Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that there are possible cases in which the demands of justice and the norms of epistemology cannot be simultaneously satisfied. I will bring out these normative clashes in terms of the now-familiar phenomenon of testimonial injustice. While the resulting argument is very much in the spirit of two other sorts of argument that have received sustained attention recently – arguments alleging epistemic partiality in friendship, and arguments that motivate the hypothesis of moral encroachment on (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cryptonormative Judgments.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):3-24.
    A cryptonormative judgment, roughly speaking, is a judgment that is presented by the agent who makes it as non-normative, but that is in fact normative. The idea of cryptonormativity is familiar from debates in social theory, social psychology, and continental political philosophy, but has to my knowledge never been treated in analytic metaethics, moral psychology or epistemology except in passing. In this paper, I argue, first, that cryptonormative judgments are pervasive: familiar cases from everyday life are most naturally diagnosed as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Some claim that moral factors affect the epistemic status of our beliefs. Call this the moral encroachment thesis. It’s been argued that the moral encroachment thesis can explain at least part of the wrongness of racial profiling. The thesis predicts that the high moral stakes in cases of racial profiling make it more difficult for these racist beliefs to be justified or to constitute knowledge. This paper considers a class of racial generalizations that seem to do just the opposite of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception.Nicholas Silins - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.
    If our experiences are cognitively penetrable, they can be influenced by our antecedent expectations, beliefs, or other cognitive states. Theorists such as Churchland, Fodor, Macpherson, and Siegel have debated whether and how our cognitive states might influence our perceptual experiences, as well as how any such influences might affect the ability of our experiences to justify our beliefs about the external world. This article surveys views about the nature of cognitive penetration, the epistemological consequences of denying cognitive penetration, and the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Epistemology of Prejudice.Endre Begby - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.
    According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The Importance of Self‐Knowledge for Free Action.Joseph Gurrola - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Much has been made about the ways that implicit biases and other apparently unreflective attitudes can affect our actions and judgments in ways that negatively affect our ability to do right. What has been discussed less is that these attitudes negatively affect our freedom. In this paper, I argue that implicit biases pose a problem for free will. My analysis focuses on the compatibilist notion of free will according to which acting freely consists in acting in accordance with our reflectively (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Norms, the False Belief Requirement, and Love.J. Spencer Atkins - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (3):289-309.
    Many authors have argued that epistemic rationality sometimes comes into conflict with our relationships. Although Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller argue that friendships sometimes require bad epistemic agency, their proposals do not go far enough. I argue here for a more radical claim—romantic love sometimes requires we form beliefs that are false. Lovers stand in a special position with one another; they owe things to one another that they do not owe to others. Such demands hold for beliefs as well. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    “Implicit bias” is a term of art referring to relatively unconscious and relatively automatic features of prejudiced judgment and social behavior. While psychologists in the field of “implicit social cognition” study “implicit attitudes” toward consumer products, self-esteem, food, alcohol, political values, and more, the most striking and well-known research has focused on implicit attitudes toward members of socially stigmatized groups, such as African-Americans, women, and the LGBTQ community.[1] For example, imagine Frank, who explicitly believes that women and men are equally (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics.
    What is the connection between justification and truth in moral epistemology? The primary goal of this paper is to argue that you cannot have justified false beliefs about your own moral obligations. The secondary goal is to explain why not. Some epistemologists embrace a global truth-connection in epistemology, according to which epistemic justification is always factive. In contrast, I endorse a local truth-connection in moral epistemology, which says that epistemic justification is factive when it concerns your own moral obligations. To (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against Epistemic Pessimism About Moral Testimony.Paddy Jane McShane - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):200-223.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.
    In this paper, I argue that morality might bear on belief in at least two conceptually distinct ways. The first is that morality might bear on belief by bearing on questions of justification. The claim that it does is the doctrine of moral encroachment. The second, is that morality might bear on belief given the central role belief plays in mediating and thereby constituting our relationships with one another. The claim that it does is the doctrine of doxastic wronging. Though (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On Statistical Criteria of Algorithmic Fairness.Brian Hedden - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):209-231.
    Predictive algorithms are playing an increasingly prominent role in society, being used to predict recidivism, loan repayment, job performance, and so on. With this increasing influence has come an increasing concern with the ways in which they might be unfair or biased against individuals in virtue of their race, gender, or, more generally, their group membership. Many purported criteria of algorithmic fairness concern statistical relationships between the algorithm’s predictions and the actual outcomes, for instance requiring that the rate of false (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Accessibility, Implicit Bias, and Epistemic Justification.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1529-1547.
    It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Implicit Bias: From Social Structure to Representational Format.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):41-60.
