A topic common to both Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of theories of the soul is the doctrine of the soul as a harmony of the parts of the body. Plato’s Phaedo as well as Aristotle’s De anima and Eudemus present this theory and argue against the identification of the soul as a harmony. This paper has two focuses, one philosophical and one historical. First, I will focus on the argumentation used by Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus, which is often associated (...) with Aristotle’s early attachment to Plato. On the basis of the argumentation against the harmonia theory, I will try to show that the Eudemus is not a dialogue that depicts Aristotle’s Platonic phase. Instead, by comparing the arguments of the Eudemus with both Plato and Aristotle’s mature thought, I will argue that the argumentation of the Eudemus seems to be an indirect attack on Plato’s view on the Forms and on the nature of the soul, and that it seems to be consistent with Aristotle’s mature work On the Soul. Second, given that Aristotle discusses this topic twice, I will try, also on the basis of conclusions about the Eudemus and on later reception of Aristotle’s arguments, to show why this is the case. (shrink)

L’objectif de cette étude est d’examiner l’hypothèse selon laquelle la quarta natura, théorisée par Épicure pour rendre compte des activités de l’âme et décrite par Lucrèce (DRN III, 237-244), résulte de l’appropriation par Épicure d’un argument aristotélicien afin de répondre aux critiques d’Aristote à l’égard de la théorie démocritéenne de l’âme. Pour ce faire, on analysera le témoignage de Cicéron (Tusc. I, 10, 22) sur le quintum genus attribué à Aristote et on rendra compte des débats sur ses sources possibles. (...) En confrontant le témoignage cicéronien avec les vers dans lesquels Lucrèce expose la théorie de la quatrième nature, on montrera les fortes ressemblances entre leurs structures argumentatives. Sur la base de la possible datation de la théorie de la quintessence et de son attribution au Péripatos du iie siècle av. J-C, on proposera d’expliquer cette similarité par l’appropriation par Lucrèce de l’argument par soustraction qui caractérise la théorie de la quintessence, à partir de laquelle il aurait conçu la théorie de la quatrième nature. Afin de vérifier l’exactitude de cette interprétation, on examinera l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’appropriation de cet argument, et donc la conception de la quatrième nature, remontent à Épicure, la paternité de l’argument par soustraction (à partir duquel les péripatéticiens postérieurs pourraient avoir conçu la théorie de la quintessence) étant alors à attribuer à Aristote. Pour ce faire, on analysera un passage du De Caelo (269a30-269b2) et un passage de La Génération des animaux (736b29-737a1) où l’argument par soustraction sert à introduire d’une part l’éther et d’autre par le pneuma. Ensuite, en s’appuyant sur l’analyse d’un passage du De Anima (405a5-7), on montrera que l’appropriation de cet argument pourrait s’expliquer par la tentative, de la part d’Épicure, de répondre à une critique aristotélicienne concernant la théorie démocritéenne de l’âme. (shrink)

The paper provides an innovative interpretation of the treatise De Victu, showing that, though Heraclitean, Anaxagorean and Empedoclean borrowings in the work are certainly pervasive, the author also develops a sophisticated and multi-purpose explanatory framework, which, being based on an original conception of the nature of man, the cosmos and the relationship between the two, provides an effective foundation for the medical enterprise, allowing him to propose his dietetics as a ‘way of life’. At the core of this enterprise is (...) the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm: in virtue of this relationship, I submit, the cosmos becomes both an active factor to be taken into account for the maintenance of individual physical well-being and the normative standard to which a dietician and whoever cares about health must refer in order to live the healthiest possible life. (shrink)

Ancient philosophy has been a source of inspiration for contemporary philosophy in recent decades. An outstanding example is the renaissance of hylomorphism in the field of philosophy of biology. For the philosophy of mind, hylomorphism has been little discussed so far. Therefore, ancient models in the philosophy of mind are still of interest. This article argues that Plato’s Phaedo can act as a source for contemporary debates. As a starting point, Simmias’s objections to the immortality of the soul are analyzed. (...) Plato does not simply reject these objections, but introduces conditions for a hylomorphistic understanding of the soul in Socrates’ reply. These conditions are the following: (A) the mind supervenes on the body; (B) this supervenience must allow the strong emergence of the mind; (C) the mind comprises causal powers; (D) teleological explanations are a necessary ingredient of a suitable model for the mind-body problem. With these conditions, Plato already introduces central components that are present in contemporary philosophical debates, but have not yet been unified into a hylomorphistic concept in the philosophy of mind. The present article proposes this unification. (shrink)

Nearly all of us would accept that at least some of our thoughts – desires, beliefs, and intentions, for example – can be causally responsible for movements in our bodies. Starting in antiquity, and especially since Descartes, philosophers have deployed this claim as the pivotal premise in an increasingly popular line of argument against dualism. The purpose of this paper is to show that, in the Phaedo, Socrates uses this very same claim as the pivotal premise in a surprisingly powerful (...) two-part argument for dualism. (shrink)

At Phaedo 86b7–c2 Simmias puts forward the theory that the soul is the attunement of bodily elements. Many scholars have claimed that this theory originates in the Pythagoreans, especially Philolaus. The claim is largely based on their reading of the Phaedo, since we have scarce doxographical evidence. In this paper I show that the dialogue in question does not constitute any evidence for the Pythagorean origin of Simmias’ attunement theory, and that it rather represents the theory as stemming from a (...) materialistic world view that had become widespread among people at that time. I also pursue the question how and why, then, the attunement theory was able to attract many people, by examining its relation to Socrates’ affinity argument. (shrink)