Switch to: References

Citations of:

On Social Facts

Routledge (1989)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Avatars of the Collective: A Realist Theory of Collective Subjectivities.Frédéric Vandenberghe - 2007 - Sociological Theory 25 (4):295-324.
    Let it be a network of voices... A network of voices that not only speak, but also struggle and resist for humanity.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone*: Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden.Luigino Bruni - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):35-64.
    This paper reappraises the idea, traceable to Adam Smith, of a fundamental distinction between market transactions and genuinely social relationships. On Smith's account, each party to a market transaction pursues his own interests, subject only to the law of contract. Using the work of Smith's contemporary Antonio Genovesi as our starting point, we reconstruct an alternative understanding of market interactions as instances of a wider class of reciprocal relationships in civil society, characterized by joint intentions for mutual assistance. We consider (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Towards Collective Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1153-1173.
    We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Group Inquiry.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1099-1123.
    Group agents can act, and they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account faces two challenges: to make sense of how large-scale distributed activities might be a kind of group action, and to make sense of the kind of division of labour involved in collective inquiry. In the first part of the paper, I argue that existing accounts of group (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (Re)Connecting Analytic Philosophy and Empirical Research: The Example of Ritual Speech Acts and Religious Collectivities.Andrea Rota - 2022 - Sophia 61 (1):79-92.
    In this paper, I demonstrate how philosophical insights and empirical research on the use of religious language can be fruitfully combined to tackle issues regarding the ontology of religious collectivities and the agency of group actors. To do so, I introduce a philosophical framework that draws on speech act theory and recent advances in the fields of collective intentionality and social ontology, with particular attention paid to the work of Raimo Tuomela. Against this backdrop, I discuss a brief case study (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau’s General Will.Michael J. Thompson - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2):266-285.
    Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Dewey’s Social Ontology: A Pragmatist Alternative to Searle’s Approach to Social Reality.Italo Testa - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):40-62.
    Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Group Agents: Persons, Mobs, or Zombies?Cathal O’Madagain - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):271-287.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 271-287, May 2012.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2021 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. pp. 171-184.
    This chapter addresses the question of what, according to the conception of meaning offered by Donald Davidson, makes expressions meaningful. It addresses this question by reflecting on Kathrin Glüer’s recent response to it. It argues that Glüer misconstrues both the evidence for meaning that the radical interpreter must rely on and the way in which the principle of charity must be deployed. The articulation of the correct construal of the evidence and the principle reveals the thoroughly non-reductionist aspect of Davidson’s (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen de Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge.
    A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Mapping Higher-Level Causal Efficacy.Horia Tarnovanu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8533-8554.
    A central argument for non-reductive accounts of group agency is that complex social entities are capable of exerting causal influence independently of and superseding the causal efficacy of the individuals constituting them. A prominent counter is that non-reductionists run into an insuperable dilemma between identity and redundancy – with identity undermining independent higher-level efficacy and redundancy leading to overdetermination or exclusion. This paper argues that critics of non-reductionism can manage with a simpler and more persuasive reductio strategy called mapping: allow (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    This volume concerns Rational Agents - humans, players in a game, software or institutions - which must decide the proper next action in an atmosphere of partial information and uncertainty. The book collects formal accounts of Uncertainty, Rationality and Agency, and also of their interaction. It will benefit researchers in artificial systems which must gather information, reason about it and then make a rational decision on which action to take.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Metaphysics of Social Groups.Katherine Ritchie - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (5):310-321.
    Social groups, including racial and gender groups and teams and committees, seem to play an important role in our world. This article examines key metaphysical questions regarding groups. I examine answers to the question ‘Do groups exist?’ I argue that worries about puzzles of composition, motivations to accept methodological individualism, and a rejection of Racialism support a negative answer to the question. An affirmative answer is supported by arguments that groups are efficacious, indispensible to our best theories, and accepted given (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Group belief reconceived.Jeroen de Ridder - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.
    An influential account or group belief analyzes it as a form of joint commitment by group members. In spite of its popularity, the account faces daunting objections. I consider and reply to two of them. The first, due to Jennifer Lackey, is that the joint commitment account fails as an account of group belief since it cannot distinguish group beliefs from group lies and bullshit. The second is that the joint commitment account fails because it makes group belief voluntary, whereas (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intentional Cooperation and Acting as Part of a Single Body.Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284.
    According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Socially Extended Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):282-298.
  • Can Groups Have Concepts? Semantics for Collective Intentions.Cathal O'Madagain - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.
