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How to draw ontological conclusions from introspective data

In Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. pp. 233 (2003)

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  1. Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
    This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...)
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  • Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
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  • La pensée sans sujet pensant.Paul Bernier - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (4):589-602.
    Since Hume, some philosophers deny that conscious thinking requires the existence of a thinking subject. This claim is well illustrated by LichtenbergI thinkThinking is going on” (Es denkt). Bernard Williams has argued that the claim that there can be thinking without a thinking subject is incoherent. My purpose, in this paper, is to suggest an interpretation of that claim which overcomes the problem raised by Williams.
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  • Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):430-55.
    Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There.
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  • A peculiaridade e contingência da introspecção de crença.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Filosofia Unisinos 16 (2):100-118.
    O modelo causal de introspecção tem recebido muitas críticas e, de fato, nos últimos anos, tem caído em desuso no mundo filosófico. Neste artigo defendo o modelo e sustento que ele é um excelente candidato, dado um compromisso realista para com o mental, para explicar o nosso acesso introspectivo peculiar, mas contingente, às crenças.
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