Elucidating a metaphysics of medicine is vital for framing a coherent medical ethics. In this paper, I examine the historical case of Avicenna, the eleventh century physician-philosopher. Avicenna radicalizes the dissective power of reason using a logicized Aristotelian metaphysics to clarify concepts at the metaphysical level, which I call his anatomy of being. One of the practical consequences of Avicenna’s metaphysics is a dehumanizing eschatology of death. I outline the main elements of Avicenna’s thought that constitute his anatomy of being. (...) Through an examination of his logic, metaphysics, and psychology, I show how Avicenna develops a dissective logic. I conclude that one’s epistemology, as a method of knowing, entails a metaphysics, and, in turn, results in an ethical stance to the object of knowledge. For Avicenna, mental dissective logic applied to humans results in dehumanization, thereby destroying the humanistic impulse of medicine. (shrink)

Al comparar la visión de Avicena y Kant sobre la imaginación, encontramos una sorprendente congruencia en sus doctrinas. Las doctrinas de Kant sobre la síntesis de la imaginación en su Deducción Trascendental tiene notables similitudes con la visión de Avicena. Tanto para Avicena como para Kant, la imaginación sirve para conectar lo fenoménico con lo nouménico. Al menos esta comparación tiene el doble uso de colocar las doctrinas de Kant en el contexto de la tradición aristotélica y de iluminar la (...) importancia moderna que tiene el pensamiento de Avicena. Dado que el pensamiento de Kant nos es más familiar que el de Avicena, podemos usar a Kant también para ayudar a comprender las tesis de Avicena. Por otro lado, esta comparación puede ayudar a sostener la tesis de que la comprensión de Kant yace en gran medida en sus raíces medievales y post-medievales —tal como ocurre con Copérnico, que, en su propia “Revolución Copernicana”, seguía ciertas tradiciones anteriores. (shrink)

Although he does not have an explicit theory of supposition as is found in the works of Latin medieval philosophers, Avicenna has two doctrines giving something equivalent: the threefold distinction of quiddity, corresponding to a division of simple, personal and material supposition, and his analyses of truth conditions for categorical propositions, where sentential context determines in part the reference of their terms. While he does address which individuals are being referred to by the universal terms used there, Avicenna concentrates more (...) on the varied temporal durations of the predications being made. In Western terms, he has incorporated ampliation and restriction into the theory of supposition itself. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.