My discussion in this lecture is structured as follows. In section 1 I consider the nature of philosophical enquiry and its affinity to liberalism. In section 2 I lay out some of the basic components of liberal theory and explore their interrelations. In section 3 I discuss two challenges to liberalism: one concerning the conception of liberty which it involves and one concerning the way in which it introduces the idea of legitimate political authority. In section 4 I suggest that (...) these problems, to do with the values of liberalism, arise on the basis of a prior conception of individuals which is in need of modification. In a brief concluding section 5 I indicate the need for a post-liberal political theory. (shrink)

The aim is to defend the starting?point of Marx's theory of class, which is located in a definition of the working class in the Communist Manifesto. It is a definition solely in terms of separation from productive resources and a need to sell one's labour power, and it is closely connected with Marx's thesis that the population in capitalism has a tendency to polarize. That thesis conflicts with the widely?held belief in the growth of a large middle class, unaccounted for (...) by Marx. Moreover, recent critics such as Elster, Roemer, and Cohen have argued that this definition fails even in its own terms. The definition is refurbished so as to withstand these objections. But is there any point in using it? Does it serve to pick out the exploited producers as Marx intended? It does, once due attention is given to the idea of the collective worker, which is central in the volume of Capital which Marx himself published. That idea makes plain that it is an irreducibly corporate entity which is productive and subject to exploitation. The structural conditions for membership of that entity remove Marx's view from any simple identification of working?class membership with manual or lowly labour. (shrink)

In this paper I will try to defend a quasi-naturalistic interpretation of J.L. Austin’s work. I will rely on P. Kitcher’s 1992 paper “The Naturalists Return” to compile four general criteria by which a philosopher can be called a naturalist. Then I will turn to Austin’s work and examine whether he meets these criteria. I will try to claim that versions of such naturalistic elements can be found in his work.

Despite the emphasis on the state in the history of political philosophy, the twentieth century has been characterized by a remarkable lack of philosophical reflection on the concept. Until recently analytical philosophy had eschewed those evaluative arguments about political obligation and the limits of state authority that were typical of political theory in the past in favour of the explication of the meaning of the concept. However, even here the results have been disappointing. Logical Positivist attempts to locate some unique (...) empirical phenomenon which the word state described proved unsuccessful, and indeed led to the odd conclusion that there was nothing about the state that distinguished it from some other social institutions. For example, its coercive power was said to be not unique: in some circumstances trade unions and Churches exercised similar power over their members. Ordinary language philosophers were far more interested in the complexities that surround words such as law, authority and power than in the state. In all this there was perhaps the fear that to concentrate attention on the state was implicitly to give credence to the discredited doctrine that it stood for some metaphysical entity; propositions about which could not be translated into propositions about the actions of individuals, and which represented higher values than those of ordinary human agents. (shrink)