- Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.details
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Incompatibilism and prudential obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Do Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities?Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1085-1095.details
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Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.details
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At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies: Hornsby's Account of Action.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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The body in action.Thor Grunbaum - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):243-261.details
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Trying and the arguments from total failure.Thor Grünbaum - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.details
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Traps and gaps in action explanation: Theoretical problems of a psychology of human action.Werner Greve - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (2):435-451.details
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The standard argument for blame incompatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):697-726.details
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In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.details
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Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – Discussion.Carl Ginet - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):261-272.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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Powers, Necessity, and Determinism.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):225-229.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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A theory of the normative force of pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.details
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Reply: The free will revolution.John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):145 – 156.details
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Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):203 - 228.details
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Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past.John Martin Fischer - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.details
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Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.details
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Dennett on the basic argument.John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.details
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Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation of the Consequence Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):426-433.details
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Simply, false.E. Di Nucci - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):69-78.details
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Semicompatibilism: no ability to do otherwise required.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):308-321.details
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Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188.details
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Autonomy in R. S. Peters' Educational Theory.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (supplement s1):189-207.details
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Reid's Regress.Terence Cuneo & Randall Harp - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):678-698.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.details
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Reasons Explanation and Agent Control.John Ross Churchill - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):241-253.details
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Unintentional collective action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.details
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Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.details
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Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss.Joseph K. Campbell - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):71-76.details
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Farewell to direct source incompatibilism.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.details
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Compatibilist alternatives.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.details
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Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.details
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Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.details
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Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.details
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Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
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Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
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The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):379-406.details
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A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):379-406.details
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