Switch to: References

Citations of:

Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?

& (eds.)
Cambridge University Press (2012)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82.
    Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-reflective self-awareness is the basis of our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):702-714.
    In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument either. The discussion of this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • There is nothing to identity.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7321-7337.
    Several have denied that there is, specifically, a criterion of identity for persons and some deny that there are, for any kind, diachronic criteria of identity. I argue, however, that there are no criteria of identity, either synchronic or diachronic, for any kind whatsoever. I begin by elaborating the notion of a criterion of identity in order to clarify what exactly is being denied when I maintain there are none. I examine the motivation of those who qualify in some way (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • La nature individuelle non-descriptive des êtres conscients.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2014 - Repha 8:11-33. Translated by Samir Blakaj.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • ¿Hemos respondido la pregunta "¿Puede pensar una máquina?"?Gonzalez Rodrigo - 2019 - In Discusiones Fundamentales en Filosofía de la Mente: Voces Locales. Valparaíso: Universidad de Valparaíso. pp. 71-95.
    Este trabajo examina si la pregunta “¿puede pensar una máquina?” ha sido respondida de manera satisfactoria. La primera sección, justamente, examina el dictum cartesiano según el cual una máquina no puede pensar en principio. La segunda trata sobre una rebelión en contra de Descartes, encabezada por Babbage. A su vez, la tercera describe una segunda rebelión encabezada por Turing. En ambas se examina, primero el lenguaje mentalista/instrumentalista para describir a una máquina programada y segundo, el reemplazo de la pregunta por (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•