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  1. Quantum Sleeping Beauty.Peter J. Lewis - 2006 - Analysis 67 (1):59-65.
    The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics both raise problems concerning subjective probability assignments. Furthermore, there are striking parallels between the two cases; in both cases personal experience has a branching structure, and in both cases the agent loses herself among the branches. However, the treatment of probability is very different in the two cases, for no good reason that I can see. Suppose, then, that we adopt the same treatment of probability in each (...)
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  • Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief.Darren Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.
    This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.
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  • Making New Tools From the Toolbox of Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-7.
    In this review, I specify the metametaphysical background against which Alastair Wilson’s “The Nature of Contingency” should be properly understood. Metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline, is standing on thin ice. The caricature of the situation is polarized, and is often presented as follows: metaphysics is either entirely extracted from science or it is entirely independent of science. There is a recent trend that focuses on the middle ground between these extremes, searching the philosophical literature for metaphysical theories that can fill (...)
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  • Probability in the Everett Interpretation.Hilary Greaves - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):109–128.
    The Everett (many-worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics faces a prima facie problem concerning quantum probabilities. Research in this area has been fast-paced over the last few years, following a controversial suggestion by David Deutsch that decision theory can solve the problem. This article provides a non-technical introduction to the decision-theoretic program, and a sketch of the current state of the debate.
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  • Can Many-Worlds Survive a Quantum Doomsday.Brett Bevers - unknown
    A novel puzzle for the notion of probability in the Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is presented. The puzzle makes use of a thought experiment that some have claimed would provide empirical support for Many-Worlds over alternatives. It is argued that, if the predictions of Many-Worlds do indeed differ from other interpretations as claimed, then Born’s rule must generally be invalid in Many-Worlds. It is shown that the thought experiment provides a counter example for recent decision-theoretic arguments that purport to (...)
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  • A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'.David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):78-86.
    Since the publication of Elga's seminal paper in 2000, the Sleeping Beauty paradox has been the source of much discussion, particularly in this journal. Over the past few decades the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 1 has also been much debated. There is an interesting connection between the way these two topics raise issues about subjective probability assignments.This connection is often alluded to, but as far as we know Peter J. Lewis's ‘Quantum Sleeping Beauty’ is the first attempt to examine (...)
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  • Is Quantum Suicide Painless? On an Apparent Violation of the Principal Principle.Milan M. Ćirković - 2004 - Foundations of Science 11 (3):287-296.
    The experimental setup of the self-referential quantum measurement, jovially known as the ‘quantum suicide’ or the ‘quantum Russian roulette’ is analyzed from the point of view of the Principal Principle of David Lewis. It is shown that the apparent violation of this principle – relating objective probabilities and subjective chance – in this type of thought experiment is just an illusion due to the usage of some terms and concepts ill-defined in the quantum context. We conclude that even in the (...)
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  • Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
    Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant (...)
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  • Uncertainty and Probability for Branching Selves.Peter J. Lewis - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):1-14.
    Everettian accounts of quantum mechanics entail that people branch; every possible result of a measurement actually occurs, and I have one successor for each result. Is there room for probability in such an account? The prima facie answer is no; there are no ontic chances here, and no ignorance about what will happen. But since any adequate quantum mechanical theory must make probabilistic predictions, much recent philosophical labor has gone into trying to construct an account of probability for branching selves. (...)
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  • Uncertainty and Probability for Branching Selves.Peter J. Lewis - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):1-14.
    Everettian accounts of quantum mechanics entail that people branch; every possible result of a measurement actually occurs, and I have one successor for each result. Is there room for probability in such an account? The prima facie answer is no; there are no ontic chances here, and no ignorance about what will happen. But since any adequate quantum mechanical theory must make probabilistic predictions, much recent philosophical labor has gone into trying to construct an account of probability for branching selves. (...)
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