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Bootstrapping and Content Parts

Erkenntnis 64 (3):345-370 (2006)

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  1. What is relative confirmation?David Christensen - 1997 - Noûs 31 (3):370-384.
    It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation (...)
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  • Content & Watkins's account of natural axiomatizations.Ken Gemes - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):85–92.
    This paper briefly recounts the importance of the notion of natural axiomatizations for explicating hypothetico‐deductivism, empirical significance, theoretical reduction, and organic fertility. Problems for the account of natural axiomatizations developed by John Watkins in Science and Scepticism and the revised account developed by Elie Zahar are demonstrated. It is then shown that Watkins's account can be salvaged from various counter‐examples in a principled way by adding the demand that every axiom of a natural axiomatization should be part of the content (...)
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  • A new theory of content I: Basic content. [REVIEW]Ken Gemes - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):595 - 620.
    Philosophers of science as divergent as the inductivist Carnap and the deductivist Popper share the notion that the (logical) content of a proposition is given by its consequence class. I claim that this notion of content is (a) unintuitive and (b) inappropriate for many of the formal needs of philosophers of science. The basic problem is that given this notion of content, for any arbitrary p and q, [(p ∨ q)] will count as part of the content of both p (...)
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  • A new theory of content II: Model theory and some alternatives. [REVIEW]Ken Gemes - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):449-476.
    This paper develops a semantical model - theoretic account of (logical) content complementing the syntactically specified account of content developed in "A New Theory of Content I", JPL 23: 596-620, 1994. Proofs of Completeness are given for both propositional and quantificational languages (without identity). Means for handling a quantificational language with identity are also explored. Finally, this new notion of content is compared, in respect of both logical properties and philosophical applications, to alternative partitions of the standard consequence class relation (...)
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