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  1. Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation.Margaret Gilbert - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.
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  • Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich.Margaret Gilbert - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):525-538.
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  • Creature Construction and the Morality of Shared Agency: Response to Bratman.Margaret Gilbert - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (3):412-415.
    I start by emphasizing two aspects of Michael Bratman's approach to shared agency and contrast it with my own in those respects. I conclude with some related remarks on the relation of morality and joint commitment.
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