    In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Algorithmic bias: on the implicit biases of social technology.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9941-9961.
    Often machine learning programs inherit social patterns reflected in their training data without any directed effort by programmers to include such biases. Computer scientists call this algorithmic bias. This paper explores the relationship between machine bias and human cognitive bias. In it, I argue similarities between algorithmic and cognitive biases indicate a disconcerting sense in which sources of bias emerge out of seemingly innocuous patterns of information processing. The emergent nature of this bias obscures the existence of the bias itself, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Rational Dynamics of Implicit Thought.Brett Karlan - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Implicit attitudes are mental states posited by psychologists to explain behaviors including implicit racial and gender bias. In this paper I investigate the belief view of the implicit attitudes, on which implicit attitudes are a kind of implicit belief. In particular, I focus on why implicit attitudes, if they are beliefs, are often resistant to updating in light of new evidence. I argue that extant versions of the belief view do not give a satisfactory account of this phenomenon. This is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responding to Sanist Microaggressions with Acts of Epistemic Resistance.Abigail Gosselin - 2022 - Hypatia 37 (2):293-314.
    People who have mental health diagnoses are often subject to sanist microaggressions in which pejorative terms to describe mental illness are used to represent that which is discreditable. Such microaggressions reflect and perpetrate stigma against severe mental illness, often held unconsciously as implicit bias. In this article, I examine the sanist attitudes that underlie sanist microaggressions, analyzing some of the cognitive biases that support mental illness stigma. Then I consider what responsibility we have with respect to microaggressions. I argue that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Understanding Implicit Bias: A Case for Regulative Dispositionalism.Annemarie Kalis & Harmen Ghijsen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
  • Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof.Tim Smartt - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):303-318.
    In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss's recent account of legal proof. Moss's account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy, in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds of statistical generalisation. In this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Algorithmic Bias: Senses, Sources, Solutions.Sina Fazelpour & David Danks - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12760.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Intentional and Unintentional Discrimination: What Are They and What Makes Them Morally Different.Rona Dinur - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (2):111-138.
    The distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination is a prominent one in the literature and public discourse; intentional discriminatory actions are commonly considered particularly morally objectionable relative to unintentional discriminatory actions. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what the two types amount to, and what generates the moral difference between them. The paper develops philosophically-informed conceptualizations of the two types based on which the moral difference between them may be accounted for. On the suggested account, intentional discrimination is characterized by the agent (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):500-521.
    Philosophers have recently come to focus on explaining the phenomenon of ​bad beliefs,​ beliefs that are apparently true and well-evidenced but nevertheless objectionable. Despite this recent focus, a consensus is already forming around a particular explanation of these beliefs’ badness called ​moral encroachment​, according to which, roughly, the moral stakes engendered by bad beliefs make them particularly difficult to justify. This paper advances an alternative account not just of bad beliefs but of bad attitudes more generally according to which bad (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • There is No Such Thing as Doxastic Wrongdoing.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
  • Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Seeing‐As: An Alternative to “Alief” as an Explanation of Reason‐Recalcitrant Behaviours.Talia Morag - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (1):38-55.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Stereotyping Patients.Katherine Puddifoot - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (1):69-90.
  • What Should Relational Egalitarians Believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.
    Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 55-74, February 2022. Many find that the objectionable nature of paternalism has something to do with belief. However, since it is commonly held that beliefs are directly governed by epistemic as opposed to moral norms, how could it be objectionable to hold paternalistic beliefs about others if they are supported by the evidence? Drawing on central elements of relational egalitarianism, this paper attempts to bridge this gap. In a first step, it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
    It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences.Galen Barry - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):52-76.
    What does it mean to listen to someone respectfully, that is, insofar as they are due recognition respect? This paper addresses that question and gives the following answer: it is to listen in such a way that you are open to being surprised. A specific interpretation of this openness to surprise is then defended.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reading the Bad News About Our Minds.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):293-310.
    Psychologists and neuroscientists have delivered a lot of bad news about the inner workings of our minds, raising challenging questions about the extent to which we are rational in important domains of our judgments. I will focus on a central case of an unsettling effect on our perception, and primarily aim to establish that there actually is no impact from it on the rationality of our perceptual beliefs. To reach my goal, I will start with a rough review of different (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Should Relational Egalitarians Believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.
    Many find that the objectionable nature of paternalism has something to do with belief. However, since it is commonly held that beliefs are directly governed by epistemic as opposed to moral norms, how could it be objectionable to hold paternalistic beliefs about others if they are supported by the evidence? Drawing on central elements of relational egalitarianism, this paper attempts to bridge this gap. In a first step, it argues that holding paternalistic beliefs about others implies a failure to regard (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs.Cécile Fabre - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (1):47-69.
