Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Platitudes against paradox.Sven Rosenkranz & Arash Sarkohi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):319 - 341.
    We present a strategy to dissolve semantic paradoxes which proceeds from an explanation of why paradoxical sentences or their definitions are semantically defective. This explanation is compatible with the acceptability of impredicative definitions, self-referential sentences and semantically closed languages and leaves the status of the so-called truth-teller sentence unaffected. It is based on platitudes which encode innocuous constraints on successful definition and successful expression of propositional content. We show that the construction of liar paradoxes and of certain versions of Curry’s (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Platitudes against Paradox.Sven Rosenkranz & Arash Sarkohi - 2007 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):319-341.
    We present a strategy to dissolve semantic paradoxes which proceeds from an explanation of why paradoxical sentences or their definitions are semantically defective. This explanation is compatible with the acceptability of impredicative definitions, self-referential sentences and semantically closed languages and leaves the status of the so-called truth-teller sentence unaffected. It is based on platitudes which encode innocuous constraints on successful definition and successful expression of propositional content. We show that the construction of liar paradoxes and of certain versions of Curry's (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Chrysippus Confronts the Liar: The Case for Stoic Cassationism.Michael Papazian - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):197-214.
    The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus wrote extensively on the liar paradox, but unfortunately the extant testimony on his response to the paradox is meager and mainly hostile. Modern scholars, beginning with Alexander Rüstow in the first decade of the twentieth century, have attempted to reconstruct Chrysippus? solution. Rüstow argued that Chrysippus advanced a cassationist solution, that is, one in which sentences such as ?I am speaking falsely? do not express propositions. Two more recent scholars, Walter Cavini and Mario Mignucci, have rejected (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A FailedCassatio? A Note on Valor and Martínez on Goldstein.Laureano Luna - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):383-386.
    I address the claim by Valor and Martínez that Goldstein's cassationist approach to Liar-like paradoxes generates paradoxes it cannot solve. I argue that these authors miss an essential point in Goldstein's cassationist approach, namely the thesis that paradoxical sentences are not able to make the statement they seem to make.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Grounded Ungroundedness.Casper Storm Hansen - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):216-243.
    A modification of Kripke’s theory of truth is proposed and it is shown how this modification solves some of the problems of expressive weakness in Kripke’s theory. This is accomplished by letting truth values be grounded in facts about other sentences’ ungroundedness.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences.C. Dutilh Novaes - 2008 - History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (3):227-261.
    Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in self-referential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12th to the 15th century) and the last 100 years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • A Failed "Cassatio": Goldstein on the Liar.Jordi Valor Abad & José Martínez Fernández - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):327 - 332.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction, and More.Laurence Goldstein - 2004 - In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press. pp. 295--313.
    outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations