I propose to examine here, at the outset, what I call the asymmetry in Thomas Hobbes's thought between his treatment of civil war and war between states, that is to say, between the departure from the state of nature - when that is a condition prevailing between individuals - and the permanency in the state of nature when it forms a condition existing between states. Secondly, I will address the Kantian progression beyond this asymmetry through the dual introduction of the (...) idea of progress and of ‘cosmo-political’ peace. The attention given in recent years by Habermas to the Kantian idea of perpetual peace [Habermas, 1996], the recent events in Kosovo and Chechnya, and their implications for the shape of an international penal tribunal to judge crimes against humanity, invigorate the questions of civil peace and of rights which transcend state frontiers. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) toplum sözleşmesi teorisinin kurucusu olarak kabul edilen önemli bir siyaset kuramcısıdır. Hobbes’un doğal durumu tanımlaması, toplumun oluşmasındaki nedenleri belirtmesi, yetkiye ve siyasi yükümlülüklere dair fikirleri siyasi düşünce tarihinde dikkat çeker. Düşünür, özellikle yaşadığı yüzyılda monarşiyi güçlendirmek adına siyasal itaati meşrulaştırmanın gerekliliği üzerinde durmuş, dönemin koşullarından dolayı Tanrı fikrini tamamıyle dışlayamamıştır. Bu yüzden toplum sözleşmesi fikrini temellendirdikten sonra ahlaki yasalar ve yükümlülükler aracılığı ile Tanrı kavramını teorisine dahil etmeyi seçmiştir. Bununla birlikte, kendisinden önceki düşünürlerin aksine Tanrı’ya siyasal ve (...) toplumsal düzeni sağlama hususunda ancak ikincil bir görev vermiştir. Tanrı kavramını ve yazılı olmayan kuralların yükümlülüğünü dışlaması, söz konusu dönemde Hobbes’un ateist olduğuna dair tartışmalara yol açsa da, kendisi bunu kabul etmemiştir. Bizim kanaatimiz, Hobbes’un aslında bir ateist olduğu ve Tanrı fikrini sadece toplumun düzenini sağlamak için siyasi bir araç olarak kullandığı yönündedir. Bir başka deyişle, argümanımız; Hobbes’un dini ve Tanrı korkusunu, bireyleri yazılı yasalara uymaları yönünde zorlamak için kullandığı şeklindedir. Bu argümanın haklılığını gösterebilmek için makalemizde Hobbes’un De Cive ve Leviathan kitaplarındaki argümanları analiz edilmiş ve geliştirmiş olduğu kuramda dinin ve Tanrı’nın yeri incelenmiştir.Özet: Thomas Hobbes, İngiltere’de sosyal ve siyasi düzenin tehlike altında olduğu ve egemen gücün meşrulaştırılması gerektiği bir dönem olan onyedinci yüzyılda yaşamıştır. Doğal bilimlerdeki ilerlemeler ve felsefik düşünce yapısındaki değişimler, rasyonaliteyi önemli kılarak, söz konusu dönemde egemenin gücünün ve bireylerin özgür istencinin sorgulanmasına olanak vermiştir. Bu yüzden, Tanrı, din ve siyasi yükümlülükler ile ilgili sorunlar da yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. Hobbes’un esas felsefesi Aristoteles teleolojisini çürütmek ve sonrasında da onu mekanik yaklaşım ile değiştirmekti. Hobbes’un modern doğal bilimlere olan yaklaşımı, siyaset felsefesini de mekanik bir yaklaşımla temellendirmeye itmiştir. Bu sebeple, Tanrı’nın birincil rolünü siyaset felsefesinden çıkarmış, ama bunu yaparken de Tanrı’nın varlığını inkar etmemiştir. Hobbes’un bu makalede tartışılan kitapları; De Cive ve Leviathan’da, bireylerin toplumun önemli parçaları olduğundan ama doğal olarak siyasi birer varlık olmadıklarından bahsedilir. Hobbes’a göre bireyler hayatta kalmak için siyasi bir kurumun altına girmek durumundadırlar. Bir başka deyişle, insanın zayıflığı, siyasi toplumun kurulmasını gerekli kılmıştır. İnsan doğal olarak siyasi bir varlık olmasa dahi, siyasi bir kurum altında yaşamak insan doğasına aykırı bir durum değildir. Hobbes’un üzerinde durduğu temel nokta, sivil toplumun yapay bir ürün olsa dahi bireylerin refahı için gerekli olduğudur. Yazılı yasaların ve bir otoritenin, kısacası zorlayıcı bir gücün olmaması halinde, insanlar tehlike altında olacaktır. Bu koşullar altında, bir kişinin kendisini koruması için ne gerekiyorsa yapacağı şaşırtıcı bir durum değildir. Böylesi bir savaş durumunu engellemek için, kişiler doğal durumdaki