'analyticité de toutes les propositions exprimant des relations internes, 2) qui établit une distinction entre l'analytique et le synthétique, 3) qui s'avère compatible avec la critique de l'analyticité entreprise par Quine.
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  • Being and Holding Responsible: Reconciling the Disputants Through a Meaning-Based Strawsonian Account.Benjamin De Mesel - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1893-1913.
    A fundamental question in responsibility theory concerns the relation between being responsible and our practices of holding responsible. ‘Strawsonians’ often claim that being responsible is somehow a function of our practices of holding responsible, while others think that holding responsible depends on being responsible, and still others think of being and holding responsible as interdependent. Based on a Wittgensteinian reading of Strawson, I develop an account of the relation between being and holding responsible which respects major concerns of all parties (...)
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  • Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  • Let’s Be Realistic About Serious Metaphysics.Paul Bloomfield - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):69-90.
  • Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water: Putnam on Kinds and Kind Terms.Åsa Wikforss - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):242-261.
    Since Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ‘Putnam-Kripke’ view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that Putnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of Kripke. In particular, Putnam has from the very start been sceptical of Kripke's modal claims, and in later papers he explicitly rejects the proposal that theoretical identity statements are (...)
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  • Translating Logical Terms.Stewart Shapiro - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):291-303.
    The is an old question over whether there is a substantial disagreement between advocates of different logics, as they simply attach different meanings to the crucial logical terminology. The purpose of this article is to revisit this old question in light a pluralism/relativism that regards the various logics as equally legitimate, in their own contexts. We thereby address the vexed notion of translation, as it occurs between mathematical theories. We articulate and defend a thesis that the notion of “same meaning” (...)
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  • Departmental Boundaries Within the Corporate Body of Theory: Quine on the Holistic Foundations of Logic: Dialogue.David M. Godden - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):505-528.
    ABSTRACT This article argues that Quine's holistic and naturalized semantics provides an inadequate account of the foundations of logical expressions and misrepresents the internal structure of theories. By considering a Quinean model of theoretical revision, I identify the status and foundation holism provides to the propositions of logic. I contend that a central tenet of Quinean holism—the Revisability Doctrine—cannot be held consistently, and that the inconsistencies surrounding it mark a series of pervasive errors within naturalized holism. In response, I propose (...)
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  • Epistemic Analyticity Reconsidered.Célia Teixeira - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):280-292.
    It is nowadays standard to distinguish between epistemic and metaphysical analyticity. Metaphysical analyticity has been widely rejected, while epistemic analyticity has been widely endorsed. I argue that we also have good reason to reject epistemic analyticity. I do so by considering all the plausible ways of characterizing epistemic analyticity and of drawing the epistemic analytic–synthetic distinction. I argue that on all of them, the distinction fails to carve at the semantic joints. I conclude that there is good reason to think (...)
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  • Quine’s Two Dogmas as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism.Artur Koterski - 2015 - Philosophia Scientae 19:127-142.
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  • Vagueness and Family Resemblance.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2017 - In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 407-419.
    Ben-Yami presents Wittgenstein’s explicit criticism of the Platonic identification of an explanation with a definition and the alternative forms of explanation he employed. He then discusses a few predecessors of Wittgenstein’s criticisms and the Fregean background against which he wrote. Next, the idea of family resemblance is introduced, and objections answered. Wittgenstein’s endorsement of vagueness and the indeterminacy of sense are presented, as well as the open texture of concepts. Common misunderstandings are addressed along the way. Wittgenstein’s ideas, as is (...)
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  • Strawson and Kant: Descriptive Metaphysics as Сonceptual Background for the Analysis of “Critique of Pure Reason”.Viktor Kozlovskyi - 2016 - Sententiae 34 (1):25-41.
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  • Naturalism and the Surreptitious Embrace of Necessity.Kurt Mosser - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):17-32.
    Abstract: In this article, two philosophical positions that structure distinct approaches in the history of metaphysics and epistemology are briefly characterized and contrasted. While one view, “naturalism,” rejects an a priori commitment to necessity, the other view, “transcendentalism,” insists on that commitment. It is shown that at the level of the fundamentals of thought, judgment, and reason, the dispute dissolves, and the naturalists' employment of “necessity for all practical purposes” is at best only nominally distinct from the transcendentalists' use of (...)
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  • Cognitive Synonymy.D. Goldstick - 1980 - Dialectica 34 (3):183-203.
    SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...)
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  • Schauer's Anti‐Essentialism.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (2):182-214.
    In his new book, The Force of Law, Frederick Schauer maintains that law has no necessary properties, and that therefore jurisprudents should not assume that an inquiry into the nature of law has to be a search for such properties. I argue, however, that Schauer's attempt to show that legal anti-essentialism is a defensible position fails, because his one main argument is either irrelevant or else incomplete, depending on how one understands it, and because the other main argument is false.
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  • Science Nominalized.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):529-549.
    I propose a way of formulating scientific laws and magnitude attributions which eliminates ontological commitment to mathematical entities. I argue that science only requires quantitative sentences as thus formulated, and hence that we ought to deny the existence of sets and numbers. I argue that my approach cannot plausibly be extended to the concrete "theoretical" entities of science.
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  • Inexactness and Explanation.D. H. Mellor - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (4):345-359.
    The paper discusses the problems raised by the inexactness of experiential concepts for a deductivist account of theoretical explanation. The process of theoretical explanation is explicated in terms of the devising of exact forms of inexact concepts. Analysis of the adjustments of concepts and their exact forms to each other reveals an implicit criterion of adequacy for theories which is related to the principle of connectivity.
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  • Indeterminacy, A Priority, and Analyticity in the Quinean Critique.Gurpreet Rattan - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):203-226.
    : Significant issues remain for understanding and evaluating the Quinean critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction. These issues are highlighted in a puzzling mismatch between the common philosophical attitude toward the critique and its broader intellectual legacy. A discussion of this mismatch sets the larger context for criticism of a recent tradition of interpretation of the critique. I argue that this tradition confuses the roles and relative importance of indeterminacy, a priority, and analyticity in the Quinean critique.
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  • A Wittgensteinian Solution to the Sorites.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (3):229-244.
    I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the (...)
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  • Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals.Dennis Patterson - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (1):47-58.
    Robert Alexy has built his original theory of law upon pervasive claims for “necessary” features of law. In this article, I show that Alexy's claims suffer from two difficulties. First, Alexy is never clear about what he means by “necessity.” Second, Alexy writes as if there have been no challenges to claims of conceptual necessity. There have been such challenges and Alexy needs to answer them if his project is to succeed.
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  • Concepts and Analytic Intuitions.Bradley Rives - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):285-314.
    In this paper I defend the view that positing analytic, constitutive connections among concepts best explains certain semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions. Jerry Fodor and Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence offer alternative explanations according to which such intuitions can be explained without positing analyticities. I argue that these alternative explanations fail. As a partial diagnosis of their failure, I suggest that critics have failed to recognize the extent to which a psychologized notion of analyticity must depart from the traditional notion of ‘truth in (...)
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  • One Dogma of Millianism.Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
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  • The Legacy of Methodological Dualism.Kent Johnson - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):366–401.
    Methodological dualism in linguistics occurs when its theories are subjected to standards that are inappropriate for them qua scientific theories. Despite much opposition, methodological dualism abounds in contemporary thinking. In this paper, I treat linguistics as a scientific activity and explore some instances of dualism. By extracting some ubiquitous aspects of scientific methodology from its typically quantitative expression, I show that two recent instances of methodologically dualistic critiques of linguistics are ill-founded. I then show that there are nonetheless some divergences (...)
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  • Should We Trust Our Intuitions? Deflationary Accounts of the Analytic Data.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):299-323.
    At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have ' intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions and (...)
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  • Naturalizing Jurisprudence – by Brian Leiter.Torben Spaak - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):352-362.
  • Hacker's Complaint.Scott Soames - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):426 - 435.
    My goal in writing 'Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century' was to identify and explain the most important achievements of analytic philosophy which every student of the subject should be aware of, as well as those of its failures from which we have the most to learn. I attempted to do this by constructing a history that was itself a piece of analytic philosophy in its emphasis on analysis, reconstruction and criticism of arguments. In rebutting Hacker's critique of it, I (...)
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  • In Defence of Metaphysical Analyticity.Frank Hofmann & Joachim Horvath - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):300-313.
    According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion (...)
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  • Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification.Torben Spaak - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (4):469-485.
    In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study (...)
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  • The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Gillian Russell - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):712–729.
    Once a standard tool in the epistemologist’s kit, the analytic/synthetic distinction was challenged by Quine and others in the mid-twentieth century and remains controversial today. But although the work of a lot contemporary philosophers touches on this distinction – in the sense that it either has consequences for it, or it assumes results about it – few have really focussed on it recently. This has the consequence that a lot has happened that should affect our view of the analytic/synthetic distinction, (...)
