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  1. How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):39-67.
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  • How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):39-67.
    There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...)
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  • Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happiness.Laura Sizer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):133-163.
    In the philosophical literature on happiness, happiness has sometimes been identified with subjective psychological states or conditions (feelings or sets of judgments), and sometimes with more objectively evaluable conditions of a life. I refer to these as 'good feelings' versus 'good lives' accounts of happiness, and show how they satisfy different aspects of our intuitions about the nature of happiness. This paper offers an affect theory of happiness that brings together both the subjective and objective strands of our intuitions about (...)
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  • Authentic Happiness.Greg Bognar - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):272-284.
    This article discusses L. W. Sumner's theory of well-being as authentic happiness. I distinguish between extreme and moderate versions of subjectivism and argue that Sumner's characterization of the conditions of authenticity leads him to an extreme subjective theory. More generally, I also criticize Sumner's argument for the subjectivity of welfare. I conclude by addressing some of the implications of my arguments for theories of well-being in philosophy and welfare measurement in the social sciences.
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