Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

In this article, I study, from the point of view of the analytic philosophy of mind, the compatibility of students’ ideas studies with radical constructivism. I demonstrate that RC is based on a psychology of narrow mental states; that is, the idea that the mental content of an individual can be fully characterised without any reference external to her or him. I show that this fact imposes some severe restrictions to SIS to be incorporated into RC. In particular, I argue (...) that only qualitative studies can comply with the requirement of narrowness. Nevertheless, I propose that quantitative works can be employed as sources of types in order to study token actual students. I use this type-token dichotomy to put forward an outline of a theory of the relation between school contents and mental contents. In this view, token mental contents regarding a given topic can be defined, and probed, only by resorting to typical school contents. (shrink)

Although most contemporary philosophers of language hold that semantics and pragmatics require separate study, there is surprisingly little agreement on where exactly the line should be drawn between these two areas, and why. In this paper I suggest that this lack of clarity is at least partly caused by a certain historical obfuscation of the roots of the founding three-way distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics in Charles Peirce’s pragmatist philosophy of language. I then argue for recovering and revisiting these (...) original roots, taking indexicality as a case-study of how certain questions connected with the distinction which are currently considered complex and difficult may be clarified by a ‘properly pragmatist pragmatics’. Such a view, I shall argue, upends a certain priority usually accorded to semantics over pragmatics, teaching that we do not work out what terms mean in some abstract overall sense and then work out to what use they are being put; rather, we must understand to what use terms are being put in order to understand what they mean. (shrink)

The concept of protosemiosis or semiosis at the lower levels of the living goes back to Giorgio Prodi, Thomas A. Sebeok and others. More recently, a typology of proto-signs was introduced by Sharov and Vehkavaara. Kull uses the term of vegetative semiosis, defined by iconicity, when referring to plants and lower organism semiosis. The criteria for the typology of proto-signs by Sharov and Vehkavaara are mostly based on two important presuppositions: agency and a lack of representation in low-level semiosis. We (...) would like to focus on an alternative approach to protosign classification. In particular, we aim to provide a sign-typological characteristic of proteins (in analogy to Maran’ s classification of environmental signs). Our approach is focused on representation, that is, we only consider the relation between a sign and its object. We are considering representation independently from the role of interpretant and interpretation (which is an epiphenomenon of agency). Two hypotheses are investigated and accordingly evaluated in this paper: (I) Proteins are indexical protosigns. (II) Proteins are iconic protosigns. The conclusion our argumentation leads to supports the hypothesis (II). (shrink)

This thesis attempts an explanation of the object of signs in Charles s. Peirce's semiotic theory. In this regard it tries to defend Peirce's view that every sign has an object. The question of the conventionality of signs is also taken up in the investigation of Peirce's classification of signs. In this regard the thesis attempts to argue, contrary to Peirce, that anything requires a convention if it is to be significative. In chapter I Peirce's categories are introduced and explained (...) in order to provide the necessary background for the later explanation of his classificatory scheme. In chapter II Peirce's original three classification trichotomies are discussed in order to develop the main lines of the triadic sign relation and Peirce's sign theory in general. In this chapter it is argued that Peirce’s classification scheme breaks down at certain points and leads to a blurring of some of the distinctions between signs. On this point the question of conventions in sign theory arises. The thesis argues that a convention is required for all signs whereas Peirce seems to think that only symbols require a convention. An explanation of the immediate-dynamical object distinction and the immediate-dynamical-final interpretant distinction is also attempted in this chapter. In chapter II the question of the object of signs is taken up in some detail. Here it is argued that every sign has an object when it is actually functioning as a sign. In this regard much emphasis is put on the role of context in determining the object of a given sign. The distinction between the immediate and dynamical object is developed in greater detail and it is suggested that this distinction might be helpful in deciding whether or not Peirce thought all things are signs. In the conclusion a summary of the arguments for the necessity of a convention for all signs and the intentionality of all signs is given and some other questions in sign theory are suggested. A bibliography is appended to the end of the thesis. (shrink)

This paper takes indexicality as a case-study for critical examination of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics as currently conceived in mainstream philosophy of language. Both a ‘pre-indexical’ and ‘post-indexical’ analytic formal semantics are examined and found wanting, and instead an argument is mounted for a ‘properly pragmatist pragmatics’, according to which we do not work out what signs mean in some abstract overall sense and then work out to what use they are being put; rather, we must understand to (...) what use signs are being put in order to work out what they mean. (shrink)

Although the index is one of the best known features of Peirce's theory of signs there is little appreciation of Peirce's theory of the index amongst contemporary philosophers of language. Amongst Peirce scholars, the value placed on Peirce's account is greater, but is largely based on Thomas Goudge's paper, "Peirce's Index" (Goudge, 1965). Despite marking a crucial milestone in our comprehension of Peirce's theory, our understanding of indices and indexical reference has grown markedly over the last forty years. Time has (...) now come, then, to develop the work that Goudge began and to provide a full analysis of Peirce's account that makes its value to the philosophy of language clear. I undertake this enterprise here. (shrink)