In studying what people do two points of view can be distinguished: We can choose the perspective of the actors themselves (the actor’s perspective), or we can look at what is going on from the outside, from a distance (the researcher’s perspective). Regarding the relation between both points of view three standpoints have been defended.

The postwar period has been marked by a problematization of nations and nationalism: these phenomena, which were previously assumed to be natural products of evolution, have received a growing amount of attention from social theory. First an attempt was made to debunk nationalist constructions, and then a `primordialist' reaction defended the nation. Explanatory theory has however been held back due to vagueness regarding key categories such as culture, agency, rationality and motivations. Nationalism studies must be clearer in its use of (...) these categories, and separate normative and explanatory questions if it is to yield more useful generalizations in the future. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to provide an in-depth review of Andrew Feenberg’s Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason. To this end, the anal...

This paper considers the nature of learning and the role of institutions in general and schools in particular in structuring learning. It outlines and commends a view of learning as a process whereby we discover ourselves as persons and thereby act to create the contexts in which we live and work. Central to this view is the idea of the 'learning school'.

This paper considers the nature of learning and the role of institutions in general and schools in particular in structuring learning. It outlines and commends a view of learning as a process whereby we discover ourselves as persons and thereby act to create the contexts in which we live and work. Central to this view is the idea of the 'learning school'.

Revisiting the structure/agency debate, the article puts forward the broad position shared by Giddens’structuration theory and Bhaskar's transformational model. It defends Giddens’concept of structure as‘rules and resources’against charges of idealism, arguing that its strength is its focus on the interface of structure and agency. But both Giddens and Bhaskar emphasise social reproduction as an unintended consequence of social action. Taking issue with postmodern pessimism, the article goes on to consider the conditions of possibility, and requisite forms of knowledgeability, for deliberate (...) social transformation. (shrink)

The concept of structure is central to Giddens’s structuration theory because it apparently accounts for the reproduction of the social system without derogating the lay actor in functionalist or structuralist fashion. In fact, the concept of structure involves the very derogation of the lay actor which Giddens highlights as the principal error of these objectivist social theories and which he wishes to avoid. However, although Giddens fails to recognize it, the concept of “practical consciousness” which Giddens also regards as central (...) to structuration theory avoids this relapse into objectivism and offers a route to a sustainable social theory which highlights the agency of social actors. (shrink)

If we are to find the criteria for critical analyses of social arrangements and processes not in some abstract, universalist framework, but from the guiding ‘self-interpretations’ of the societies in question, as contemporary contextualist and ‘communitarian’ approaches to social philosophy suggest, the vexing question arises as to where these self-interpretations can be found and how they are identified. The paper presents a model according to which there are four interdependent as well as partially autonomous spheres or ‘levels’ of socially relevant (...) self-interpretation that have to be taken into account equally in order to provide a sound basis for social and political criticism. Thus, it is from the tensions and incoherences between (A) social ideas and doctrines, (B) social institutions and practices, (C) individual beliefs and convictions, and (D) body-practices and habits that social pathologies can be identified and possible solutions can be envisaged. (shrink)

Jens Beckert’s 2009 article on the constitution and dynamics of markets is a bold attempt to define a novel research agenda. Deeming uncertainty and coordination essential for the constitution of social action in markets, Beckert proposes a framework centered on the resolution of three coordination problems: valuation, cooperation, and competition. The empirical study of these three coordination problems has the potential to contribute considerably to the sociological analysis of markets. However, the assertion that such a theoretical vantage point can explain (...) the constitution and dynamics of markets is not compelling because it (1) conflates social interaction with social structures, (2) fails to address power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures, and (3) neglects the historically contingent and socially contested nature of markets themselves. The present article shows that these three pitfalls are the result of starting from the problem of order and building upon uncertainty as the basis of action in markets, lending the suggested framework a methodologically individualist bent. Therefore, Beckert’s suggested framework is in danger of mystifying the very power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures that are at the heart of the constitution and dynamics of markets. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an outpouring of work at the intersection of social movement studies and organizational theory. While we are generally in sympathy with this work, we think it implies a far more radical rethinking of structure and agency in modern society than has been realized to date. In this article, we offer a brief sketch of a general theory of strategic action fields (SAFs). We begin with a discussion of the main elements of the theory, describe (...) the broader environment in which any SAF is embedded, consider the dynamics of stability and change in SAFs, and end with a respectful critique of other contemporary perspectives on social structure and agency. (shrink)

In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from (...) each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception. (shrink)

: Carol Gilligan's temporally embedded caring subjects reason in terms of relationships with and forward-looking responsibilities to others, and consider how their decisions will shape future ties. Subsequent work in philosophy and economics has had difficulty developing these aspects because of an underlying social ontology that excludes them. This paper draws on a heterodox tradition, post-Keynesianism, to develop an alternative social ontology and an analysis of material life that takes time fully into account.

