Based on ethnographic and linguistic analyses, this article describes the discourse-related practices and interactional role behaviours of an experienced lawyer who assumed a pivotal role in the negotiation of a Mergers-and-Acquisitions type transaction vis-a-vis a number of other legal and financial professionals. Set in an international business context, all communication took place in English and for the most part via email. Complex discursive processes facilitated close interdisciplinary engagement and, more particularly, required that a single individual assume a key interactional role (...) to oversee and advance the negotiation activities. This pivotal role entailed the strategic use of language and discourse to negotiate, account for, and justify the various stages of the negotiation. In addition to textual analyses of the negotiated contract and attendant emails, interviews were conducted with the principal lawyer and her senior partner in order to examine the textual findings grounded in the organisational context of a law firm and produce an ontology of this negotiation process. These research findings could be used to assist novice lawyers and business professionals to understand some of the discourse strategies and interactional roles that are often so critical for commercial contract negotiation activities. (shrink)

The Foundation for Legal Knowledge Systems (JURIX) has, sinceits foundation in 1988, become an internationally renowned forumfor Law and Artificial Intelligence in theNetherlands. This paper is based onan intellectual review of the work of JURIX requested by theorganisation as part of its 10th anniversary in December 1997 andpresented as a keynote address at the 10th anniversary conference.It has been updated to include the following two conferences. Itapplauds the overall effort but also suggests some directions forfuture development and suggests in particular:The (...) breadth of research has been commendable, butthere is a need to move towards greater integration of systems andmigration to internet based systems. (shrink)

The centrality of argumentation in the judicial process is an age-old acquisition of research on legal discourse. Notwithstanding the deep insights provided by legal theoretical and philosophical works, only recently has judicial argumentation been tackled in its linguistic dimension. This paper aims to contribute to the development of linguistic studies of judicial argumentation, by shedding light on evaluation as a prominent aspect in the construction of the judge’s argumentative position. Evaluation as a deep structure of judicial argumentation is studied from (...) a discursive point of view entailing the analysis of a sample of authentic judicial language. Evaluative lexis is investigated within a single genre of judicial discourse, i.e. judgments, instantiated by a corpus of US Supreme Court judgments. Findings show that judges use diversified strategies to take stance as they organise their argumentative discourse: from easily recognisable verbal and adjectival tools to more finely-grained discourse elements such as the encapsulating pattern ‘this/these/that/those + labelling noun’. (shrink)

This article reviews the opportunities for legal semiotics to contribute to legal philosophy, legal sociology, the reading of legal texts and the analysis of legal language (with bibliography) and surveys the institutional development of legal semiotics.

A major focus of the study of courtroom interaction in the fields of sociolinguistics and discourse analysis has been the discursive strategies that lawyers use during trials. While acknowledging the role of rhetorical skill in influencing hearers' perceptions, this paper seeks to demonstrate that language has its limits, and that the speaker's personality and identity are key factors in determining how a verbal presentation will be received. The opening statement given by John Allen Muhammad, the ‘Beltway Sniper’, acting as his (...) own lawyer at his murder trial, incorporated many recommended strategies and was surprisingly well crafted, but was widely derided by media commentators. Through a comparison of Muhammad's opening statement with similar presentations delivered by celebrated attorneys, this paper will explore the relationships between language, personality, and identity in the construction of legal persuasion. Specifically, this paper will argue that Muhammad's identity as a criminal defendant, coupled with his inability to project his personality in a way that would command the attention of his hearers, set the stage for a negative reception of his remarks that their content could not overcome. (shrink)

Legislatures enact laws and the courts interpret them. Under the doctrine of legislative supremacy, a judge is not free to ignore or modify a statutory provision in order to substitute a rule that seems to him to be better reasoned; thus where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, interpretation is unnecessary and it must be enforced according to its terms. Nevertheless, gaps and ambiguities can arise and, in such cases, courts apply interpretive rules, or ‘canons of construction’, (...) to resolve these ambiguities. One frequently invoked rule requires that words that are not defined by a statute be given their ordinary meaning by the interpreting court. In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has increasingly relied upon dictionary definitions in applying this rule. The Court’s use of dictionaries as authority for its interpretations incorporates the assumption that the dictionary is the best source for ascertaining the meaning of statutory texts. This article challenges that assumption on linguistic grounds. I argue that the focus on definitions skews the interpretation of statutory language by isolating words from their semantic context. By comparing two cases in which the Court used dictionary definitions to a third case in which the definition used by the Court was contained in the statute itself, I demonstrate that the ordinary meaning of legal terms cannot be determined by dictionary definitions. (shrink)

Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history of Western thought. This work is a multidisciplinary guide to theorizing about analogy. It contains 1,406 references, primarily to journal articles and monographs, and primarily to English language material. classical through to contemporary sources are included. The work is classified into eight different sections (with a number of subsections). A brief introduction to each section is provided. Keywords and key expressions of importance to research on (...) analogy are discussed in the introductory material. Electronic resources for conducting research on analogy are listed as well. (shrink)

This article examines some of the interactions between law, science, and society taking place during a trial. By focusing on a restricted set of scientific and nonscientific actors engaged in negotiating the meaning, relevance, and reliability of scientific evidence, the article illustrates how the categories—law, science, and society—are inextricably interrelated in the legal negotiations and outcome. The introduction of scientific evidence into adversarial legal settings produces strategies, opinions, and claims that are not shaped solely by scientists, lawyers, or legal processes. (...) The situated law-science negotiations provide a site where social order and scientific knowledges are mutually constituted. The outcome of specific law-science interactions will be open to a range of readings and constraints that are not reducible to some putatively correct scientific understanding nor adequately described as the distortion of scientific evidence by the legal system. (shrink)

This article examines two modalities of law, depicted spatially as the vertical and the horizontal. The intellectual background for seeing law in vertical and horizontal dimensions is to be found in much socio-legal scholarship. These approaches have challenged the modernist, legal positivist and essentially vertical view of law as a system of imperatives emanating from a hierarchically superior source such as a sovereign. In keeping with the socio-legal critical tradition, but approaching it from the perspective of legal philosophy, my aim (...) is to address three matters. First, why is vertical law problematic for feminists? Second, what are the theoretical characteristics of law in its horizontal register? Third, how is an appreciation of this ‘flat’ law useful for feminist legal theory and practice? In particular, I consider the ways in which feminist legal theory operating in the horizontal dimension can transgress, without transcending, the vertically determined perimeters of the nation state. (shrink)

In this thesis I outline a view of primary legislation from a systems perspective. I suggest that systems theory and, in particular, autopoietic theory, as modified by field theory, is a mechanism for understanding how society operates. The description of primary legislation that I outline differs markedly from any conventional definition in that I argue that primary legislation is not, and indeed cannot be, either a law or any of the euphemisms that are usually accorded to an enactment by a (...) parliament. I cite two reasons for such a conclusion. The primary reason for my conclusion is that I see primary legislation as being an output of a particular subsystem of society, while the law is the output of another subsystem of society. I argue that these outputs are the discrete products of separate subsystems of society. I argue that primary legislation should be viewed as a trinity. The first state of this trinity is that, upon enactment, primary legislation is a brute fact in that it is but a thing and the only property of this thing is that of being a text. The second state of this trinity is that following the act of enactment, the thing enacted will be reproduced and this reproduction is a separate thing that will sit in some repository until used. The third state of this trinity is that, upon use, this thing that is primary legislation will be transformed into an object and the user will attribute such functions and attributes to that object as are appropriate to the context within which the object is used. The thing has therefore become an object and an institutional fact. The second reason for my conclusion that primary legislation is not a law relates to the fact that the thing that is primary legislation is a text and the only function of a text is that it is available to be read. That is to say, of itself, a text is incapable of doing anything: it is the reader who defines the status of the text and attributes functions and attributes. Upon use, primary legislation thus becomes a censored input for future action and one of these actions may be some statement by a court of law. I assert that the view of primary legislation that has been accepted within the body politic is the product of the discourse of a particular subsystem of society that I have designated 'the legal practice', and I outline why and how this has occurred. Outlining a view about primary legislation also necessitates outlining a view as to the nature of the law. I assert that the law is a myth and I see this myth as a product of the discourse of the legal practice. I have asserted that although it is the judges that state the law, such statements flow from the discourse of those who practise the law. (shrink)