Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Privacy and the Standing to Hold Responsible.Linda Radzik - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-22.
    In order to be held responsible, it is not enough that you’ve done something blameworthy, someone else must also have the standing to hold you responsible. But a number of critics have claimed that this concept of ‘standing’ doesn’t hold up to scrutiny and that we should excise it from our analyses of accountability practices. In this paper, I examine James Edwards’ (2019) attempt to define standing. I pose objections to some key features of Edwards’ account and defend an alternative. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
  • Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.
    Do privacy rights restrict what is permissible to infer about others based on statistical evidence? This paper replies affirmatively by defending the following symmetry: there is not necessarily a morally relevant difference between directly appropriating people’s private information—say, by using an X-ray device on their private safes—and using predictive technologies to infer the same content, at least in cases where the evidence has a roughly similar probative value. This conclusion is of theoretical interest because a comprehensive justification of the thought (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Digital Self-Defence: Why you Ought to Preserve Your Privacy for the Sake of Wrongdoers.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):233-248.
    Most studies on the ethics of privacy focus on what others ought to do to accommodate our interest in privacy. I focus on a related but distinct question that has attracted less attention in the literature: When, if ever, does morality require us to safeguard our own privacy? While we often have prudential reasons for safeguarding our privacy, we are also, at least sometimes, morally required to do so. I argue that we, sometimes, ought to safeguard our privacy for the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Privacy.Judith DeCew - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.