RESUMEN En el presente trabajo se buscará dar cuenta diagramáticamente del alcance y extensión del concepto de vida en Freud y Nietzsche, al pensar sus límites en términos de polos -instancias no alcanzables vitalmente, que marcan la frontera a partir de la cual se extiende el ‘más allá’ de la vida. Dicho de otro modo: haciendo uso de un diagrama, se buscará dar cuenta del carácter de lo vital para Nietzsche - al pensar a la vida como Wille zur Macht (...) - y Freud - desde su último modelo pulsional - no solo en cuanto a su particularidad, sino en función de lo que resulta en cada caso el límite mismo de la vida - es decir, aquello que marca el pasaje a otra cosa que la vida. ABSTRACT In the present work, we will seek to give a diagrammatic account of the scope and extension of the concept of life in Freud and Nietzsche, by thinking about its limits in terms of poles - vitally unreachable instances, which mark the border from which the ‘beyond ‘of life extends itself. In other words: making use of a diagram, we will seek to account for the character of what is vital for Nietzsche - thinking of life as Wille zur Macht - and Freud - from their latest drive model - not only in terms of their particularity, but rather as a function of what the very limit of life results in each case - it means, that which marks the passage to something other than life. (shrink)

This article examines Nietzsche’s enduring influence on Deleuze by showing how the interpretation advanced in Nietzsche and Philosophy informs Deleuze’s later work with Guattari. I analyse Deleuze’s reading of the will to power as a typology of forces and his interpretation of the Overman as a pinnacle of creative activity with an eye towards demonstrating that these are not merely Deleuzian creations but are also defensible interpretations of Nietzsche; and I suggest how these portions of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche influence (...) his concepts of desiring-production and nomadism, respectively. By analysing Deleuze’s relation to Nietzsche as a longue durée, we can better appreciate how Deleuze’s early reading of Nietzsche is carried forward in his later work. (shrink)

Modules in ethics have become astonishingly popular at the University of the Western Cape. This could reflect students’ concern about morality, but the saying by Lafargue in Tao te ching in the title suggests that moral discourse flourishes when moral behaviour is languishing. This article reflects on some 15 years of teaching ethical theory to third-year students. Three trends are identified: Students’ responses to the theories are unpredictable and surprising. Nietzsche and Kant are very popular, although some modern ‘contextual’ theories (...) draw less support. Students who can be extremely moralistic in class are sometimes amoral in their practices and offhand pronouncements. Students are hampered by their poor conceptual skills and rely excessively on memorising. The last two trends raise questions about our teaching of ethics and the ethics of our teaching. Although many students embrace character-based theories, to some ‘a good character’ apparently means ‘what makes me feel good about myself’ and to others ‘what makes me look good to my group’. Thus, they effectively embrace either individual relativism or group relativism, which is understandable when theories are presented without the backing of at least a rudimentary philosophical anthropology. Questions of indoctrination become acute in the teaching of ethics. Are we, in the name of moral formation, teaching students to parrot current dogmas presented without arguments? If so, our practice may be both morally dubious and counterproductive. The best students rebel against such manipulation. The article calls for more reflection on how and to what ends we teach ethics. (shrink)

The slogans of social movements are often put forward as simple truths, so that advocacy has consisted in changing social conditions such that these new truth claims are accepted as true: that women’s rights are human rights, that Black lives matter. Social movements critical of the political ascendance of Donald Trump, however, have been concerned not merely with this or that truth claim, but with the status—epistemological, social, and political—of truth itself. Those examining this post-truth moment have often turned to (...) Friedrich Nietzsche, who for many is synonymous with the kind of postmodern conception of truth at the center of post-truth politics. However, while it is true that Nietzsche offers valuable... (shrink)

I focus on Nietzsche’s architectural metaphor of self-construction in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche misunderstand his various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving the way for acceptance of a self characterized by fundamental disunity. Nietzsche’s attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is a call to engage in a purposive self-creation under a unifying will, a will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to “the problem that we are”. Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that (...) unity is not a pre-given, however he would disavow their rejection of unity as a goal. Where the postmodernists celebrate “the death of the subject” Nietzsche rejects this valorization of disunity as a form of Nihilism and prescribes the creation of a genuine unified subjectivity to those few capable of such a goal. Post modernists are nearer Nietzsche’s idea of the Last Man than his idea of the Overman. (shrink)