- Individual differences in theory-of-mind judgments: Order effects and side effects.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):343 - 355.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Dimensions of naturalness.Helena Siipi - 2008 - Ethics and the Environment 13 (1):pp. 71-103.details
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Intending, believing, and supposing at will.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):321-330.details
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Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will.David Palmer - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):99-107.details
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On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.details
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The Problem of Luck and the Contradictory Nature of Moral Responsibility in the Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Aleksandr S. Mishura - 2019 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62 (10):102-120.details
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The sweet mystery of compatibilism.Eugene Mills - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):50 - 61.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Incompatibilism and prudential obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.details
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Trying and the arguments from total failure.Thor Grünbaum - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.details
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Mental overpopulation and mental action: Protecting intentions from mental birth control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65.details
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Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
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The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.details
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A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):379-406.details
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A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):379-406.details
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How Many Accounts of Act Individuation Are There?Joseph Ulatowski - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Utahdetails
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A Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility.Zsolt Ziegler - unknowndetails
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The Relevance of Folk Intuitions to Philosophical Debates.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Dissertation, Florida State Universitydetails
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Précis de La Nature de la Volonté et Disputatio.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Philosophiques:0-00.details
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