    According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Prejudiced Beliefs Based on the Evidence: Responding to a Challenge for Evidentialism.Anna Brinkerhoff - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14317-14331.
    According to evidentialism, what is epistemically rational to believe is determined by evidence alone. So, assuming that prejudiced beliefs are irrational, evidentialism entails that they must not be properly based on the evidence. Recently, philosophers have been interested in cases of beliefs that seem to undermine evidentialism: these are beliefs that seem both prejudiced and properly based on the evidence. In these cases, a believer has strong statistical evidence that most members of a social group have some property and then (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
    Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • The Public Ecology of Freedom of Association.Andres Moles - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (1):85-103.
    This paper defends the claim that private associations might be legitimately constrained by a requirement of reasonableness. I present a list of goods that freedom of association protect, and argue that the limits to associational freedom have to be sensitive to the nature of these goods. In defending this claim, I cast doubt on two popular liberal arguments: One is that attitudes cultivated in the private sphere are not likely to spill over into the public arena. The other is that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Uncoordinated Norms of Belief.Oliver Traldi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Bias and Interpersonal Skepticism.Robert Pasnau - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):154-175.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • ‘I Love Women’: An Explicit Explanation of Implicit Bias Test Results.Reis-Dennis Samuel & Vida Yao - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):13861-13882.
    Recent years have seen a surge of interest in implicit bias. Driving this concern is the thesis, apparently established by tests such as the IAT, that people who hold egalitarian explicit attitudes and beliefs, are often influenced by implicit mental processes that operate independently from, and are largely insensitive to, their explicit attitudes. We argue that implicit bias testing in social and empirical psychology does not, and without a fundamental shift in focus could not, establish this startling thesis. We suggest (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Using Values as Evidence When There’s Evidence for Your Values.Sharyn Clough - 2020 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 26 (1):5-37.
    I have argued that political values are beliefs informed, more or less well, by the evidence of experience and that, where relevant and well-supported by evidence, the inclusion of political values in scientific theorizing can increase the objectivity of research. The position I endorse has been called the “values-as-evidence” approach. In this essay I respond to three kinds of resistance to this approach, using examples of feminist political values. Solomon questions whether values are beliefs that can be tested, Alcoff argues (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.
    Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Beyond Accuracy: Epistemic Flaws with Statistical Generalizations.Jessie Munton - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):228-240.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.
    Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment.Stephanie Leary - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Bubbles and Chambers: Post-Truth and Belief Formation in Digital Social-Epistemic Environments.Massimiliano Badino - 2022
    It is often claimed that epistemic bubbles and echo chambers foster post-truth by filtering our access to information and manipulating our epistemic attitude. In this paper, I try to add a further level of analysis by adding the issue of belief formation. Building on cognitive psychology work, I argue for a dual-system theory according to which beliefs derive from a default system and a critical system. One produces beliefs in a quasi-automatic, effortless way, the other in a slow, effortful way. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading.Krista Hyde - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (4):858-873.
    Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual-like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their proper degree. I argue that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • What is Implicit Bias?Jules Holroyd, Robin Scaife & Tom Stafford - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12437.
    Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.
    In discussions of whether and how pragmatic considerations can make a difference to what one ought to believe, two sets of cases feature. The first set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic reasons for belief, is exemplified by cases of being financially bribed to believe (or withhold from believing) something. The second set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic encroachment on epistemic justification, is exemplified by cases where acting on a belief rashly risks some disastrous outcome if the belief turns (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Perceptual Skill And Social Structure.Jessie Munton - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):131-161.
    Visual perception relies on stored information and environmental associations to arrive at a determinate representation of the world. This opens up the disturbing possibility that our visual experiences could themselves be subject to a kind of racial bias, simply in virtue of accurately encoding previously encountered environmental regularities. This possibility raises the following question: what, if anything, is wrong with beliefs grounded upon these prejudicial experiences? They are consistent with a range of epistemic norms, including evidentialist and reliabilist standards for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • I—The Third Horse: On Unendorsed Association and Human Behaviour.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):185-218.
    On one standard reading, Plato's works contain at least two distinct views about the structure of the human soul. According to the first, there is a crucial unity to human psychology: there is a dominant faculty that is capable of controlling attention and behaviour in a way that not only produces right action, but also ‘silences’ inclinations to the contrary—at least in idealized circumstances. According to the second, the human soul contains multiple autonomous parts, and although one of them, reason, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Feminist Radical Empiricism, Values, and Evidence.Audrey Yap - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (1):58-73.
    Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism. I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Moral Hinges and Steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation