Étroitement lié au concept d'histoire, celui de culture devient un «collectifsingulier » à partir du dernier tiers du XVIIIe siècle. L'idée allemande de culture ne s'est pas immédiatement opposée au concept de civilisation et les deux termes ont longtemps gardé une signification presque identique. Que révèle donc l'orientation polémique du concept allemand de culture à partir des années 1880-1890? D'abord, la chute du modèle idéaliste néo-kantien d'un individu cultivé qui se détermine lui-même comme une fin (la Selbstbildung); ensuite, la montée (...) en puissance d'une condamnation morale de l'esprit vide de l'époque. Ce double processus atteint son apogée haineuse durant la Première Guerre mondiale. (shrink)

Some 60 years separate us from Theodor W. Adorno’s “Theory of pseudo-culture.” Yet Adorno’s analysis might never have been as pertinent and as compelling as it is in the present moment. The dawn of the “post-truth” era, and the persistent impact of the culture industry on human sensibility and capacity for critical self-reflection, call for a return to Adorno’s critical theorisation of pseudo-culture. This paper revisits Adorno’s assessment of pseudo-culture and proposes a reconstruction of some of his most compelling arguments (...) on the subject in light of the present socio-historical circumstances. The paper starts with a concise discussion of the notions of Kultur, Bildung and Halbbildung in relation to Adorno’s thought. It then discusses the effects of pseudo-culture on human experience by looking into the role of opinions—in particular, what Adorno terms “delusional” opinions—in contemporary late capitalist reality. Finally, the paper ends with a juxtaposition of the barbarism of the banal and neoteric barbarism. I argue that, whereas the former stuns culture and impels it to regress to a state of pseudo-culture, the latter gives it new impetus by opening up new theoretical and practical paths. (shrink)

This paper examines the loss of culture as a possible effect of the neoliberalisation of education, especially higher education. The paper opens with a brief comparison between the humanistic education founded on the idea of culture and its modern-day neoliberal form, with the help of José Ortega y Gasset’s reflections on the mission of higher education. It then discusses certain aspects of the historical development of libraries and of the figure of the public intellectual with a view to bringing into (...) relief some negative repercussions that can, and already do affect the university. The paper also explores aspects of John Dewey’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s thoughts to draw lessons with respect to how experience and culture are not only essential components of education as a whole, but also elements of resilience amidst a series of contemporary challenges that threaten its purpose and meaning. The paper draws to a close with some suggestive yet inconclusive remarks on the promises inherent in existing and possible alternatives to the neoliberalised university. (shrink)

The author claims that we should differentiate the concept, the conception and the ideal of Bildung. Based on these differences, Bildung could be considered as a kind of attitude, project, or as specific - normative and optative - practice.. Autor smatra da treba praviti formalnu razliku izmedju pojma, koncepcije i ideala Bildung-a. Na osnovu tako utvrdjene razlike, Bildung bi se mogao poimati kao stav, projekt ili specificna, u isti mah i normativno i optativno intonirana, praksa..

The article contains an explanation of the topic to be dealt with by the author within the work on the project "Regional and European Aspects of Integration Processes in Serbia: Civilization Preconditions, Reality and Prospects for the Future" of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. A concern for the problem of Bildung reoccurs in social sciences. The author claims that we should elicit a dominated normative meaning from many senses of the concept of Bildung, in order to explain his (...) vitality and the possibility of his interdisciplinary application in more appropriate way. Clanak sadrzi obrazlozenje teme kojom ce se autor baviti u okviru rada na projektu "Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u Srbiji civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za buducnost" Instituta za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju. U drustvenim naukama reaktualizovano je interesovanje za problem Bildunga. Autor tvrdi da bi iz viseznacnosti tog pojma trebalo izvuci njegovo dominantno normativno znacenje, kako bi se na adekvatniji nacin objasnila njegova vitalnost i mogucnost njegove interdisciplinarne primene. (shrink)

This paper claims that Kant’s conception of culture provides a new means of understanding how the two parts of the Critique of Judgment fit together. Kant claims that culture is both the ‘ultimate purpose’ of nature and to be defined in terms of ‘art in general’ (of which the fine arts are a subtype). In the Critique of Teleological Judgment, culture, as the last empirically cognizable telos of nature, serves as the mediating link between nature and freedom, while in the (...) Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, the connection between art and morality passes through culture. In either case, Kant offers distinct, yet interdependent, arguments for how culture demonstrates the amenability of nature to its supersensible ground: the central question Kant claims in the Introduction that the work seeks to answer. Thus, not only does this account advance a concept essential to both parts of the work; it also demonstrates how the two parts can be conceived as complementary, with each supplementing the other to solve Kant’s central question. As such, understanding the Critique of Judgment in terms of culture enables us to see how the two parts of the work do not merely share points of similarity or common themes, but presuppose one another in order to understand how nature is amenable to freedom. (shrink)

Philosophers often mention Friedrich Schiller as the author of a famous epigram taking aim at Kant’s account of moral motivation: Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. To this, the answer is given: Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, And then with aversion do what your duty enjoins. These joking lines capture a natural objection to Kant’s rationalist (...) picture of moral motivation, especially as it appears in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Schiller himself, however, intended his poem as a caricature of Kant’s view, reserving his considered critique of Kant’s practical philosophy for his extended treatise ‘On Grace and Dignity’. It is in this major work that Schiller begins his debate with Kant about the aesthetic aspect of morality, sets out a systematic account of his own ethics, and argues for an account of character according to which the virtuous person is inclined to do her duty and takes pleasure in moral action. This essay aims to highlight the importance of Schiller’s ‘On Grace and Dignity’, which is a valuable resource in relation to contemporary debates about Kant’s moral psychology. Section 1 outlines the main features of Schiller’s concerns with Kantian rationalism. Section 2 surveys a number of recent critical discussions of Schiller’s interpretation of Kant. Finally, Section 3 concludes with some observations about the historical and broader philosophical significance of ‘On Grace and Dignity’. (shrink)