: In this essay I argue that in any country, the realization of sexual equality requires a certain level of economic development. I support this general theme by examining a particular case--a dilemma faced by Chinese feminists today. I intend to show that in a developing country such as China, where heavy physical labor is still in great demand in daily life and productive activity, full sexual equality cannot be a reality.

Throughout the development of an "ethic of care" different from an "ethic of justice," the relationship between the two has been problematic. Are they theories between which one must choose? Are they complementary? Are they domain-specific? In support of my view that neither is adequate by itself, I here examine the private domain of care of the dying by intimates, and find there important issues both of care and of justice.

Doppelt criticizes my theory of freedom as self?development and the related model of workers? self?management which I propose. I argue that Doppelt ignores or misconstrues three major features of my view: (1) the systematic grounding of the conception of freedom in the nature of agency and the distinction I draw between abstract and concrete freedom; (2) my derivation of rights of self?management from the concept of freedom; (3) my argument for a universal right of employment. In general, Doppelt's criticism ignores (...) the systematic conception I have offered of equal rights of access to the social and economic conditions of self?development, a conception which he himself seems to be getting at in his proposed paradigm. I go on to criticize two major features of Doppelt's own view, namely, his historical relativism and his interpretation of meaningful work. (shrink)

What is the nature of evil action? My thesis is that perpetrators and victims of evil inhabit an asymmetrical relation of power; the strength of the more powerful party lies in its ability to exploit the other’s fundamental vulnerability, and the weaker party is vulnerable precisely insofar as it is directly dependent on the more powerful party for the satisfaction of its fundamental needs. The fundamental vulnerabilities that are exploited correspond to features essential to our humanity (ontological), moral personhood (personal), (...) and individuality (characteristic). These kinds of vulnerabilities are both constituted by and engender fundamental needs and give rise to direct dependencies on others to satisfy or to refrain from interfering with the satisfaction of fundamental needs. The unambiguous exploitation by the more powerful agent on whom the vulnerable directly depend is characteristic of evil action. Although I do not claim that the exploitation of ontological, personal, and characteristic vulnerabilities necessarily results in evil, it does typify it. (shrink)