Carol Gilligan's temporally embedded caring subjects reason in terms of relationships with and forward-looking responsibilities to others, and consider how their decisions will shape future ties. Subsequent work in philosophy and economics has had difficulty developing these aspects because of an underlying social ontology that excludes them. This paper draws on a heterodox tradition, post-Keynesianism, to develop an alternative social ontology and an analysis of material life that takes time fully into account.

The equation between the concept of society and the nation-state in modernity is known as methodological nationalism in scholarly debates. In agreement with the thesis that methodological nationalism must be rejected and transcended, this article argues that we still lack an understanding of what methodological nationalism actually is and, because of that, we remain unable to answer the substantive problem methodological nationalism poses to social theory: how to understand the history, main features and legacy of the nation-state in modernity. The (...) first section of the article reconstructs the origins of the critique of methodological nationalism in the 1970s and differentiates between its logical and historical versions. It then critically reviews the most salient critique of methodological nationalism in contemporary social theory, that of Ulrich Beck. The final part of the article assesses the thesis of social theory’s immanent methodological nationalism by demonstrating how social theory’s equivocations towards the nation-state only mirror the nation-state’s own ambivalence within modernity. It is shown that social theory’s ambivalent attempts at conceptualizing the nation-state reflect the actual ambivalence of the position of the nation-state in modernity: its historical opacity, its sociological uncertainty and its normative ambiguity. (shrink)

Neoclassical economic theory assurnes that people pursue utility maximization within an obiective framework, evident to all, that serves as the basis for the interaction. Agents are assumed to be detached observers who see the situation as it is in obiective reality. It is argued in this article that there is no obiective ground for interaction that exists apart from the understanding of economic agents. Agents have orientations that change over time depending on the way that the situation is currently understood. (...) Depth of understanding and the extent of common ground depend on the quality of attention and the will to openness and honesty. Efforts to maintain connections with others make possible mutual understanding and visions of the common good that enable the coordinated pursuit of desired states of the world. (shrink)

This paper explores themethodological consequences of AmericanPragmatism for the social sciences. It alsocriticises some rival perspectives onmethodology of social research, in particularfalsificationist, realist and someanti-naturalist views. It is argued thatAmerican Pragmatism shows striking affinitieswith the genealogical method of history and thereflexive turn in cultural anthropology. It isalso argued that Pragmatism forces us to thinkdifferently about the relationship betweentheory and empirical research.

The present work is a review of the early literature on "reflexive prediction" - the notion that public predictions by policymakers may influence and affect the social systems the predictions are made in relation to - in the disciplines of sociology and economics. It is a relatively complete treatment for the time period that it covers. It is intended for attachment to my January 2006 doctoral thesis as "Appendix B.".

While mathematical economic theory is replete with structural relationships, it has been suggested that economists have been far to content with the structure created in their conceptual theoretical worlds, and have done too little to conceptualise or study the structure inherent in actual economic systems. I advance the state of the argument by proposing a typology of theory types - correspondence, instrumental, speculative, and literary - with differing attempts and approaches to building some kind of 'correspondence' between the ontological elements (...) and relationships in the real world and the ontological elements and relationships in the theoretical world. The central argument advanced in the present paper is that the use of mathematics in economics is of a fundamentally different nature than the use of mathematics in, for example, physics. In physics an attempt is made to capture the central and important features of the real world in mathematical equations, and a deeper understanding of the dynamics and relationships in the real world is gained as a consequence. In economics, by contrast, the use of mathematics does little to identify, abstract and capture the structure existing in real world social and economic systems. The use of mathematics may make economic theories very precise, may exclude individuals without extensive training to access economic theories, and may perform a rhetorical service in presenting economic theory as mathematical and, by analogy with physics, scientific. In many cases, however, the net effect of using mathematics in economic theory is the precise opposite of the effect of using mathematics in physics: in physics, mathematics brings us a greater focus on and awareness of structures and relationships in our physical reality, while in economics mathematics takes us away from a focus on and concern with the ontologies and structures in real world economic systems and focuses our attention on abstract, invented theoretical worlds often with unclear relationships to actual economic systems. (shrink)