This study is the first part of an attempt to settle a vigorous debate among historians of medieval philosophy by harnessing the resources of analytic philosophy. The debate is about whether Avicenna's epistemology is rationalist or empirical. To settle the debate, I first articulate in this article the three core theses of rationalism and one core thesis of empiricism. Then, I probe Avicenna's epistemology in his major works according to the first core thesis of rationalism (the intuition thesis). In the (...) end, I find Avicenna committed to this thesis in at least one substantive way, namely, in his claim to intuit the intelligible forms or essences. This suffices to count Avicenna as rationalist. In a subsequent article, I shall probe Avicenna's epistemology according to the other two core theses of rationalism, presenting further evidence that he was a rationalist, not an empiricist. (shrink)

Alexandre de Afrodísia tratou claramente do Intellectu in habitu no De Anima e no De Intellectu. No De Anima, o intelecto em habitus é somente um depósito de conceitos latentes reunidos pelo intelecto potencial e, por isso, não cabe a ele a função de pensar ou abstrair. Já no De Intellectu, o Intellectu in habitu é considerado como uma faculdade plenamente desenvolvida, capaz de abstrair. Essa capacidade é dada pelo terceiro intelecto, chamado de Intelecto que “vem de fora” ou intelecto (...) divino. Este artigo é favorável à interpretação do De Intellectu. Ele se apóia no fato de que o Intellectu in habitu é capaz de pensar porque recebe, por um lado, o conteúdo material dado pelo intelecto material ou potencial e, por outro lado, as formas inteligíveis dadas pelo intelecto divino. (shrink)

La “reducción universal al ser”, como método de la metafísica, fue descubierta por san Alberto Magno en un tratado panteísta que él consideró erróneamente de origen aristotélico.

Suhrawardi's interpretation of Avicenna's philosophical anthropology greatly depends on the Peripatetic system, in spite of its novel light motif and the faculty of imagination's predominance. His definition of the soul does not depart significantly from Avicenna's: its definition as an entelechy and a substance, its incorporeality, its pre-existence, or the role of the vital spirits---pneumata. However, he criticizes the materialism implied in a number of Avicennan theses. At issue is the ontological unity of the soul that Suhrawardi perceives to be (...) jeopardized by the localization in the body of the representative faculties---the active and passive imaginations and the estimation---and their objects. After criticizing the "extramissive" and the "intromissive" theories of vision, Suhrawardi introduces his own illuminative theory in an effort to simultaneously account for mystical vision. He also reduces Avicenna's faculties responsible for representation to a single faculty, focusing on the soul's role in perception. Suhrawardi analyses self-knowledge, discussing the primary awareness of one's own existence, self-identity, the unmediated character of this type of knowledge, and the issue of individuation. At the conceptual level, intellection is logically prior to imagination, while discussions about the active intelligence, its functions, and the conjunction of the rational soul---the Isfahbad-light---with the active intelligence---the light principle---still remain Avicennan. Epistemological concepts such as intuition and mystical contemplation become central in the debate over the primacy of mystical knowledge over philosophical knowledge. Suhrawardi's and Avicenna's discussions about the nature of prophetic knowledge are then contrasted with the nature of mystical knowledge by introducing the negative and positive functions of the faculty of imagination, namely, its role in the particularization of universal truths and its mimetic function. The survival of th. (shrink)

This dissertation offers a new and comprehensive analysis of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's cosmology by focusing on various important issues that have been largely neglected by the modern scholarship. It provides an examination of the physical, metaphysical, and astronomical aspects of al-Fārābī's cosmology by adopting a multidisciplinary approach that takes into account the history of philosophy and the history of astronomy. Accordingly, my dissertation explores how al-Fārābī attempted to reconcile features of Ptolemaic astronomy with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic theories, an endeavor which (...) resulted in the formulation of innovative cosmological ideas. Chapters I and II provide background information on al-Fārābī's activity as a commentator and his relation to the Greek commentatorial tradition and assess the relevant primary sources. In addition, they examine al-Fārābī's approach to cosmology and his scientific method in terms of both the Ptolemaic astronomical tradition and the Aristotelian corpus. Chapter III addresses problems related to the structure of al-Fārābī's cosmology, especially the origin of his ennadic cosmological model and his spherology. Particular attention is devoted to the question of how Aristotle's unmoved movers and Ptolemy's astronomical theories are reconciled. Chapters IV, V, and VI analyze the place of celestial matter, intellect, and motion respectively in al-Fārābī's cosmology and attempt to redefine the second teacher's relation to the various trends of Greek philosophy. The study stresses al-Fārābī's connection with the Neoplatonic and Peripatetic currents, particularly with thinkers such as Alexander of Aphrod. (shrink)

This thesis is an examination of the extant psychological treatises of Abu Yusuf Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi, the ninth century A.D. Arab scholar who was among the first of his race to interest himself in strictly philosophical questions. Al-Kindi's writings were among the first fruits of the translation of Greek philosophical and scientific works into Arabic. It is under that aspect that this thesis approaches his views on soul and intellect - as an instance of the passage of Greek philosophical (...) ideas to the Muslim Arabs. Apart from his specifically Islamic position on the nature and value of divine revelation, nearly all of al-Kindi's ideas on psychology can be traced to Greek sources, and the version of that philosophy with which he was directly familiar was that of the late Greek schools. This thesis is an attempt to understand and present al-Kindi's psychology in the light of the Greek sources from which it was derived. (shrink)