    A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to make their decisions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Institutional Objects, Reductionism and Theories of Persistence.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):525-562.
    Can institutional objects be identified with physical objects that have been ascribed status functions, as advocated by John Searle in The Construction of Social Reality (1995)? The paper argues that the prospects of this identification hinge on how objects persist – i.e., whether they endure, perdure or exdure through time. This important connection between reductive identification and mode of persistence has been largely ignored in the literature on social ontology thus far.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On the Social Dimensions of Moral Psychology.John D. GreenwooD - 2011 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 41 (4):333-364.
    Contemporary moral psychology has been enormously enriched by recent theoretical developments and empirical findings in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and social psychology and psychopathology. Yet despite the fact that some theorists have developed specifically “social heuristic” (Gigerenzer, 2008) and “social intuitionist” (Haidt, 2007) theories of moral judgment and behavior, and despite regular appeals to the findings of experimental social psychology, contemporary moral psychology has largely neglected the social dimensions of moral judgment and behavior. I provide a brief sketch (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Holding Them Responsible.Paul Sheehy - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):74–93.
    [Opening paragraph:] Ontological realism or holism about social groups is the thesis that groups are composite material particulars. Social groups are entities over which we quantify in the set of our best descriptions and explanations of the social world. The realist explains that a group considered in its own right can be causally responsible for the production of events or states of affairs. We do more than just describe and furnish explanations of the phenomena of the social world. In our (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Shared Intentions and Shared Responsibility.Brook Jenkins Sadler - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):115–144.
  • Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
    The central topic of this paper is to study joint intention to perform a joint action or to bring about a certain state. Here are some examples of such joint action: You and I share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan, we sing a duet together, we clean up our backyard together, and I cash a check by acting jointly with you, a bank teller, and finally we together elect a new president for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • The Moral Legacy of Communal Wrongs: Ethnic Identity Groups and Intergenerational Moral Sentiment.Karen Kovach - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (4):618-638.
    Abstract: Many individuals experience feelings of collective guilt or shame for the blameworthy historical acts of the nations or ethnic groups to which they belong. I reject the idea that collective moral sentiment rests on inherited moral responsibility. I suggest that the possibilities for individual action inherent in membership in ethnic identity groups can be a source of special moral duties. I argue that collective guilt and shame are moral emotions that individuals experience in response to complex assessments of their (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Freedom of Collective Agents.Frank Hindriks - 2008 - Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183.
    Corporate freedom is the freedom of a collective agent to perform a joint action. According to a reductive account, a collective or corporate agent is free exactly if the individuals who constitute the corporate agent are free. It is argued that individual freedoms are neither necessary nor sufficient for corporate freedom. The alternative account proposed here focuses on the performance of the joint action by the corporate agent itself. Subsequently, the analysis is applied to Cohen’s (1983) analysis of proletarian freedom. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • A Sense of Identity: Prolegomena to a Social Theory of Personal Identity.John D. GreenwooD - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (1):25–46.
    A philosophical account of personal identity - in terms of the maintenance of fundamental beliefs, principles and commitments by spatiotemporally continuous particulars - is sketched, an account which is able to incorporate a social and relational conception of personal identity, and thus serve as the basis for a social psychological theory of personal identity - in terms of the pursuit of identity projects’within social collectives. Some implications of this theory are developed, concerning the relation between identity and individualism, responsibility and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Collective Memory: Metaphor or Real?Premjit Laikhuram - forthcoming - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science.
    Collective memory researchers predominantly in the cultural and social sciences have commonly understood the concept of collective memory as a mere metaphor, as something not existing in itself as memory but useful only as a tool for referring to the way groups construct shared representations of their past. Few have however addressed the question of whether it is a metaphor or literal in its own right. This paper looks at the plausibility of the claim that collective memory is a mere (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Individuals-in-Communities: The Search for a Feminist Model of Epistemic Subjects.Heidi E. Grasswick - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (3):85-120.
    : Feminist epistemologists have found the atomistic view of knowers provided by classical epistemology woefully inadequate. An obvious alternative for feminists is Lynn Hankinson Nelson's suggestion that it is communities that know. However, I argue that Nelson's view is problematic for feminists, and I offer instead a conception of knowers as "individuals-in-communities." This conception is preferable, given the premises and goals of feminist epistemologists, because it emphasizes the relations between knowers and their communities and the relevance of these relations for (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • What is It Like to Be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2016 - Noûs:295-319.
    The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • The Collectivist Approach to Collective Moral Responsibility.Seumas Miller & Pekka Makela - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (5):634-651.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Collective Agents and Communicative Theories of Punishment.Bill Wringe - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (4):436-456.
