This paper highlights the relevance of moral authority, and the role that egoistic ethical claims have in waging war. This is done, in view of the just war tradition, by drawing a parallel between the crusades in the 'kingdom of heaven' proclaimed in 1095, and the present Islamic jih d , as well as the Bush administration's declaration of a war on terror. It maintains that the role of self-legitimized leaders is crucial in shaping the order of the jus ad (...) bellum criteria, in both Christian and Muslim societies, and that the indiscriminate usage of just war rhetoric proves to be a formidable weapon. Moral authority is described as a power resource, capable of capsizing the relevance of ethics, subjecting the interpretation of justice to declare war to the self-proclaimed authorities, and moving masses on the grounds of enthusiasm. (shrink)

This article argues against Catton and Dunlap’s claims that the natural environment has been ignored or downplayed in American sociology before the emergence of environmental sociology in the 1970s. By reviewing a collection of 86 sociology textbooks between 1894 and 1980, the article provides quantitative evidence regarding the scope and types of references to the natural environment in mainstream sociology. The bulk of the article is based on an interpretive-historical analysis of the different representations of the environment in the textbook (...) literature. This analysis is carried out from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge, whereby sociological ideas about nature are interpreted in terms of their intellectual milieu and social context. The main finding is that the ‘natural environment’ has been interpreted in different ways and has been put to a variety of epistemological and ideological uses — particularly positivism and functionalism — throughout the history of the discipline. (shrink)

Talcott Parsons is often identified as the ‘master’ of mid-twentieth-century social theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, his writings were hardly any longer discussed, but mostly neglected. The American University is Parsons’s last monograph published during his lifetime. On the basis of extensive archival research, this paper discusses the conception, construction and publication of this monograph. The first section clarifies how and why some fine distinctions were made within ‘the team,’ viz. between co-author, collaborator and editorial associate. The second (...) section focuses on the two epilogues of this monograph, viz. Smelser’s epilogue to The American University and Parsons’s epilogue to Smelser’s coeval study on Public Higher Education in California, in which the tensions within ‘the team’ surfaced most visibly. The third section looks at the publication of the monograph and the failed attempts to complete related research projects. Altogether, this reconstruction of the making of The American University clearly illuminates the descending phase of Parsons’s scientific career. It also sheds light on the substantive problems of the work Parsons produced in the latter part of his life and career. (shrink)

This article situates Craig Calhoun’s early sociological trajectory within a diverse set of movements that aimed to transform the discipline of sociology in the United States. As a means to historicizing Calhoun’s critical intellectual practice, I position it within the extensively debated, though only partially understood, disciplinary insurgencies of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, emphasizing attempts to transform sociology that drew substantially on interdisciplinary engagements to fuel the fires of a critical sociological imagination. A member of American sociology’s ‘disobedient (...) generation’, Calhoun was a key contributor to a resurgence of historical work that has come to be referred to as the ‘second wave’ of historical sociology. Tracing the ways that this intellectual movement drew inspiration from, worked alongside of, and overlapped with other critical disciplinary formations, I close with a brief consideration of the current state of critical sociology in the United States. (shrink)

This article presents a long overdue analysis of the idea of an ethically committed social science, which, after the demise of positivism and the deeming of moral neutrality as impossible, has come to dominate the self-understanding of many contemporary sociological approaches. Once adequately specified, however, the idea is shown to be ethically questionable in that it works against the moral commitments constitutive of academic life. The argument is conducted with resources from the work of Peter Winch, thus establishing its continuing (...) relevance and critical importance for the social sciences, sociology in particular. Special reference is made to heretofore unappreciated aspects of Winch’s work, including within the groundbreaking The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, but focusing specifically on his later contributions to ethics. (shrink)

Accounts of normal appearances in Goffman's Stigma and Garfinkel's "Passing and the Managed Achievement of Sex Status in an Intersexed Person" are compared. It is found that in these two classic interactionist texts the formulation of stigma requires the production of normal appearances that occlude interactants' selves. In effect, selves are stigmatized. The essay reads Goffman and Garfinkel in terms of each other, and in certain emergent paradoxes rediscovers the missing (stigmatized) selves.

This paper presents an analysis of the structure of contemporary sociological knowledge in terms of a theory of scientific discourse. The concept of 'discourse' is introduced as a theoretical refinement of the concept of 'paradigm' and is applied to the classes of knowledge claims of the natural and social sciences. It is concluded that general modes of scientific discourse are definable in terms of their vertical differentiation from everyday discourse, while particular modes of sociological discourse are additionally definable in terms (...) of their horizontal differentiation. A classification is then proposed which identifies three modes of sociological discourse: natural, technical and formal. (shrink)

Starting from the metaphor of “playing chamber music at a rock festival” used by Peter L. Berger in 1992 to describe the impact of The Social Construction of Reality on US sociology, this article works out how the book’s somewhat puzzling legacy as a bestseller and a classic with remarkably rare direct follow-ups in the US discourse can indeed be conceived. I argue that one needs to take into account the theoretical-historical context in which Berger and Luckmann developed their ideas, (...) including the specific forms of knowledge production in US sociology at the time, the institutional background of the book’s emergence at the New School for Social Research and the author’s biographical trajectories. On this basis, on can explain why Berger and Luckmann’s reformulation of the sociology of knowledge both perfectly met the 1960s Zeitgeist and at the same time remained theoretically marginal. (shrink)

A number of writers have picked out the way knowledge in the human sciences reflexively alters the human subject as what separates these sciences from the natural sciences. Furthermore, they take this reflexivity to be a condition of moral existence. The article sympathetically examines this emphasis on reflexive processes, but it rejects the particular conclusion that the reflexive phenomenon enables us to demarcate the human sciences. The first sections analyse the different meanings that references to reflexivity have in the psychological (...) and social sciences, in philosophy and in material life, and they link these meanings to the post-positivist philosophy of the social sciences. The discussion considers the problems raised (most influentially in the human sciences by Foucault) by being reflexive about reflexivity itself. They put a large question mark against hopes for a revived philosophical anthropology. Whatever the philosophical arguments, however, there is clearly a reflexive practice in the humanities and human sciences which there is not in the natural sciences. This leads to the argument that there are different forms of knowledge for different purposes and that it may therefore be divergence of purpose, not reflexivity itself, that creates differences among the sciences. It is the fact and purpose of human self-reflection that marks out the human sciences. If this is so, then it explains why an apparently circumscribed question about the classification of knowledge turns out to be inseparable from ontological and moral questions about human identity. (shrink)

Problem setting. The structure of the legal life phenomenological model, alongside the social experience and legal values, always contains subjective measurements that reflect legal person’s specific features. In particular, the point is in the legal duties, powers and the capability of legal reasoning. Their consideration provides an opportunity to show the integral phenomenological model of law via restored bonds of all its elements, and also enables us to extend the semantic field of social-philosophical aspect of the research through creating theoretical (...) pre-conditions for studying burning issues and specific manifestations of the modern law. Recent research and publications analysis. In phenomenology the person is traditionally recognized as the essential being, while the process of sense generation ensures, inter alia, contextual opportunities to study law. The contemporary experience of the legal person phenomenological understanding may be complemented by the research into the abilities of the legal person as an element of the legal life phenomenological model. Paper aim. This work aims to study the features of the legal person as a structural element of the legal life phenomenological model. Paper results and discussion. The paper shows that the law lifeworld is deeply rooted in social experience. It confirms that owing to the legal person the law lifeworld is constituted and “extended” with interpretations. Its activity as to the given social experience provides grounds to declare the equality of the following modalities: “be the carrier of legal awareness”, “be a legal agent” and “be a recognized and legally protected value”. These theoretical statements enable us to formulate certain social-philosophical issues of legal standing, and outline the ways of their solving. For instance, there is a problem of the symbolic status of a legal entity, found in its relations with the state and citizens; the issue of possible legal person’s recognition as a value in the conditions of his/her minimalized rights and hypertrophy of the legal duties is considered; the nature of a legal conflict and the mechanism of its solution is studied through recognizing the value of various communicative perspectives; it is stated that the differences between the intentional experiences of a legal person and the person with duties are a precondition to form legal nihilism and ignorance. The legal person is also considered in the context of his or her ability to be engaged in the discourse practices, embedded in the mechanisms of interpersonal constitution of senses inherent in the social being. The purpose of the legal discourse in the modern world is defined as a field to identify problems and “tension zones” in the implementation of liberal values and the rule of law. Following the analysis of the approaches to identifying the legal discourse core, its main strategies were discussed: legal discourse is focused on searching and developing socially important topics and sound arguments, confirming positive suggestions for the solving social problems (after J. Habermas); legal discourse implies the use of the power of language to fight against the arbitrary rule, including that of the legitimate power (М. Foucault); the specifics of the legal discourse are in creating linguistic tools and developing the procedures, owing to which legal enforcement is transferred to the speech space (P. Ricoeur). Conclusion. The study showed that the activity of the person who has his or her own legal opinion is in the fact that their generated texts and individual statements are not limited to the formal logical regulations, but are the means of expressing their social experience, the measure of balancing between the person’s claims and his or her social recognition. (shrink)

Karl Mannheim's contribution to a conceptual framework towards establishing objective knowledge in the social sciences has been overlooked and neglected. The paper discusses and reevaluates particularly Mannheim's concept of relationism which he used for clarifying the possibility of a "dynamic synthesis of perspectives" as the task of sociology of knowledge. One of the functions of Mannheim's conceptual framework was to narrow the gap between the techno-scientific or empiricist paradigm of knowledge and the humanistic-hermeneutical paradigm by a set of mediations which (...) shifted the emphasis from facts to the way of looking at them through concepts and terms which are never purely experiential, i.e. independent of interpretation. The author stresses the epistemological fertility of the relationist model of truth in view of recent insights of sociology of science. (shrink)

The work of psychiatrist R. D. Laing deserves recognition as a key contribution to sociological theory, in dialogue with the interactionist and interpretivist sociological traditions. Laing encourages us to identify meaningful social action in what would otherwise appear to be nonsocial phenomena. His interpretation of schizophrenia as a rational strategy of withdrawal reminds us of the threat that others can pose to the self and how social relations are implicated in even the most "private" and "internal" of experiences. He developed (...) a far-reaching critical theory of the self in modern society, which challenges the medicalization and biochemical reduction of human problems. Using the case of shyness as an example, the article seeks to demonstrate the importance of Laing's theories for examining the fragility of the self in relation to contemporary social order. (shrink)

Google Trends reveals that at the time we were writing our article on ‘The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology’ in 2007 almost nobody was searching the internet for ‘Big Data’. It was only towards the very end of 2010 that the term began to register, just ahead of an explosion of interest from 2011 onwards. In this commentary we take the opportunity to reflect back on the claims we made in that original paper in light of more recent discussions about (...) the social scientific implications of the inundation of digital data. Did our paper, with its emphasis on the emergence of, what we termed, ‘social transactional data’ and ‘digital byproduct data’ prefigure contemporary debates that now form the basis and rationale for this excellent new journal? Or was the paper more concerned with broader methodological, theoretical and political debates that have somehow been lost in all of the loud babble that has come to surround Big Data. Using recent work on the BBC Great British Class Survey as an example this brief paper offers a reflexive and critical reflection on what has become – much to the surprise of its authors – one of the most cited papers in the discipline of sociology in the last decade. (shrink)

This article offers both a feminist and an ethnomethodological reanalysis of Harold Garfinkel's report on Agnes, the intersexed person he studied with several colleagues. Both reanalyses yield similar conclusions. Specifically, while it does illuminate the work of accomplishing gender, the report on Agnes simultaneously illustrates how gender operates as a powerful background expectancy among professional as well as “lay” sociologists.

This is an article about the history of US sociology with systematic intent. It goes back to World War II to recover a wartime narrative context through which sociologists formulated a ‘trauma’ to the discipline and ‘blamed’ qualitative and values-oriented research for damaging the scientific status of sociology. This narrative documents a discussion of the changes that sociologists said needed to be made in sociology as a science to repair its status and reputation. While debates among sociologists about theory and (...) method had always been contentious, the wartime narrative insisted for the first time that sociology be immediately unified around quantitative approaches. The narrative of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ science that developed during the war not only undermined the efforts of social interactionists to theorize social action and social justice, but also derailed Parsons’ pre-war effort to bridge differences. The moral coding that is the legacy of the narrative stigmatized important approaches to sociology, leading to a ‘crisis’ in the 1960s that still haunts the discipline. Disciplinary history has overlooked the wartime narrative with the result that the role played by World War II in effecting this crisis has gone unrecognized. (shrink)

In 1964, the British psychologist Hans Jürgen Eysenck published Crime and Personality, the book that set forth his theory of the criminal as a psychopathic poor conditioner. Crime and Personality went through three editions, and even those who vehemently rejected the theory acknowledged it as the most highly articulated and influential biological explanation of crime of its time. Yet today Eysenck’s name is fading from criminological memory - and none too soon, in the opinion of critics who continue to anathematize (...) him as a self-serving showman, charlatan, and dangerous right-wing conservative. This article addresses four questions. Who was Eysenck? What did he say about the causes of crime? Why was he (and why does he continue to be) such a controversial figure? And did he contribute any ideas of lasting significance to criminology? The answers open a window onto the late 20th-century revival of biocriminology, a return to biological explanations that continues into the present and seems to be accelerating. They also reveal characteristics of criminology itself as a knowledge enterprise that has changed over time. (shrink)

This article is a response to Ray Pawson’s critique of critical realism, the philosophy of science elaborated by Roy Bhaskar. I argue with Pawson’s interpretation of critical realism’s positions on both natural and social science and his charges concerning its totalizing ontology, its arrogant epistemology and its naive methodology. The differences between critical realism and realist evaluation are not as significant as Pawson contends. The main differences between the two realisms lie in their approaches to the relationship between social structures (...) and human agency, and between facts and values. I argue that evaluation scientists need to clearly distinguish structure and agency. They should also make their values explicit. The uncritical approach of realist evaluation, combined with its underplaying of the importance of agency, leaves it open to implication in the abuses of bureaucratic instrumentalism. (shrink)