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  • Language, Truth, and Logic and the Anglophone Reception of the Vienna Circle.Andreas Vrahimis - 2020 - In Adam Tamas Tuboly (ed.), The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. Hampshire: Palgrave. pp. 41-68.
    A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic had been responsible for introducing the Vienna Circle’s ideas, developed within a Germanophone framework, to an Anglophone readership. Inevitably, this migration from one context to another resulted in the alteration of some of the concepts being transmitted. Such alterations have served to facilitate a number of false impressions of Logical Empiricism from which recent scholarship still tries to recover. In this paper, I will attempt to point to the ways in which LTL has (...)
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  • Carnap on Concept Determination: Methodology for Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]James Justus - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):161-179.
    Abstract Recent criticisms of intuition from experimental philosophy and elsewhere have helped undermine the authority of traditional conceptual analysis. As the product of more empirically informed philosophical methodology, this result is compelling and philosophically salutary. But the negative critiques rarely suggest a positive alternative. In particular, a normative account of concept determination—how concepts should be characterized—is strikingly absent from such work. Carnap's underappreciated theory of explication provides such a theory. Analyses of complex concepts in empirical sciences illustrates and supports this (...)
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  • Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.
    Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws.
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  • Synthetic Apriority.Yakir Levin - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (2):137 - 150.
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  • The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness.J. A. Burgess - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):417-474.
    One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can be constructed (...)
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  • Quine and the Linguistic Doctrine of Logical Truth.Ken Akiba - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (3):237 - 256.
  • Review Essay: The `Two Dogmas of Empiricism' 50 Years On.Paolo Parrini - 2007 - Diogenes 54 (4):91-101.
    ...its identity in the pragmatics of elucidation, and not in some sort of special knowledge...yer's essay (`Implicit Thoughts: Quine, Frege and Kant on Analytic Propositions...by Quine, and attributed to Kant, Frege and Carnap, has nothing in common..
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  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Practices.Mark Mccullagh - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:83-100.
    Some readers of Wittgenstein---I discuss Robert Brandom---think that his writings contain a regress argument showing that the notion of participating in a practice is more basic than the notion of following a rule, in explanations of linguistic correctness. But the regress argument bears equally on both these notions: if there is an explanatory regress of rules, then there is an explanatory regress of practices as well. Why then does Wittgenstein invoke the notion of a practice, apparently by way of diagnosing (...)
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  • Experience and Reasoning: Challenging the a Priori/a Posteriori Distinction.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1127-1148.
    Williamson and others have recently argued against the significance of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. My aim in this paper is to explain, defend, and expand upon one of these arguments. In the first section, I develop in some detail a line of argument sketched in Williamson. In the second section, I consider two replies to Williamson and show that they miss the structure of the challenge, as I understand it. The problem for defenders of the distinction is to find (...)
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  • The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
    It is commonplace in cognitive science that concepts are individuated in terms of the roles they play in the cognitive lives of thinkers, a view that Jerry Fodor has recently been dubbed ‘Concept Pragmatism’. Quinean critics of Pragmatism have long argued that it founders on its commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction, since without such a distinction there is plausibly no way to distinguish constitutive from non-constitutive roles in cognition. This paper considers Fodor’s empirical arguments against analyticity, and in particular his (...)
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  • Knowledge is Closed Under Analytic Content.Samuel Elgin - manuscript
    I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true, then S knows that all analytic parts of p are true as well. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox. I close by arguing that contextualists (...)
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  • Review Essay: The `Two Dogmas of Empiricism' 50 Years On.Paolo Parrini - 2007 - Diogenes 54 (4):91 - +.
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  • On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
    This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not (...)
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  • Can Philosophy Exist?Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1):83-105.
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  • Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?Gary Ebbs - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.
    W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism (...)
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  • Are Scrutability Conditionals Rationally Deniable?Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):452-461.
    Chalmers has argued that Bayesianism supports the existence of a priori truths, since it entails that scrutability conditionals are not rationally revisable. However, as we argue, Chalmers's arguments leave open that every proposition is rationally deniable, which would be devastating for large parts of his philosophical program. We suggest that Chalmers should appeal to well-known convergence theorems to argue that ideally rational subjects converge on the truth of scrutability conditionals. However, our discussion reveals that showing that these theorems apply in (...)
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