The aim of this paper is to study and analyse the Charlie Hebdo attacks from a methodological and an ethical perspective, concentrating generally, though in some cases indirectly, on the consequences of our actions and the motives behind them. The analysis examines the issues of liberties, freedoms and responsibilities in general and further applies these values to the phenomenon of terrorism in contemporary society. The primary goal of this study is to use the Thomas Aquinas doctrine of double effect and (...) Michael Ignatieff’s lesser evil theory to appraise specific acts of terrorism. The article suggests that certain freedoms should be limited in democratic societies and thus ensure safety. (shrink)

The article attempts to trace the evolution of the concept of civil society. Drawing from the work of political philosophers from the classical period, the period of renaissance, scientific revolution, the period of Enlightenment in the 18th century, and ideologies from the Marxist and Gramscian discourses, the article demonstrates the shifts in the meaning and implications of the concept, its relations to public spaces, accountability, governance, normative ideals of state and the relationship between the state and its citizens. The article (...) concludes its historical progression with the New Social Movements, wherein the civil society became synonymous with strategic action to construct 'an alternative social and world order’, a site for problem solving. Other contenders who put forth a renewed interest in the resurgence of civil society were the New Left, who assigned civil society a role to defend people’s democratic will in the face of state power, and the neoliberals who considered civil society as a site for subversion from authoritarian regimes. The article finally concludes with a call for urgent attention towards reclaiming the authority of the civil society in education scenario. (shrink)

It is often claimed that surveillance should be proportionate, but it is rarely made clear exactly what proportionate surveillance would look like beyond an intuitive sense of an act being excessive. I argue that surveillance should indeed be proportionate and draw on Thomas Hurka’s work on proportionality in war to inform the debate on surveillance. After distinguishing between the proportionality of surveillance per se, and surveillance as a particular act, I deal with objections to using proportionality as a legitimate ethical (...) measure. From there I argue that only certain benefits and harms should be counted in any determination of proportionality. Finally I look at how context can affect the proportionality of a particular method of surveillance. In conclusion, I hold that proportionality is not only a morally relevant criterion by which to assess surveillance, but that it is a necessary criterion. Furthermore, while granting that it is difficult to assess, that difficulty should not prevent our trying to do so. (shrink)