This article offers a historical analysis of the relationship between the practice of participant-observation among American sociologists and Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical model of the self. He was a social scientist who privileged ethnography in the field over the laboratory experiment, the survey questionnaire, or the mental test. His goal was a natural history of communication among humans. Rather than rely upon standardizing technologies for measurement, Goffman tried to obtain accurate recordings of human behavior through secretive observations. During the 1950s, he (...) conducted three major studies as a participant-observer, disguised from those studied through insincere performances. As originally presented, his dramaturgical theory did not draw upon the theater as the governing metaphor, but rather the confidence game. It is suggested that Goffman’s writings exemplify what Gerd Gigerenzer calls the tools-to-theories heuristic. Goffman’s depiction of the confidence man’s behavior closely mirrored how he and his fellow sociologists described the practice of participant-observation. Both were represented as embedded and attentive yet coolly detached observers skilled at playing different roles as the situation necessitated. The similarities between his own professional behavior and the activities of the confidence man may have suggested to Goffman the latter as a model for human nature. (shrink)

Reflexivity, or the systematic attempt to include the spokesperson in accounts of the social world, is a magnetic signature and inherent riddle of all modern thinking about knowledge and science. Turning the narrative back upon the narrator may sharpen our critical wits about the `inescapable perspectivity' of human knowledge; but self-referential accounts may also trigger endless loops of meta-theorizing and lose track of the object itself. Negotiating the twin pitfalls of spiralling meta-reflexivity and flat naturalistic accounts, I argue for a (...) reflexive `one step up', which adds one storey to the story. It explores, through critical discussions of the work of Harding and Bourdieu, how reflexivity may promiscuously combine with conflicting objectivist and constructivist epistemologies, and how reflexive accounts invariably appear to run in a circle. This performative circularity, it is argued, does not invalidate the reflexive effort but defines its major strength. Constitutive circularity graces both world-accounts and self-accounts with a radical uncertainty and incompleteness; which implies, among other things, that we must shift part of the burden of reflexive work to our friends, or rather: to our best enemies. (shrink)

Relativism in psychology unravels the truth-claims and oppressive\npractices of the discipline, but simply relativizing psychological knowledge\nhas not been sufficient to comprehend and combat the discipline\nas part of the ‘psy-complex’. For that, a balanced review of the contribution\nand problems of relativism needs to work dialectically, and so\nthis article reviews four problematic rhetorical balancing strategies in\nrelativism before turning to the contribution of critical realism. Critical\nrealism exposes positivist psychology’s pretensions to model itself\non what it imagines the natural sciences to be, and it grounds (...) discursive\naccounts of mentation in social practices. The problem is that those\nsympathetic to mainstream psychology are also appealing to ‘realism’\nto warrant it as a science and to discredit critical research that situates\npsychological phenomena. Our use of critical realism calls for an\naccount of how psychological facts are socially constructed within\npresent social arrangements and for an analysis of the underlying historical\nconditions that gave rise to the ‘psy-complex’. Only by understanding\nhow the discipline of psychology reproduces notions of\nindividuality and human nature, a critical realist endeavour, will it be\npossible to transform it, and to socially construct it as something different. (shrink)

(1988). Approaches, opportunities and priorities in the rhetoric of political inquiry: A critical synthesis. Social Epistemology: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 21-42.

By referring to mundane practices as well as to more systematic or theoretical discourses (those of Krishnamurti and Buber), this article shows the utility of focusing on the negatory, apophatic aspects of reflexivity, i.e. on attempts at removing obstacles (mainly thinking, decision-making processes) which prevent the spontaneous emergence of open-ended self—self and self—other relationships.

The ArgumentPsychology has been frequently subjected to the criticism that it is an unreflexive science — that it fails to acknowledge the reflexive properties of human action which influence psychologists themselves as well as their subjects. However, even avowedly unreflexive actions may involve reflexivity, and in this paper I suggest that the practices of psychology include reflexive ones. Psychology has an established tradition of silence about the self-awareness and sell-consciousness of its actors, whether those actors are experimenters, theorists, or participants (...) (subjects) in research, yet this silence has been established and maintained through sophisticated exercises in self-regard — through sustained reflexive work. Historical analysis reveals some of the ways in which psychologists recognized and then neglected, covered over, or denied reflexivity. Study of those instances where psychologists have engaged in self-conscious reflection or have attended to the sell-consciousness of research subjects indicates both the dangers of reflexivity to governing investigative practices and the resilience which psychology has built against reflexive work. Canonized procedures for scientific work reproduce selves of experimenters and subjects alike, selves who acknowledge only part of their reflexive engagements. Historians of psychology have a special opportunity (and obligation) to explore the reflexive dynamics of investigative practices, and, hence, to theorize aboutscientists, along with their actions and interactions, just as we theorize about science, its products, and its evolution. (shrink)