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14 Russell, Experience, and the Roots of Science

In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press. pp. 449 (2003)

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  1. Reichenbach, Russell and scientific realism.Christopher Pincock - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8485-8506.
    This paper considers how to best relate the competing accounts of scientific knowledge that Russell and Reichenbach proposed in the 1930s and 1940s. At the heart of their disagreements are two different accounts of how to best combine a theory of knowledge with scientific realism. Reichenbach argued that a broadly empiricist epistemology should be based on decisions. These decisions or “posits” informed Reichenbach’s defense of induction and a corresponding conception of what knowledge required. Russell maintained that a scientific realist must (...)
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  • Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions.David M. Godden & Nicholas Griffin - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186.
    This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, (...)
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  • Aristotle on Being.George Couvalis - 2015 - Modern Greek Studies (Australia and New Zealand) 1:41-50.
    Aristotle explains existence through postulating essences that are intrinsic and percep- tion independent. I argue that his theory is more plausible than Hume’s and Russell’s theories of existence. Russell modifies Hume’s theory because he wants to allow for the existence of mathematical objects. However, Russell’s theory facilitates a problematic collapse of ontology into epistemology, which has become a feature of much analytic philosophy. This collapse obscures the nature of truth. Aristotle is to be praised for starting with a clear account (...)
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  • Russell on Acquaintance with Spatial Properties: The Significance of James.Alexander Klein - 2017 - In Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 229 – 264.
    The standard, foundationalist reading of Our Knowledge of the External World requires Russell to have a view of perceptual acquaintance that he demonstrably does not have. Russell’s actual purpose in “constructing” physical bodies out of sense-data is instead to show that psychology and physics are consistent. But how seriously engaged was Russell with actual psychology? I show that OKEW makes some non-trivial assumptions about the character of visual space, and I argue that he drew those assumptions from William James’s Principles. (...)
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