sınırsız özgürlüklerini bırakarak, egemen bir gücün altında yaşamayı tercih edeceklerdir. Aslında Hobbes’a göre, insanın güvenliğini sağlayan siyasi toplumun varlığı değil, zorlayıcı bir gücün varlığıdır. Bu güç, insanların barış içerisinde yaşaması için gereken koşuldur. Bir başka deyişle, bireyler önce toplumu oluşturmak için sonra da o toplumun devamlılığını sağlamak için bir güçten korkmalıdırlar. Korku kavramı olmadan Hobbes’un bahsettiği siyasi güce bir temel bulmak zor olacaktır çünkü korku faktörü bireylerin kişisel çıkarları ile toplumsal iyinin karşı karşıya geldiği durumlarda, bireyi korkutarak siyasi güce uymayı zorlayacak ve böylece toplumsal refahı sağlayacaktır. Bu noktada, Hobbes’un kuramına Tanrı kavramı dahil olur. Bu makalede, Hobbes’un kuramında dinin rolü olmadan siyasi yükümlülük kavramının eksik kalacağı tartışılmıştır. Bireyler birbirlerinden korktukları için ve güvenliğe ihtiyaçları oldukları için bir toplumun altında yaşamayı tercih ederler. Hobbes’a göre bu ihtiyaç Tanrı korkusuyla desteklenmelidir. Fakat, Hobbes ne Tanrı korkusunu ne de ahlaki yasaların varlığını doğal durumda kullanmıştır. Bunun yerine, sonrasında siyasi düzen için gerekli olan yükümlülüklere bir temel bulmak için, Tanrı kavramını kullanmayı seçmiştir. Hobbes, burada analiz edilen kitaplarında doğal yasalar, ahlaki yasalar ve ilahi yasalar kavramlarını açıklar. Ona göre, doğal yasalar ahlaki yasalardır ve aynı zamanda ilahi yasalar olarak da adlandırılabilirler. Bu yüzden üçü de aynı görünür ve hepsi de Tanrı tarafından verilir. Tanrı her bireye akıl verdiğinden, herkes bu yasalara akılları aracılığı ile ulaşabilir. Hobbes’un kuramında bu noktaya kadar, sadece sivil toplumda değil, doğal durumda da ahlaki yükümlülüklerin olmasına imkan veriliyordu. Fakat, Hobbes insanların doğal durumda ahlaki bilinçlerinin olmadığını ve ahlaki yasalara uymak zorunda olmadıklarını söyler. Ona göre doğal yasalar, ahlaki yasalar ya da Tanrı’nın yasaları, adına her ne dersek diyelim, yükümlülük yaratan yasalar olmaları için bir sivil otoritenin yaptırımında olması gerekir. Her ne kadar da doğal durumda ahlaki yasaların varlığından söz etse de, söz konusu yasaların insanların toplum altında yaşamaya geçmeden önce yükümlülüğe yol açmadığını da ekler.Doğal yasalar sadece insanları toplum altında birleştirmeye zorlayacak bir güç olması halinde, Tanrı’nın buyrukları olarak zorunluluğa dönüşürler. Bu demektir ki; ahlaki ilkeler siyasi bir güç olmadığı sürece anlamsızdırlar. Hobbes’un felsefesinde aklın buyrukları ve Tanrı’nın yasaları iki farklı kavram olarak ortaya çıkar; bu durum da bizi Hobbes’un aslında Tanrı’ya inanmadığını savunmaya kadar götürebilir. Halbuki, Hobbes’un yükümlülükleri meşrulaştırmak için dinin gücüne ihtiyacı vardır. Bu sebeple, Tanrı’yı bir araç olarak kullanmayı seçmiştir. Böylece, egemenin mutlak gücünü de sınırlamış ve yükümlülükler için de bir temel bulabilmiştir. Bir başka deyişle, Tanrı’nın varlığının dini açıdan meşrulaştırmasını yapmak yerine, egemen gücün eline dini ve Tanrı’yı siyasi ve sosyal düzene ulaşmak için bir araç olarak vermiştir. Hobbes’un göstermeye çalıştığı, Leviathan diye adlandırdığı toplumun bireylerden oluştuğu ve bu bireylerin egemen güce biat etme sebeplerinin, kendilerinin vermiş olduğu rıza ve yetki olduğudur. Kısacası, Hobbes siyaset felsefesinin temeline Tanrı’yı değil, öznelerin özgür iradelerini koyar. Bireyler doğal durumdaki sınırsız özgürlüklerinden feragat ederek bir egemen altında yaşamaya rıza göstermişlerdir, çünkü karşılığında güvenliklerini sağlayacaklardır. Bu anlaşma gereği egemene itaat etmeyi kabul ederler. Böylece siyasal olarak bireyin bağlı bulunduğu yükümlülükler Tanrı kavramı ile sınırlandırılmış olan egemenin gücü ile meşrulaştırılmış olur. Bu makalede, Hobbes’un egemenin mutlak gücünü ilahi irade olan Tanrı ile sınırlandırmış olduğu gösterilir. Aslında Hobbes’un yapmaya çalıştığı, egemenin gücüne mutlakiyet sağlayarak, onu ne dünyevi ne de ilahi bir güce karşı sorumluluk altına sokmaktır. Bunu nasıl başardığı ise bu makalede, Hobbes’un De Cive ve Leviathan kitaplarının analiz edilmesi ile detaylı olarak gösterilmiştir. (shrink)

