Cicero once stressed as the first law of history that “the historian must not dare to tell any falsehood.” This precept entails a minimal ethical requirement that remains unscathed by the whirlpools of epistemic relativism that have called many other aspects of professional historians’ practice into question in the last century or so. No commendable scholar seems willing to invalidate Cicero’s first law, and dependable scholarship—whether relying on objectivity-friendly or objectivity-hostile theoretical assumptions—follows shared standards of integrity and accuracy with which (...) someone from Cicero’s time, for instance, would never be able to comply. In this essay, I suggest that those two circumstances should dispose us more favorably toward a refreshed notion of historical objectivity pointing not only to epistemology but also to professional ethics. I address the condemnation of lying and, more generally, historians’ commitment to sincerity as a way to highlight the ethical dimension of history writing. By focusing on the deep but underexplored moral roots of objectivity, I argue that this concept is still very useful as both an analytical tool and a normative ideal. Objectivity, in the sense I underline here, does not stand in opposition to subjectivity—on the contrary, it is actually tied up with subjective dispositions, virtues, and skills that help shape responsible historiography. (shrink)

This manuscript contributes to a future definition of objectivity by bringing together recent statements in epistemology and methodology. It outlines how improved objectivity can be achieved by systematically incorporating multiple perspectives, thereby improving the validity of science. The more result-biasing perspectives are known, the more a phenomenon of interest can be disentangled from these perspectives. Approaches that call for the integration of perspective into objectivity at the epistemological level or that systematically incorporate different perspectives at the statistical level already exist (...) and are brought together in the manuscript. Recent developments in research methodology, such as transparency, reproducibility of research processes, pre-registration of studies, or free access to raw data, analysis strategies, and syntax, promote the explication of perspectives because they make the entire research process visible. How the explication of perspectives can be done practically is outlined in the manuscript. As a result, future research programs can be organized in such a way that meta-analyses and meta-meta-analyses can be conducted not only backward but forward and prospectively as a regular and thus well-prepared part of objectification and validation processes. (shrink)

Resumen: El propósito de este artículo consiste en responder afirmativamente a la pregunta por la posibilidad de la objetividad en las ciencias humanas. Se comienza planteando que, pese a su aparente anacronismo, la discusión sobre la objetividad se torna vigente frente al desafío que plantea a la epistemología la noción de posverdad. Posteriormente, se reconstruyen algunas versiones de objetividad presentes en la literatura. A continuación, se exponen y discuten algunas posturas respecto a la posibilidad de la objetividad en las ciencias (...) humanas y se evalúa no solo su consistencia, sino también las consecuencias que estas tienen para las ciencias humanas. Finalmente, se proponen algunas ideas para la constitución de un concepto plausible de objetividad para las ciencias humanas. Se espera que este trabajo abra rutas para la exploración sistemática de un programa de epistemología de las ciencias humanas comprometido con un marco realista de investigación.: This paper aims to answer affirmatively the question about the possibility of objectivity in the human sciences. I firstly claim that, though their seemly anachronism, the discussion on objectivity is valid in front of the challenge that puts the notion of post-truth to epistemology. Then, I reconstruct some views about objectivity from the literature. Next, I show and discuss some views about the possibility of the objectivity in the human sciences and I assess both their consistency as the consequences that they have to the human sciences. Finally, I propose some ideas for the constitution of a plausible concept of objectivity for the human sciences. I hope this paper open routes to the systematic exploration of an epistemological program for the human sciences committed with a realistic framework of research. (shrink)