We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter’s concept of superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of type drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and to (...) account for the existence of some of them. We find conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes. (shrink)

In the standard formulation of game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices and study the consequences for the basic results on normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. (...) These equilibria turn out to be related to experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play. (shrink)

Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, 1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, 2011) it was shown that under fairy general conditions maximin strategies in completely mixed games can guarantee the same expected payoff as completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Based on this finding, the current paper argues that maximin strategies have important properties. For instance, (...) maximin strategies may refine Nash equilibria in subjective mixed strategies. Further, Bayesian rationality of the players may favor maximin strategies more often than Nash equilibrium strategies. The paper concludes with several suggestions for further experimental research that may shed more light on whether maximin behavior can explain reality better than Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

How is one’s cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2×2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2 \times 2$$\end{document} dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the (...) latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability. (shrink)

Proponents of neuroeconomics often argue that better knowledge of the human neural architecture enables economists to improve standard models of choice. In their view, these improvements provide compelling reasons to use neural findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. In a recent article, I criticized this view by pointing to the trade-offs between the modeling desiderata valued by neuroeconomists and other economists, respectively. The present article complements my earlier critique by focusing on three modeling desiderata that figure prominently in economic (...) and neuroeconomic modeling. For each desideratum, I examine findings that neuroeconomists deem to be especially relevant for economists and argue that neuroeconomists have failed to substantiate their calls to use these findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. In doing so, I identify methodological and evidential constraints that will continue to hinder neuroeconomists’ attempts to improve such models. Moreover, I draw on the literature on scientific modeling to advance the ongoing philosophical discussion regarding the prospects of interdisciplinary models of choice. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to investigate the impact of agent heterogeneity (as regards their attitude towards cooperation) and payoff structure on cooperative behaviour, using an experimental setting with incomplete information. A game of chicken is played considering two types of agents: ‘unconditional cooperators’, who always cooperate, and ‘strategic cooperators’, who do not cooperate unless it is in their interest to do so. Overall, our data show a much higher propensity to cooperate than predicted by theory. They also suggest (...) that agent heterogeneity matters: the higher the proportion of ‘strategic cooperators’ in the population, the higher their probability to cooperate. Finally, our data confirm that higher rewards to cooperation (embedded in the payoff structure) tend to lower defection. Taken together, our results suggest that the subjects might be non-expected utility maximizers, dealing with both outcomes and probabilities in a non-linear manner. (shrink)

For decades, discrete choice modelling was practically dominated by only two models: multinomial probit and logit. This paper presents a novel alternative—harmonic choice model. It is qualitatively similar to multinomial probit and logit: if one choice alternative greatly exceeds all (falls below at least one of) other alternatives in terms of utility then it is chosen with probability close to one (zero). Compared to probit and logit, the new model has relatively flat tails and it is steeper in the neighborhood (...) of zero (when all alternatives yield the same utility and the decision maker chooses among them at random). (shrink)

Prediction markets are low volume speculative markets whose prices offer informative forecasts on particular policy topics. Observers worry that traders may attempt to mislead decision makers by manipulating prices. We adapt a Kyle-style market microstructure model to this case, adding a manipulator with an additional quadratic preference regarding the price. In this model, when other traders are uncertain about the manipulator’s target price, the mean target price has no effect on prices, and increases in the variance of the target price (...) can increase average price accuracy, by increasing the returns to informed trading and thereby incentives for traders to become informed. (shrink)

Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and game situations at gametheory.tau.ac.il. Several thousand observations were collected and the response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences in response time across responses. It is suggested that choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of cognitive reasoning.

Kaushik Basu presenta el dilema del viajero como un desafío a la teoría de juegos. El desafío ha sido investigado experimentalmente. Al enfrentarse a la versión de Basu del DV o similares, los participantes se comportan como sugiere Basu. Sin embargo, un pequeño cambio en el juego tiene como consecuencia revertir las tendencias de elección. La cuestión es, entonces, si es posible brindar una explicación de los principales hallazgos empíricos como consecuencias de decisiones racionales. Hay varias propuestas en la literatura (...) pero ninguna provee una explicación satisfactoria de por qué expertos en teoría de juegos jugando entre sí usualmente rechazan la única estrategia no dominada del DV. El objetivo de este artículo es sugerir una propuesta alternativa que solucione este problema. (shrink)