Public reason accounts commonly claim that exercises of coercive political power must be justified by appeal to reasons accessible to all citizens. Such accounts are vulnerable to the objection that they cannot legitimate coercion to protect basic liberal rights against infringement by deeply illiberal people. This paper first elaborates the distinctive interpersonal conception of justification in public reason accounts in contrast to impersonal forms of justification. I then detail a core dissenter-based objection to public reason based on a worrisome example (...) advanced by Jonathan Quong. While we may be able to impersonally justify coercing the illiberal dissenter, public reason liberals must explain how we can interpersonally justify such coercion—meaning justify given the perspective of the dissenter. The two prominent strategies for dealing with dissenters involve idealization of reasoning and requiring liberal values; I show that these strategies do not succeed in a way compatible with the public reason project. That is, the prominent strategies leave public reason theorists with a dilemma between denying the legitimacy of using coercion to protect core freedoms against deeply illiberal people or abandoning the fundamental public reason project. I conclude by proposing a different answer to public reason liberalism’s fundamental question: what requires justification? On my account, it is not that coercion requires interpersonal justification for its permissibility, but that such justification is necessary as a constitutive element of a kind of moral community. (shrink)

Epicurean contractarianism is an attempt to reconcile individualistic hedonism with a robust account of justice. The pursuit of pleasure and the requirements of justice, however, have seemed to be incompatible to many commentators, both ancient and modern. It is not clear how it is possible to reconcile hedonism with the demands of justice. Furthermore, it is not clear why, even if Epicurean contractarianism is possible, it would be necessary for Epicureans to endorse a social contract. I argue here that Epicurean (...) contractarianism is both possible and necessary once we understand Epicurean practical rationality in a new way. We are left with an appealing version of teleological, individualistic contractarianism that is significantly different from Hobbesian contractarianism. (shrink)

According to Hobbes, individuals care about their relative standing in a way that shapes their social interactions. To model this aspect of Hobbesian psychology, this paper supposes that agents have social preferences, that is, preferences about their comparative resource holdings. Introducing uncertainty regarding the social preferences of others unleashes a process of trust-unravelling, ultimately leading to Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. This Trust-unravelling Model incorporates important features of Hobbes’s argument that past models ignore.

This paper considers contractarianism as a method of justification. The analysis accepts the key tenets of contractarianism: expected utility maximization, unanimity as the criteria of acceptance, and social-scientific uncertainty of modelled agents. In addition to these three features, however, the analysis introduces a fourth feature: a criteria of rational belief formation, viz. Bayesian belief updating. Using a formal model, this paper identifies a decisive objection to contractarian justification. Insofar as contractarian projects approximate the Agreement Model, therefore, they fail to justify (...) their conclusions. Insofar as they fail to approximate the Agreement Model, they must explain which modelling assumption they reject. (shrink)

El propósito del presente trabajo consiste en explicar por qué Hobbes adopta una perspectiva corporativista para dar cuenta de la dinámica social y política que opera al interior del Leviatán. En concreto, intentaremos demostrar cómo el ordenamiento de la sociedad política en sistemas conducidos por representantes le permite a Hobbes establecer ciertas pautas en el desenvolvimiento de los conflictos públicos, fundamentalmente, la asignación de responsabilidades. A su vez, como hipótesis subsidiaria, argüiremos que el rol de la teoría de la representación (...) es central en la medida en que Hobbes no pretende eliminar la disputa política como tal, sino tan sólo deshacerse de su modalidad irregular. (shrink)

The most influential justification of individual property rights is the Propertarian Argument. It is the idea that the institution of private property renders everyone better off, and crucially, even the worst-off members of society. A recent critique of the Argument is that it relies on an anthropologically false hypothesis – the idea, following Thomas Hobbes, that life in the state of nature is one of widespread scarcity and violence to which property rights are a solution. The present article seeks to (...) reformulate this Anthropological Objection in a way that more directly addresses Hobbes’ original argument. It then shows that private property is justified to the extent that it allows anyone to reclaim their free time. (shrink)

In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the anthropological point of departure of his theory of the state by invoking the Delphic injunction ‘Know thyself!’ of which he presents a peculiar reading thereafter. In this paper, I present a reading of the anthropology of the Leviathan that takes this move seriously. In appealing to Delphic injunction, Hobbes wanted to prompt a particular way of reading his anthropology for which it is crucial that the reader relate the presented anthropological (...) views to his self-conception. The anthropology of the Leviathan is thus a kind of manual for a certain kind of self-reflection by which the reader's self-knowledge is to be improved. Furthermore, I will argue that Hobbes' interpretation of the Delphic injunction illuminates several theoretical issues relevant to the epistemology of that kind of ‘self-knowledge’ that was demanded by the Delphic injunction. While Hobbes does not solve all the epistemological problems related with the ideal appealed to by this inscription, he does provide some interesting insights into some general requirements that any epistemological account of Socratic self-knowledge has to meet. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically inquire into some of the interpretations of what appears to me to be the core of Hobbes's political philosophy: his concept of political obligation. And in so doing I will provide a new way of reading the problem of obedience in Hobbes, one that does not dismiss the limits of political obligation and the theological context that surrounds it.