    This paper considers the applicability of expressive theories of punishment to the punishment of corporate entities. The author argues that although arguments which suggest that the denunciatory account is superior to a communicative account in paradigmatic cases of punishment cannot be transferred straightforwardly to cover this kind of case, there are other reasons, connected with the different attitudes we have to regret and remorse in individual and collective cases, for preferring a communicative to a denunciatory account here.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Collective Scientific Knowledge.Melinda Fagan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):821-831.
    Philosophical debates about collective scientific knowledge concern two distinct theses: groups are necessary to produce scientific knowledge, and groups have scientific knowledge in their own right. Thesis has strong support. Groups are required, in many cases of scientific inquiry, to satisfy methodological norms, to develop theoretical concepts, or to validate the results of inquiry as scientific knowledge. So scientific knowledge‐production is collective in at least three respects. However, support for is more equivocal. Though some examples suggest that groups have scientific (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • A Plural Subject Approach to the Responsibilities of Groups and Institutions.Ludger Jansen - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):91-102.
    Margaret Gilbert has defended the claim that her plural subject theory can give a reasonable account of retrospective (or backward-looking) collective responsibility. On one occasion, publishing in this periodical, she writes that she deliberately left out the discussion of prospective (or forward-looking) collective responsibility, or the “responsibilities” of a collective. In the present paper, I want to show that plural subject theory, in fact, also allows accounting for prospective responsibilities of groups and institutions. In order to do so, I will (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and Empirical.Francesco Guala - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):954-980.
    opinionated survey paper to be published in the Blackwell’s Philosophy Compass.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Is Act-Consquentialism Self-Effacing?Nikhil Venkatesh - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):718-726.
    Act-consequentialism (C) is self-effacing for an agent iff that agent’s not accepting C would produce the best outcome. The question of whether C is self-effacing is important for evaluating C. Some hold that if C is self-effacing that would be a mark against it (Williams 1973: 134); however, the claim that C is self-effacing is also used to defend C against certain objections (Parfit 1984: Ch. 1, Railton 1984). -/- In this paper I will show that one argument suggested by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal.Robert D. Rupert - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (9):630-639.
    This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition – which appeals to Occam’s razor – is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are briefly surveyed in the final (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Exploitation and Joint Action.Erik Malmqvist & András Szigeti - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (3):280-300.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Social Facts, Social Groups and Social Explanation.John D. Greenwood - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):93–112.
  • Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Co-Subjective Consciousness Constitutes Collectives.Michael Schmitz - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):137-160.
    In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Why We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action.Matthew Rachar & Javier Gomez Lavin - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):478-507.
    What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations associated with collective action according to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Are Propositional Attitudes Mental States?Umut Baysan - forthcoming - Minds and Machines:1-16.
    I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Distributed Cognition in Sports Teams: Explaining Successful and Expert Performance.Kellie Williamson & Rochelle Cox - 2014 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 46 (6):1-15.
    In this article we use a hybrid methodology to better understand the skilful performance of sports teams as an exemplar of distributed cognition. We highlight key differences between a team of individual experts and an expert team, and outline the kinds of shared characteristics likely to be found in an expert team. We focus on the way that shared knowledge contributes to expert team performance. In particular, we suggest that certain kinds of shared knowledge and shared skill, potentially developed through (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
    Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Effects of Social Ties on Coordination: Conceptual Foundations for an Empirical Analysis. [REVIEW]Giuseppe Attanasi, Astrid Hopfensitz, Emiliano Lorini & Frédéric Moisan - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):47-73.
    This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How Does It Feel to Act Together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
    This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • The DNA of Conventions.George Letsas - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (5):535-571.
    This paper defends a moralized account of conventions, according to which conventional practices are necessarily normative reasons that are ultimately grounded on moral principles . It argues that a convention exists just in case the fact that others participate in some common practice as well as facts about their motivating reasons for doing so, justify conformity to that practice. The paper locates this moralized account within the relevant philosophical literature and argues that it does better than its rivals in explaining (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Free Will of Corporations.Kendy M. Hess - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):241-260.
    Moderate holists like French, Copp :369–388, 2007), Hess, Isaacs and List and Pettit argue that certain collectives qualify as moral agents in their own right, often pointing to the corporation as an example of a collective likely to qualify. A common objection is that corporations cannot qualify as moral agents because they lack free will. The concern is that corporations are effectively puppets, dancing on strings controlled by external forces. The article begins by briefly presenting a novel account of corporate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations