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  1. Quine’s critique of C. I. Lewis: pragmatism, psychologism, and naturalism—a response to Quine, conceptual pragmatism, and the analytic-synthetic distinction (Robert Sinclair, 2022).Carl B. Sachs - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.
    I argue that Quine’s naturalization of Lewis’s Kantian pragmatism should be understood in terms of Lewis’s attempt to de-psychologize pragmatist epistemology. Lewis wants epistemology to be a priori in order to be distinct from psychology. Quine’s criticisms of Lewis result in a picture that weakens the distinction between epistemology and psychology. Nevertheless, Quine’s naturalized Kantian pragmatism remains far more Kantian than is widely recognized, due to what Quine retains from Lewis.
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  • C. I. Lewis, Kant, and the reflective method of philosophy.Gabriele Gava - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):315-335.
    ABSTRACTIf it seems unquestionable that C. I. Lewis is a Kantian in important respects, it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, is original about his Kantianism. For it might be argued that Lewis’ Kantianism simply reflects an approach to the a priori which was very common in the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the effort to make the a priori relative. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ Kantianism does present original features. The latter can (...)
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