The article investigates the interplay of moral rules in computer simulation. The investigation is based on two situations which are well-known to game theory: the prisoner''s dilemma and the game of Chicken. The prisoner''s dilemma can be taken to represent contractual situations, the game of Chicken represents a competitive situation on the one hand and the provision for a common good on the other. Unlike the rules usually used in game theory, each player knows the other''s strategy. In that way, (...) ever higher levels of reflection are reached reciprocally. Such strategies can be interpreted as moral rules.Artificial morality is related to the discipline of Artificial Life. As in artificial life, the use of genetic algorithms suggests itself. Rules of behaviour split and reunite as chromosome strings do. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine two claims Hobbes makes about obligation in Leviathan:that obligation and 'prudence' (or advantage) are conceptually separate;that fulfilling one's obligations is to one's advantage.My thesis is that Hobbes seeks to reconcile these apparently conflicting claims by arguing that obligation and advantage are empirically identical. He does so, I hold (in contrast to many of his interpreters), without 'reducing' obligation to advantage. That is, he does not hold that people should only keep covenants if doing so is (...) in their self-interest.In section I, I analyse the temporal structure of covenants and distinguish the decision to enter (or not to enter) a covenant from the decision to break or .. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine two claims Hobbes makes about obligation in Leviathan:1) that obligation and ‘prudence’ are conceptually separate;2) that fulfilling one's obligations is to one's advantage.My thesis is that Hobbes seeks to reconcile these apparently conflicting claims by arguing that obligation and advantage are empirically identical. He does so, I hold, without ‘reducing’ obligation to advantage. That is, he does not hold that people should only keep covenants if doing so is in their self-interest.In section I, I analyse (...) the temporal structure of covenants and distinguish the decision to enter a covenant from the decision to break or keep a covenant one has already entered. In section II, I examine Hobbes’ fool. Hobbes tries to refute the fool by putting him right about that which conduces to his ‘conservation, and contentment.’. (shrink)

Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘revisionist’ readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a (...) keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes tells us that he wrote Leviathan to “absolve the divine laws” of the charge that they justify rebellion. This article interprets the argumentative strategy of the second half of Leviathan in light of this intention. Over the course of his three major political works, Hobbes develops a convergent argument to absolve God’s laws. This strategy of judicial rhetoric relies on using multiple independent claims in the hope that one’s audience finds at least one of them persuasive. This was (...) a risky strategy for Hobbes that angered his critics. The strategy also reveals something about what sort of philosopher Hobbes was and how we ought to approach his work. (shrink)

Hobbes’s interpreters have struggled to find a plausible semantics for evaluative language in his writings. I argue that this search is misguided. Hobbes offers neither an account of the reference of evaluative terms nor a theory of the truth-conditions for evaluative statements. Rather, he sees evaluative language simply as having the non-representational function of prescribing actions and practical attitudes, its superficially representational appearance notwithstanding. I marshal the evidence for this prescriptivist reading of Hobbes on evaluative language and show how it (...) sidesteps various textual and philosophical problems that bedevil the traditional interpretations. (shrink)

There is an important but underappreciated ambiguity in Hobbes’ concept of personhood. In one sense, persons are representatives or actors. In the other sense, persons are representees or characters. An estate agent is a person in the first sense; her client is a person in the second. This ambiguity is crucial for understanding Hobbes’ claim that the state is a person. Most scholars follow the first sense of ‘person’, which suggests that the state is a kind of actor – in (...) modern terms, a ‘corporate agent’. I argue that Hobbes’ state is a person only in the second sense: a character rather than an actor. If there are any primitive corporate agents in Hobbes’ political thought, they are representative assemblies, not states or corporations. Contemporary political theorists and philosophers tend to miss what is unique and valuable about Hobbes’ idea of state personality because they project the idea of corporate agency onto it. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...) However, the “state of war” ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist. (shrink)

This article examines changes in the conception of morality and egoism in early modern Europe. It explains that the postulate that human beings were fractious, covetous, and endowed with a strong drive towards self-aggrandizement was associated with Thomas Hobbes, and his writings produced a strong counterflow in the form of assertions and demonstrations of altruism and benevolence as natural endowments of human beings. It suggests that the modern ethical thought has defined itself by its concern with a specific ethical conception (...) whose distinctness from eudaimonist prudential concerns is part of its very idea. (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists have recently turned to game theory and agent-based models to better understand social contract formation. The stag hunt game is an idealization of social contract formation. Using the stag hunt game, we attempt to determine what, if any, barrier diversity is to the formation of an efficient social contract. We uncover a deep connection between tolerance, diversity, and the social contract. We investigate a simple model in which individuals possess salient traits and behave cooperatively when the (...) difference between their trait and the trait of their counterpart is less than their ‘tolerance level’. If traits are fixed and correspond to permanent or semipermanent features of the individual, such as religion or race, social contract formation is a remote possibility. If traits are malleable, social contract formation is possible but comes at the steep cost of diversity and tolerance, that is, individuals are unwilling to cooperate with those much different from themselves. Yet homogeneity and intolerance are not a long-term feature of the population. Over time mutations allow for increasingly tolerant agents to prosper, thereby ushering in trait diversity. In the end, all reap the benefits of cooperation. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem como objetivo tratar do papel da imaginação na filosofia política de Hobbes. Argumentamos que a reflexão de Hobbes sobre a imaginação conduz à distinção fundamental para sua filosofia política entre prudência e razão. A instituição da soberania consiste justamente na superação da dimensão da prudência através da razão. Assim, a filosofia política de Hobbes envolve a substituição de uma esfera de relações de poder, o plano da imaginação, por uma esfera de relações de direito no estado civil, (...) o plano da razão. (shrink)

For all the recent discoveries of behavioral psychology and experimental economics, the spirit of homo economicus still dominates the contemporary disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology. Turning back to the earliest chapters of political economy, however, reveals that pioneering figures such as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and Adam Smith were hardly apostles of economic rationality as they are often portrayed in influential narratives of the development of the social sciences. As we will see, while all three of these thinkers (...) can plausibly be read as endorsing “rationality,” they were also well aware of the systematic irrationality of human conduct, including a remarkable number of the cognitive biases later “discovered” by contemporary behavioral economists. Building on these insights I offer modest suggestions for how these thinkers, properly understood, might carry the behavioral revolution in different directions than those heretofore suggested. (shrink)

According to a common reading of Thomas Hobbes, fear is the most philosophically important passion, responsible for the founding and sustaining of the commonwealth. I argue that this common reading is incorrect by focusing on the necessary and important role of hope in human action as well as in the founding and sustaining of the commonwealth. Life in the Hobbesian commonwealth, on the reading defended in this paper, is less fearful and more hopeful than scholars have noticed.

There is widespread scholarly disagreement whether Hobbesian passions are or involve a type of cognition (i.e., imagination). This largely overlooked disagreement has implications for our understanding of Hobbesian deliberation. If passions are intrinsically cognitive, then, because Hobbesian deliberation is a series of alternating passions, deliberation would appear to be intrinsically cognitive as well. In this paper, I bring to light this overlooked disagreement and argue for a non-cognitive reading of Hobbesian passions, according to which, a passion is an appetite or (...) aversion caused by, but distinct from, an imagination of a future good or harm. (shrink)

Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society. The prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The incentives for reneging are supposedly strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This paper argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position Hobbes does not hold. The context and parameters of the social contract steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. Specifically, in a setting (...) as hostile as the state of nature, Hobbes’s emphasis on self-interest places a premium on survival, and thereby on adaptability, which then promotes progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence. This transforms the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, thus favoring the pursuit of a mutually satisfactory outcome over that of the best personal outcome. The difference not only obviates the prisoner’s dilemma but also better approximates the state of nature while leaving a viable way out. (shrink)

The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.

A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.

Jeremy Gilbert’s new book is an intellectually compelling work which not only provides a detailed and rigorous account of the philosophical, cultural and historical formation of individualism in Western world and its latest developments under the aegis of neoliberal cultural hegemony, but most importantly seeks to envisage viable alternatives to both the hegemonic culture of competitive individualism and to conservative communitarianism.

This article is a reply to Carlo Ginzburg’s Max-Weber Lecture delivered at the European University Institute. The author agrees with Ginzburg in many important points. However, he insists that terror produced by the state cannot be interpreted as the highest degree of the usual fears of ordinary people. It is not even identical with the simple death fear.