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  1. Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition.Martin Sticker - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):85-108.
    There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self-deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self-deception and without being influenced by misleading (...)
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  • Kant on thinking for oneself and with others—the ethical a priori, openness and diversity.Martin Sticker - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):949-965.
    Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.
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  • Kant on the Ground of Human Dignity.Apaar Kumar - forthcoming - Kantian Review:1-19.
    Kant interpreters have contrasting views on what Kant takes to be the basis for human dignity. Several commentators have argued that human dignity can be traced back to some feature of human beings. Others contend that humans in themselves lack dignity, but dignity can be attributed to them because the moral law demands respect for humanity. I argue, alternatively, that human dignity in Kant’s system can be seen to be grounded in the reciprocal relationship between the dignity of the moral (...)
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  • Humanity and personality – what, for Kant, is the source of moral normativity?Ido Geiger - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):565-588.
    According to Korsgaard’s very influential interpretation, moral normativity follows from a commonly accepted conception of rational agency, namely, the capacity to set ends and pursue them or humanity. The paper argues that humanity is not the source of moral normativity. Taking the exercise of your freedom in pursuit of your ends to be justified commits you to acknowledging the equal claim of others to see themselves as justified in the pursuit of their ends. This entails the equal restriction of the (...)
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  • How Do We Acquire Moral Knowledge? Is Knowing Our Duty Ever Passive? – Two Questions for Martin Sticker.Ido Geiger - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (5):990-997.
    Martin Sticker's discussion of the common moral agent contains much that I find insightful, true and significant. As a response to his paper, I focus on two important issues that nevertheless separate us: Sticker claims that knowing our duty can be mere passive awareness and that it indeed is passive as awareness of the special status of humanity. I deny that knowing our duty is ever passive. He further claims that the common universalization test is the paradigmatic way active agents (...)
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  • Kant's Singularity Thesis.Robert Vanderbeek - unknown
    In this paper, I defend an interpretation of Kant’s Singularity Thesis: the claim that the formulae of the Categorical Imperative are in fact representations of a single, underlying law. I proceed by answering two questions: How should we state the underlying law? And How can we best understand the relationship between the formulae and this law they supposedly represent? My account focuses on the concept of rational agency and how Kant develops it in the Groundwork. I will argue that the (...)
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