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  1. Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and game situations at gametheory.tau.ac.il. Several thousand observations were collected and the response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences in response time across responses. It is suggested that choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of cognitive reasoning.
     
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  • Maximin Play in Completely Mixed Strategic Games.Vitaly Pruzhansky - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (4):543-561.
    Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, 1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, 2011) it was shown that under fairy general conditions maximin strategies in completely mixed games can guarantee the same expected payoff as completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Based on this finding, the current paper argues that maximin strategies have important properties. For instance, (...)
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  • Neural Findings and Economic Models: Why Brains Have Limited Relevance for Economics.Roberto Fumagalli - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (5):606-629.
    Proponents of neuroeconomics often argue that better knowledge of the human neural architecture enables economists to improve standard models of choice. In their view, these improvements provide compelling reasons to use neural findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. In a recent article, I criticized this view by pointing to the trade-offs between the modeling desiderata valued by neuroeconomists and other economists, respectively. The present article complements my earlier critique by focusing on three modeling desiderata that figure prominently in economic (...)
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  • Cognitive Ability and the Effect of Strategic Uncertainty.Nobuyuki Hanaki, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini & Adam Zylbersztejn - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (1):101-121.
    How is one’s cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2×2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2 \times 2$$\end{document} dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the (...)
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  • The Puzzle of Cooperation in a Game of Chicken: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW]Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):65-87.
    The objective of this article is to investigate the impact of agent heterogeneity (as regards their attitude towards cooperation) and payoff structure on cooperative behaviour, using an experimental setting with incomplete information. A game of chicken is played considering two types of agents: ‘unconditional cooperators’, who always cooperate, and ‘strategic cooperators’, who do not cooperate unless it is in their interest to do so. Overall, our data show a much higher propensity to cooperate than predicted by theory. They also suggest (...)
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  • Fluid Intelligence and Cognitive Reflection in a Strategic Environment: Evidence From Dominance-Solvable Games.Nobuyuki Hanaki, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini & Adam Zylbersztejn - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • On Rationality in the Traveler's Dilemma.Rodrigo Moro, Marcelo Auday & Fernando Tohmé - 2018 - Critica 50 (148):55-68.
    Kaushik Basu presenta el dilema del viajero como un desafío a la teoría de juegos. El desafío ha sido investigado experimentalmente. Al enfrentarse a la versión de Basu del DV o similares, los participantes se comportan como sugiere Basu. Sin embargo, un pequeño cambio en el juego tiene como consecuencia revertir las tendencias de elección. La cuestión es, entonces, si es posible brindar una explicación de los principales hallazgos empíricos como consecuencias de decisiones racionales. Hay varias propuestas en la literatura (...)
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  • Ellsberg games.Frank Riedel & Linda Sass - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (4):469-509.
    In the standard formulation of game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices and study the consequences for the basic results on normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. (...)
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  • 'From Exchange It Comes to Tears'. A Dutch 'Folk Theorem' Reconsidered.Nicolaas J. Vriend - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (4):315-338.
    A Dutch 'folk theorem' holds that 'from exchange it comes to tears'. This seems to contradict the basic idea found in economics that exchange and trade can make both sides better off. We show that the 'folk theorem' has a better theoretical foundation than sometimes thought, as it is vindicated by the equilibrium of an exchange game with two-sided asymmetric information. We, then, explain the practical value of such 'folk wisdom' in the real world by showing why players might be (...)
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  • Superrational Types.Fernando A. Tohmé & Ignacio D. Viglizzo - 2019 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (6):847-864.
    We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter’s concept of superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of type drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and to (...)
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  • A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market Accuracy.Robin Hanson - unknown
    Prediction markets are low volume speculative markets whose prices offer informative forecasts on particular policy topics. Observers worry that traders may attempt to mislead decision makers by manipulating prices. We adapt a Kyle-style market microstructure model to this case, adding a manipulator with an additional quadratic preference regarding the price. In this model, when other traders are uncertain about the manipulator’s target price, the mean target price has no effect on prices, and increases in the variance of the target price (...)
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  • Rational Adaptation Under Task and Processing Constraints: Implications for Testing Theories of Cognition and Action.Andrew Howes, Richard L. Lewis & Alonso Vera - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):717-751.