In this paper, I consider Charles Taylor's classic article ‘The Opening Arguments of thePhenomenology’, in which Taylor presents an account of the Consciousness chapter of thePhenomenologyas a transcendental argument. I set Taylor's discussion in context and present its main themes. I then consider a recent objection to Taylor's approach put forward by Stephen Houlgate: namely, that to see Hegel as using transcendental arguments would be to violate Hegel's requirement that his method in thePhenomenologyneeds to bepresuppositionless. I concede that Houlgate's criticism (...) of Taylor has some force, but argue that nonetheless Taylor can suggest instead that although Hegel is not offering transcendentalargumentshere, he can plausibly be read as making transcendentalclaims, so that perhaps Houlgate and Taylor are not so far apart after all, notwithstanding this disagreement. (shrink)